And what about an "absolute" acquittal? Justice Zamir says about this (ibid., at p. 497):
... A rule to say that a clear and absolute acquittal of guilt justifies, in any event, payment of expenses and compensation under section 80, would violate, in my opinion, the spirit of the section: it would prevent the court from taking into account other circumstances, as required by the section, which may negate the right to expenses and compensation in a particular case, even if
ended in a clear and complete acquittal. Indeed, Justices Barak and Beisky explicitly refrained from establishing such a rule [in the Sabah case [15], at p. 660].
- This question of the nature of the acquittal as a consideration for awarding costs and compensation to the defendant came up for discussion in the Anonymous [22]. In the same matter, a house is required-The trial on the issue of the complainant's obligation to pay expenses and compensation to a defendant who was acquitted of a charge of rape, and our friend said about this Justice A. Goldberg (with the consent of Vice-President Justice S. Levin and the judge Dorner; Name, p. 711):
Three preliminary conditions for the establishment of the court's authority to obligate the complainant to pay the defendant's defense expenses: The first condition, and the obvious one, is the acquittal of the accused...
The first condition speaks of the acquittal of the defendant. After an acquittal of any kind and for any reason whatsoever, the defendant is considered innocent. As it was stated [in the Reich case [8] , at p. 491:
"... What do I have if I am acquitted because of doubt, and what do I have if I am acquitted of a clear and absolute acquittal? In each of the cases, after acquittal, the defendant returns to the 'status' of an innocent person who has been prosecuted."
However, not every acquittal for any reason gives the court the authority to award the costs of his defense to the complainant. The acquittal to which section 81(a) of the Penal Law refers is the so-called "absolute acquittal". Neither acquittal due to doubt, nor even acquittal based entirely on procedural reasons, grants the authority in section 81(a) of the Penal Law. These acquittals are indeed acquittals for all intents and purposes, but this does not detract from the conclusion that they do not stem from a baseless complaint. In acquittal due to doubt, the court is not convinced: