"... that evidence was brought before him that leaves no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. In such a case, the court does not rule that the defendant did not commit the offense, but only that his guilt has not been proven. Such an acquittal in itself does not render the injury [to the defendant – A.C.] as a result of the criminal proceeding unnecessary, since its end testifies to its beginning, because from a public standpoint it was necessary to exist" (Criminal Appeal 7826/96 [Reich Case [8] – M. H.], at p. 492).
The condition of acquittal of a defendant is identical in the provision of section 81(a) of the Penal Law – with respect to the obligation of a complainant against a defendant who is acquitted – and in section 80(a) of the law, and hence the words of Justice A. Goldberg are directly relevant to our case. Indeed, it can be argued that there is a difference between the provisions of sections 80 and 81 of the Penal Law; that the acquittal of a defendant as provided in section 80 also includes acquittal from the doubt, and that in certain circumstances it will also be possible to acquit such an acquittal in order to confer grounds for receiving indemnification and compensation from the state, at least partially. However, we will not agree that the type and nature of the acquittal do not constitute a consideration tothe detriment of the court if it rules and if it does not award indemnity and compensation to the defendant who has been acquitted. See also the words of Justice A. Goldberg in the Reich case [8], at pp. 492-493.
- In Parashat Macmillan [18] A heavy battle was waged around the question of what effect a "complete" acquittal would have on a defendant's right to receive indemnity and compensation from the state. The majority opinion (Judge Dorner And the Judge Englard) was held that an absolute acquittal justifies, in principle, the indemnification and compensation of the defendant. In the words of Judge Dorner (Name, p. 303):
... I am of the opinion that a complete acquittal of the charge – as distinct from an acquittal due to doubt – justifies, as a rule, payment of defense expenses to the defendant, as well as compensation due to arrest or imprisonment.