Later on (ibid. [18]):
... The rule, according to which the state must bear the defense expenses and compensation for the arrest or imprisonment of a defendant who has been acquitted of an absolute acquittal, is necessitated by the proper interpretation of section 80(a) of the Penal Law in light of the provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation.
And more (ibid., at p. 304):
... As a rule, denying defendants the right to pay defense expenses and compensation in the event of an absolute acquittal – that is, when it turns out in retrospect that their accusation had no basis, since they did not commit the offenses for which they were accused – is unlawful. This is because refraining from paying expenses and compensation to such defendants harms them to a greater extent than is necessary... Refraining from paying expenses and compensation even to defendants who have been acquitted completely – a situation that experience shows is not common... Nose
may encourage the prosecution's excessive eagerness to continue conducting trials even after it has found out, or has the power to clarify, that they will end in a complete acquittal.
Indeed, as Justice Dorner states, there are exceptions to the rule (ibid., at p. 305):
... The proposed rule, according to which the court will award costs and compensation to defendants who are determined that they did not commit the offenses attributed to them, is not absolute. There may be situations, in the spirit of those mentioned in the English guidelines discussed above [Guidelines 1973 – M. 8], in which no costs or compensation will be awarded even to defendants who have been acquitted outright, or the amount of expenses and compensation awarded will be reduced. Thus, for example, expenses or compensation may be denied to defendants who were determined to have given false testimony, or to those who refrained from giving their version or evidence that they had to acquit them in advance.