However, there is no need for us to express our opinion on this application of the appellant. The reason for this is that the appellant did not ask at all to invite the complainant to participate in the hearing. Indeed, the complainant was not invited at all to argue her arguments before the trial court on the subject of her obligation to pay the appellant, and in any event, there was no prerequisite for her being charged with expenses. See and compare High Court of Justice 17/57 Cohen v. Chairman of the Execution Authority, Tel Aviv-Yafo [31], at p. 1086. We therefore reject the appellant's appeal against the complainant's non-obligation to indemnify and compensate him.
As to the state's obligation to compensate and indemnify
- The appellant, according to him, bore no damages-Few. According to the documents, he was detained for seventy days. He was also prevented from working for an additional forty-seven days, during which he was under full house arrest. The appellant presented receipts for expenses in the sum of approximately NIS 81,000- NIS. The main question is whether the appellant was able to prove one of the two grounds enumerated In section 80(a) The Penal Law has grounds that have been proven to give the acquitted defendant a cause of action against the state for payment of his expenses and compensation for his arrest. Let us go over the two grounds, one by one, in their order.
With regard to the cause of action that there was no basis for the accusation
- The first ground for compensation and indemnification from the state exists where "... []The court saw that there was no basis for the accusation..." The ground, as formulated in the law, turned the evidence material as collected into the police file to the submission of a reporter-The indictment. Indeed, the statement "there was no basis for the accusation" is a statement of-The reason is if it is a matter of consideration-His opinion – more precisely: in consideration-The Faulty Opinion of the Person Who Decided to Submit a Reporter-Indictment-According to missing evidence that was collected into the police file. This is also how the cause of action was interpreted in halakha, and rightly so. See paragraph 16 above.
A reading of the decision of the trial court may lead a reader to the conclusion that the court is required to refer to the evidence that came before it – after the fact – and not to the evidence that was collected in the police file prior to the filing of the indictment. However, this impression, it seems to me, is a mistaken impression. Admittedly, in its decision the court speaks of the evidence that came before it, but it was not difficult to understand that it was referring to the evidence that was in front of the prosecution until it was decided to file an indictment against the appellant. Indeed, how did the court know what evidence was before the prosecutor before the indictment was filed? You too