It is said: The court knew about the police file on the basis of the evidence presented to it – evidence that originated in the police file – and this is what the trial court did.
- The same applies to the merits of the matter, which in our opinion the appellant has not been able to prove the existence of the first ground. As we have seen (above, in paragraphs 16 and 17-) Several formulas have been established in the halakha for the existence of the first ground, and it seems to us that the appellant's case does not come up in any of those formulas. Thus, for example, the formula according to which the question must be answered "whether the investigative material that was before the prosecution is transferred to the filing of a-The indictment would have given the prosecutor a reasonable expectation that there was prima facie evidence to substantiate the conviction." Joseph and a Pimp [1], p. 519). This is also the case with the other formulas that have been proposed-They are. Indeed, the basis of the facts that was in front of the prosecution's eyes is transferred to the filing of a report-The indictment, this was a proper basis of fact for the filing of a reporter-Indictment. In this regard, it should be remembered that the offense as described by the complainant was committed in a closed vehicle and without any witnesses to the act. The prosecution's version relied mainly on the complainant's credibility, and the complainant was consistent in her version and no reason was found to doubt her words. The complainant's claim that she became pregnant was also prima facie proof in the doctor's examination that took place on the day the complaint was filed. The same is true of the indirect evidence that was before the prosecution's eyes, including the evidence – at the time of filing a statement-The indictment is that on the day of the incident, the appellant was working on the Jerusalem line-Home-Sun.
- The decision to prosecute the appellant was a reasonable decision, it was certainly a distant decision-The wording of the law according to which a defendant will be acquitted-He is entitled to indemnification and compensation only where "there was no basis for the accusation". There was a basis for the accusation-Also-was, and the first cause is not available to the appellant.
The existence of other circumstances that justify indemnification and compensation
- The question that is asked within the scope of the second cause is whether they were proven to the house-The phrase "other circumstances that justify" the state's obligation to indemnify and compensate. Home-The trial court answered this question in the negative, and the question that presents itself before us is whether proof of our satisfaction is grounds for intervening in his decision. As we have said elsewhere (see above, paragraph 54), we will not rush to intervene in the consideration-The Opinion of a House-The sentence before the hearing, but we will not hesitate to intervene if it is proven to our satisfaction that there was a legal error in the decision before us. The question that arises, therefore, is this: Was there a legal error in the decision of a house?-First Instance?
- In his decision, the House-trial court that "we were not impressed that the defendant's version as he presented it both in the police and at home-The trial is a true version...", and continued: "The evidence brought by the defendant regarding the alibi claim does not necessarily negate the complainant's version that the defendant committed the act described in the indictment, but only casts doubt on the fact that the act was committed on the date stated." These statements create a barrier and gap between the issue of the acquittal or conviction of a defendant and the issue of the state's obligation to indemnify and compensate; that a defendant may be acquitted, but for the purpose of indemnification and compensation, he will be regarded as a kind of-Legally obligated. The question is whether this dichotomy of conviction-Acquittal of this and compensation-Indemnification of this is a legitimate dichotomy.
- The claimant will argue that this dichotomy is illegitimate. When a defendant was acquitted, all the trial proceedings were swallowed up and assimilated into the same acquittal. Since we know this, we will add and know these two: one, that the prosecution is not entitled and permitted to rely its claim on the denial of indemnity and compensation on evidence brought in the criminal proceeding itself, and two, that there is no home-The court may base its decision on the trust it placed in this or that version that was raised on behalf of the defendant. The acquittal verdict lifts a blank slate on the criminal proceeding, and once the curtain is lowered, a recount begins. The meaning of this argument is, in fact, that an argument that relies on evidence that arose in the criminal proceeding is essentially an invalid argument in that it contains, inter alia, the presumption of innocence, i.e., the same presumption that the defendant has in a criminal trial throughout the criminal proceeding and becomes an absolute presumption upon acquittal. See and compare Parashat Sekanina [35], above. It should be noted that the supporters of this version do not claim that evidence from the criminal proceeding is inadmissible evidence, only as evidence is from the criminal proceeding. Thus, for example, they will agree that where the defendant raised his behavior-If he suspects himself, or behaves in a manner that justifies the imposition of the risk on him, his right to compensation and indemnification can be denied, partially or completely. However, they will further argue that this evidence is legitimate evidence, since it does not concern the guilt or absence of guilt of the accused. Thus, with regard to events "external" to the question of guilt, this is not the case with evidence that concerns the guilt of a defendant on the merits.
Those who argue against this will say: with regard to the obligation of the state to indemnify and compensate, there will be no evidence that is involved in the trial, and which is not proper evidence – on the threshold of the hearing – to come into the cauldron of considerations. Any evidence will be justified and accepted, provided that it itself is responsible for the circumstances that may justify – or not justify – the obligation of the state to compensate and indemnify the accused. Indeed, this is what these claimants will argue and will say, as the provision of section 80(a) of the Penal Law, the acquittal of a defendant in compensation and indemnity is not sufficient for him to be acquitted in his case, since acquittal in law is a prerequisite, but it is not a sufficient condition for ruling on indemnity and compensation; he is obligated to add