and to point to circumstances that justify awarding compensation and indemnification in his favor, and what is the reason in the law or reason for the logical reason to be found for the production of evidence submitted in a trial outside the camp? He further argues and argues: The principle of binary, which governs the criminal proceeding, is not a ruler in a proceeding that deals with compensation and indemnification. And why should we prevent the court from giving weight to the evidence presented in the trial, if only so that it would have an impact on the degree of compensation and indemnity?
- When I am myself, I share the latter claimants. In my opinion, and in principle, there is no evidence from the trial that we reject it out of hand as evidence that is not worthy of consideration-The Opinion of a House-The law at the time of deciding the question of indemnification and compensation, and I have not found either justice or a basis in the law to exclude-Outside-Evidence brought to the camp in front of a house-Trial during the criminal proceeding. The indemnification and compensation process is different from the criminal proceeding, and the considerations that determine it are different from the considerations of the criminal proceeding. Thus, for example, it is possible that the Public Prosecution has not been able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the defendant in order to imprison him in a prison-When possible, there were no circumstances that "justified" his acquittal of compensation and indemnity. If this is the case, what justice will we find in acquitting him of compensation and indemnity?
- And having said all that we have said, the last and decisive question presents itself before us: Were there circumstances in the appellant's case that justify that we should provide him with compensation and indemnification – in both remedies or in one of them? Everyone will agree that the appellant met the prerequisites for obtaining compensation and indemnity: first, he was acquitted of his sentence, and secondly, he sat in detention for seventy days and even bore financial expenses, as it stands to reason. However, these prerequisites are necessary conditions and are not sufficient conditions. A debtor is a person who is found entitled in his law to prove circumstances that justify that he will be entitled to the relief of compensation and indemnity, and the question that is asked is whether the appellant has met this burden.
- It is not an act that every day that the prosecution retracts an accusation that it filed in the house-The law, and it adds and asks, it is from the-The trial, as required, is that the defendant will be acquitted. The question that arises in any case is what is the reason for the prosecution to act as it did. In order to crack this question, we do not need to conduct in-depth research, and the prosecution lays out the curtain before us, and the reasons for its act are clearly apparent to us. It turns out – so the state reports to us – that there was a gap between the body of evidence that was in front of the prosecution and the submission of a reporter-The indictment and the body of evidence that was discovered after the conclusion of the prosecution and defense affairs. This gap is found for the state, according to its version, as an inconsequential gap-for mediation, and mainly: the body of evidence that was discovered at the end of the trial did not justify it,
Thus the state argued that the state would insist on convicting the appellant. See statements from the State in paragraphs 70 and 71 above.
- The accumulation of several factors has led the country to a change of front, and these are the main points. First of all, on the subject of the alibi claim raised by the appellant. While at the beginning of the trial it was clear to the prosecution – and reasonably – that the alibi claim claimed by the appellant was dependent on containment, during the trial it became clear (according to the state) that "the alibi... became more and more established... [and] the witnesses who testified at the last meeting reiterated their support for him..."
Second, the absence of the pregnancy test that the complainant claimed. As may be recalled, the appellant was prosecuted for committing an offense as defined in section 345(b)(3) of the Penal Law, i.e., rape "while causing ... Pregnancy." At the time of filing the indictment, the prosecution had a medical opinion written based on the complainant's examination at the time of filing her complaint of rape, according to which the complainant had "most likely undergone a complete and early abortion." This opinion was written after the complainant had an abortion, according to her, but the doctor who examined her, according to her, while she was pregnant was not present, and in any case did not give a "real-time" opinion. This deficiency intensified and intensified, arousing a great difficulty in the heart of the claim, and as the state explained before us, the same difficulty "ostensibly affected the credibility of the complainant".