In the Yassin case cited above, it was held, inter alia, in paragraph 49 of the judgment as follows:
"In the unique case before us, the factual sequence of events at those moments was not clarified accurately. It was determined that the stabbing occurred in connection with some contact made by the respondent in his attempt to take the deceased's mobile phone. Even if this contact is not referred to as a "struggle," as the minority opinion states, it is not clear whether the location of the stabbing was deliberate, so that it can be clearly inferred from it about a desire to kill the deceased... This is in contrast to cases in which, alongside a factual determination as to the location of the stabbing, there is an evidentiary basis that indicates that the defendant aimed at that sensitive and vulnerable stabbing site."
- It was further held in the Yassin case, inter alia, at p. 26 of the judgment, as follows:
"... It was also determined that the knife was in the possession of the respondent at the time of the incident in connection with these training exercises (ibid.). In other words, we do not have before us a case in which a defendant chose one means of death in an intelligent manner from which it is clear that there is a concrete desire to kill a person."
- See also Appeal 25822-09-24 Sharon Sanker v. State of Israel (September 2, 2025), where the Supreme Court ruled in the context of the mental element between the offense of murder with indifference and negligent homicide and held, inter alia, as follows (paragraph 27 of the judgment):
"The deceased turned around, and the appellant fled the scene, without showing even a slight interest in the situation of the victim of his stabbing... In these circumstances, it must be concluded that there was one for the appellant if the deceased died, or not; The hope of preventing the fatal outcome, as required for frivolous attitudes, was not expressed in his actions."
- Yes they saw Criminal Appeal 320/23 David Ashta v. State of Israel (May 11, 2025), where it was determined, in paragraph 3 of the judgment, inter alia, as follows:
"At the end of an evidentiary proceeding, the District Court ruled that the mental element in which the murder offense was committed was indifference and not intention. It was held that when it was found that "the defendant's positive desire... "only" to severely injure the deceased, and not necessarily to kill him, undertakes to determine that the defendant was of equal mind and indifferent to the possibility of causing the fatal result and the death of the stabbing victim... At the same time, it was emphasized that there is no reason to attribute to the appellant a mental element of frivolity, since his conduct is inconsistent with the hope of succeeding in preventing the fatal outcome."