"Investigator No. 1, Gil Alon: But in the end, in the end, it's a corpse, there's nothing
Interrogated, Dennis Daniel Mukin: He deserves it."
I will also refer even more strongly to the defendant's words, later in the interrogation, according to which "he who rises up to kill you, he rises up to kill him" (P/2B, p. 9, s. 4), and to his other outrageous statements, which are many, regarding the lack of expression of remorse for his actions, which, in my opinion, indicate the existence of the element of intention in the defendant at the time of the murder.
- In the circumstances of the case, there is also room to give weight to the defendant's countless lies, beginning shortly after the incident, when he claimed to his sister and the Chief of Police of Gan Ner that he had given the deceased two shots (when in fact he had shot many more), through his interrogations and ending with significant parts of the legal process, when he claimed that two bullets had been accidentally discharged, a claim that was rejected at the end of the day. All of these testify to the defendant's state of mind as well as his actions in the seconds after the shooting – when he left the scene, after approaching the deceased after his collapse and falling to the ground, he turned his gaze to him and immediately afterwards approached his car and left the scene without worrying about the deceased's well-being and even without calling medical forces to help the deceased. As appears from the evidence material, including the defendant's own version, all the defendant had in mind at that stage was to bring his sister Kristina back to the scene with him, who would inform the police that she, and not the defendant, was driving the car at the time of the incident. All of these fulfill the rule of "its end that indicates its beginning" and strengthen the argument that at the time of the incident the defendant intended the consequences of his actions.
- It should be noted that I did not find in the defendant's conduct that at the beginning of the incident, when he got out of his car with a pistol in his hand, approached the deceased and fired several bullets in the air (as opposed to direct fire in the direction of the deceased), in order to erode the presumption of intent in our case. In the circumstances of the case, I was convinced that the intention to kill the deceased was formulated by the defendant in the blink of an eye, spontaneously and in the heat of the moment. Therefore, and rightly so, the accuser claimed in her written summaries that the defendant "warmed up" during the incident, and in light of this, in the indictment filed by her, the accuser attributed to the defendant the commission of the basic murder offense and it was not claimed that the murder was committed under aggravated circumstances of planning or a significant process of formulating a decision to kill. Indeed, as stated, the facts of the case lead to the conclusion that the mental element that existed in the defendant, taking into account all of the above, is one of "spontaneous" intent; Ordinary intention, there is no weighing, but there is a convergence of the formation of the idea; the final decision to execute; and the execution itself.
- It should be recalled that according to the Supreme Court's ruling, the length of time preceding the thought is of no importance. It was held that the decision to kill can be formulated in the blink of an eye, following some occurrence close to the fatal act itself and may be formulated during the fatal event itself. It was enough for a short period of time for the murderer to anticipate the results of his actions and aspired to achieve them (Criminal Appeal 7090/15 Khalifa v. State of Israel [Published in Nevo] (25 August 2016). It was further determined, regarding the decision to kill, that "Sometimes it is woven and crystallized over time, layer upon layer, until the intention is realized in the act of causing death, and sometimes it is crystallized in the blink of an eye, due to an occurrence or state of mind that came into being close to the act itself." (Criminal Appeal 512/89 Daniels v. State of IsraelIsrSC 45 (2) 496, 503); "The only test for its existence lies in the question of whether, even in a very short period of time, the person who kills has indeed foreseen the results of his actions and wishes to fulfill his intention." (Criminal Appeal 7520-02 Raed Hamati v. State of IsraelIsrSC 58(2) 710, at p. 716).
- Thus, the presumption of intention remains. The defendant, whose version was claimed in his testimony that the deceased lost his life as a result of a bullet fired at him accidentally, did not argue for a reasonable alternative conclusion and to a large extent, due to the line of defense he chose, as aforesaid, he did not present any evidence, let alone weighty evidence, which could contradict the presumption of intent.
- Therefore, I am of the opinion that it should be determined that the defendant acted with an objective mental element of intent, and I propose that he be convicted of committing basic murder with intent, alongside the other offenses, as attributed to him in the indictment.
| Osila Abu-Assad, Judge |
President Esther Hellman, Presiding Judge