Caselaw

Criminal Appeal (Be’er Sheva) 7182/98 Shmukler et al. v. State of Israel – Ashkelon Municipality Vice President Y. Pepper - part 34

October 27, 1999
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"The constitutional projection coming from the Basic Law affects all parts of Israeli law.  It necessarily affects the old law as well.  True, the old law has been preserved.  The intensity of the projection of the Basic Law against it is, therefore, less powerful than the intensity of the projection of the new law.  The latter may be revoked if it contravenes the provisions of the Basic Law.  The old law is protected against annulment.  He has a constitutional umbrella that protects him.  But the old law is not protected from a new exegetical approach as to its meaning...  There is no possibility of distinguishing between an old law and a new law with regard to the interpretive effects of the Basic Law.  Indeed, any administrative discretion granted under the old law must be exercised in the spirit of the Basic Laws: any judicial discretion granted under the old law must be exercised in the spirit of the Basic Laws: and in general, every legislative norm must be interpreted in the spirit of the Basic Laws" (see also the similar opinion of the Honorable Justice Dorner in the case of the High Court of Justice 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense et al. [18],  at p. 138).

  1. Indeed, the Basic Laws have left their mark on everything in the legal world. In my humble opinion, it is difficult for us today to even appreciate the intensity of the revolution that took place and its scope.  The real historical revolution is an ideological revolution.  A revolution that makes a person look at the world in a different way, in a different way and in a new way.

It seems to me that in this sense it is difficult to disagree with the conclusion that from a factual point of view, the constitutional revolution is indeed a revolution.

However, like any revolution and any historical process, it consists of stages.  The first stage is the recognition of the change, the legitimacy of the change.  Internalizing the Basic Laws not as an additional law, but as a broad way of thinking about the Basic Laws.  The second stage is the implementation of the change.  This application requires not only a process of internalization, which by its nature is a subjective process, but also a process of setting objective rules, determining distinctions between different situations in the law.  This stage recognizes the importance and power of the Basic Laws, and it is precisely because of this that the court is forced to enter into the difficult and individual task of adjusting the scope of its power to different situations.  An example of this is the constitutional system in the United States, in which very clear rules have been developed by the rulings of the Supreme Court there, regarding the scope of criticism according to the nature of the right that is the subject of the constitutional proceeding.  For example, a claim of discrimination on the basis of race is examined with a closer scrutiny than a claim of economic harm.

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