And back to our matter, regarding the spirit of interpretation of the Basic Laws that blows on the old law of the Enabling Law.
It is not enough to establish that the Enabling Law permits the prohibition of the sale of pigs in all city limits. After all, even the Criminal Law, before the new Arrests Law was enacted , allowed the detention of a defendant until the end of the proceedings. This did not prevent the Supreme Court from examining the exercise of this discretion even within the framework of the principle of preservation of the laws (see the Ganimat case [13]). The same is true of the regulation regarding the imposition of temporary foreclosure in a civil proceeding prior to the enactment of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. The power to impose foreclosure did not prevent the court from considering the means of exercising this discretion and even to rule that it should be exercised in a different manner (see Miscellaneous Applications 4459/94, 4475 Salamonov et al. v. Sharabani et al. [19]).
However, we must ask whether things are completely similar. Is it possible to distinguish between different laws and to apply the interpretation in accordance with the spirit of the Basic Laws in a different way? In our case, and as noted and will be clarified below, the law is clear. The municipality is authorized to impose a sweeping ban on the sale of pork. Therefore, the task of interpretation, if possible, will focus on the possibility of limiting the municipality's discretion to order a sweeping prohibition. In my opinion, a number of objective tests can be used as a basis for distinguishing between our case and other cases.
- (a) Language of the Law:
The language of the Accreditation Law is clear. It authorizes a municipality to prohibit a sweeping prohibition in all its areas. The rule is that "the power of coercion, not only must it be determined in primary legislation, but its determination must be stated in a specific and explicit manner, and at the very least, the legislation is obligatory, as it is explicitly required" (the Honorable Justice Or in the Mitral case [10]). The constitutional history cited above contributed to this situation.