Caselaw

Civil Appeal 4628/93 State of Israel v. Apropim Housing and Development (1991) Ltd. IsrSC 49(2) 265 - part 19

June 4, 1995
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In this regard, the words of President Shamgar are appropriate in Other Municipality Applications 327/85 Kugler v. Israel Lands Administration [12], at p . 102:

"The interpretive guideline formulated in the case law of this court is therefore that where one encounters difficulty in the understanding or implementation of a provision of a contract, one must, first of all, examine the entire contract in order to learn about the purpose and purpose underlying it, and then return to the hardened provision and give it the meaning, which will be consistent with the main points of the contract that were previously identified."

  1. In my view, both the reading of the clause in question as part of the context in which it appears and its reading as part of the contract in its entirety, and in light of the purpose of the contract, its spirit and the background to its conclusion, require that it be interpreted as imposing a sanction for delay in completing construction in respect of projects of the second type. Let me clarify: the system of "sanctions" set forth in clauses 6(g) and 6(h) of the program contract should be viewed as a whole, and clause 6(h)(3) should be interpreted as part of it. This system is divided into "sanctions" for delay in completing the construction and "sanctions" for delay in submitting the application for the fulfillment of the undertaking.

Sections 6(h)(1) and 6(h)(2) deal with the delay in submitting the application for realization and speak in general about the two types of projects.  One restricts the payment of interest only until the end of the execution period (even when the realization request was submitted afterwards), the other stipulates a reduction of 2% per month from the price of the apartment, when the application is submitted more than a year and a half after the end of the execution period.

On the other hand, section 6(g) deals with delays in the execution of construction and relates only to projects of the first type, while section 6(h)(3), which explicitly relates only to projects of the second type, is indeed worded in a manner similar to sections 6(h)(1) and 6(h)(2), and ostensibly, according to its language, also deals with the delay in filing the application for realization.  However, if we interpret it this way, we will reach a result that is illogical, since a situation of "double sanctions" will be created with respect to projects of the second type in cases of delay in submitting the application for realization, and the absence of any sanction for delay in the execution of construction with respect to these projects.

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