There is no doubt that this is not what the parties intended to do.
The rule is that:
"...The words in the contract should be interpreted in such a way as to avoid an absurd consequence or to impose on a party to the contract an obligation, which it would be unreasonable to assume that he undertook ... " (Civil Appeal 46/74 [10], supra, at p. 482).
Prof. Barak, in his book Interpretation in Law, Volume 1, The Theory of General Interpretation (Nevo, 1992), explains at p. 328 that literal interpretation sometimes leads to a sharp and clear meaning, and yet the result can be absurd and unacceptable. In such a case, Prof. Barak believes that:
"There must be an additional means of interpretation – in addition to the linguistic means – which will remove the absurdity and illogic. This means must be non-linguistic, because language is what created the absurdity, and therefore it cannot remove it."
The result is absurd, especially in light of the fact that in projects of the second type, the construction company can demand that the government fulfill its commitment already after the completion of the construction of the skeleton and partitions. Such a company, which has indeed asked the government to fulfill its commitment already at this stage, has no real interest in completing the construction on time, after it has already had the purchase obligations. As a result, a situation has been created in which the government has no means of supervision that would ensure that the company will meet the set timetable, and it should be remembered that in the circumstances of the matter before us, it is of particular importance to meet the set schedule, as explained above.
Hence, this is a clear case in which a sanction is required for a delay in completing the construction, and this fact is also consistent with the determination in the section regarding a reduction of 5% for each month of delay, in contrast to section 6(g), which applies to projects of the first type, which prescribes a reduction of only 2%. With regard to projects of the first type, the required sanction is indeed less severe, since the purchase undertaking is given only at the completion of the construction of the building, and therefore there is a real interest for the construction companies to complete the construction on time.
- When we come to interpret a contract, as well as to interpret legislation, will, or any other norm that requires interpretation, we must pay attention to the purpose underlying them and strive as much as possible to realize it. In the case before us, we are dealing with a commercial contract, and the rule is that a commercial contract should be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with its commercial purpose and that will give it a plausible meaning from the point of view of business persons entering into such a contract.
Other Municipal Applications 464/75 [6], at p. 195, Justice Y. Cohen (as he was then called) gave expression to this idea by stating that: