Civil Appeal 4628/93 State of Israel v. Apropim Housing and Development (1991) Ltd. IsrSC 49(2) 265 - part 48

only to the language of the contract in formulating its purpose, and that we are entitled to determine the purpose of the program contract according to the totality of the data (internal and external).  As a result, I discussed the purpose of the program contract, as it also includes the determination of a sanction for the contractor's delay in carrying out the construction.  Against this background, the second (and alternative) proposition established by my colleague arises, and that is this: the purpose of the contract – which is learned from the totality of the circumstances – may be realized by the judge-interpreter "only if the language of the contract is likely to be interpreted one way or the other, or tolerate the interpretation that, according to the interpreter's logic, is appropriate for the probable purpose of a contract of that type."  In this context, my colleague cites my words in another parasha (Parashat Ata [1], at p. 304), according to which "the sea restricts the interpretation."  In my colleague's opinion, the program (clause 6(h)(3)), which concerns apartments in respect of which the contractor has fulfilled the state's obligation to purchase them, should not be compressed into the language of the contract ("In the case of the realization of a purchase undertaking...  after the end of the execution period"), refers to apartments whose purchase was delayed (their execution was "completed after the end of the execution period").  A provision (section 6(h)(3)) dealing with the realization of the State's undertaking to purchase apartments cannot, according to its language, carry the meaning of a delay in completing the construction of the apartments.  "The clear wording of the clause blocks our path toward external standards."  It was found that the main sanction (price reduction) that is available to the State in the event of a delay in execution in the first type of cases (Requested Areas, Section 6(g) of the Program Contract) is not given to it in the second type of cases (development areas).  Therefore, when a contractor, who builds in development zones, submits a demand for the realization of the state's undertaking – a demand that he may submit upon the completion of the skeleton and partitions, the state must pay the price determined, without any ability to reduce its price due to the delay.  This result is difficult.  True, it arises from the language of the contract, and in this matter the law is with my friends.  The language of clause 6(h)(3) of the program contract cannot bear – like a text written in Hebrew – the meaning required of the full purpose underlying the contract.  Does it follow from this that the law with my colleague, the judge, found that the appeal should be dismissed? In my opinion, the answer is no.  My friend limits himself only to interpretation in its narrow sense.  He does not expand the scope of his examination to interpretation in the broad sense.  Within the limits of the latter lies the answer to our problem.  This answer is different from that of my colleague, Justice Matza.  It is in line with that of my colleague, Justice D. Levin.  To clarify this line of thought, I will turn now.