Interpretation in the narrow sense and interpretation in the broad sense
- The normative judicial activity in the context of a legal text is of various types. At the center of this activity is the interpretation "in the narrow sense" (see: Civil Appeal 154/80 [28], supra, at p. 223; The Ata case [1], at p. 992; Civil Appeal 719/89 [43] supra, at p. 312). The latter is concerned with giving meaning to the language of the text. When the legal text is enacted (constitution, law, regulation), this activity revolves around providing a (legal) meaning to the variety of (linguistic) meanings of the law. When the text is a contract or a will, this activity deals with giving meaning to the language of the contract, or to the language of the will. This activity is discussed in part in section 25(a) of the Contracts (General Part) Law and in section 54 of the Inheritance Law, 5725-1965. As we have seen, the accepted criterion, according to which legal meaning is "extracted" from a variety of linguistic meanings, is the purpose that lies at the foundation
of the norm "imprisoned" in the text. This exegetical activity is "narrow" because it does not add to or subtract from the language of the text. Its entire power is only in giving meaning to a given text. Alongside this judicial activity, other normative judicial activities are recognized, which are also related to the legal text. They can be referred to as interpretation in the broadest sense. The list of these is not closed. I will mention three types of bar-textual activity: First, sometimes the critical question is not only the meaning of the text (i.e., its narrow interpretation), but mainly its validity. Thus, for example, the question may be the validity of a low norm versus a higher norm (law vs. constitution, regulation vs. law, personal contract vs. collective contract). Sometimes the question that arises is the validity of contradictory norms with the same normative status (such as a contradiction between two laws, two contracts, or two wills). There may even be a problem of validity within the framework of a uniform text, such as a contradiction between the two parts of a law or between the two parts of a contract or between the two parts of a will. The line separating questions of meaning from questions of validity is thin. Sometimes the distinction is difficult. Every question of validity of a daughter's life deals with questions of meaning, but not every question of meaning raises problems of validity. Second, sometimes the decisive question is not only the meaning of the language of the text (i.e., its narrow interpretation), but the possibility of changing this meaning by adding or subtracting language or giving meaning to a text that is inconsistent with its meaning in the language in which it is expressed. The judge is asked to amend the language of the text, and thus also bring about a change in its meaning. The natural authority to change the language of the text is, of course, given to the creator of the text. However, there are various situations in which the legal system recognizes the power of the judge to amend the legal text. He may, in those special situations, add words to the text or subtract from it, or give it a meaning that its original language cannot bear. Thus, for example, a judge may correct an error in a will (section 30(b) of the Inheritance Law) or in a contract ( section 16 of the Contracts Law (General Part) or a linguistic error in the wording of the law (section 10A of the Government and Legal Procedures Ordinance, 5708-1948). The judge may also add or subtract from the language of the text ("private" or "public") in order to avoid absurdity or thwarting the purpose underlying the text. The analytical classification of this activity is determined according to the legal tradition of the legal system. It seems that in Israel we refer to this activity as interpretation. This is an interpretation in the broadest sense. Here, too, the line separating interpretation in the narrow sense and interpretation in the broad sense is thin. Often there is no importance in the special character of the activity. Third, sometimes a void or lacuna is discovered in the legal norm. Under certain conditions, the judge may fill in the gaps. A deficiency in the law is completed according to the tests of the Foundations of Law Law, 5740-1980. Interpretive activity (in the narrow sense) locates the gap. The completion of this – which is concerned with the creation of a new (judicial) text that complements the (original) text – is not an exegetical activity in the narrow sense. The judge is not satisfied with giving meaning to an existing text, but with adding a new text. The legal tradition of the legal system should, of course, classify this type of activity.