In one of the cases (see Civil Appeal 719/89 [43], supra, at p. 312) I referred to this activity – following the continental tradition – as a supplementary interpretation (erganzende auslegung). It belongs to the family of interpretation in the broad sense, but it differs
from interpretation in the narrow sense. Against the background of these analytical distinctions – the entire importance of which is only in clarifying the essence of judicial activity, in light of the variety of criteria used by it – the position of my colleague, Justice Matza, must be examined.
Interpretation in the narrow sense
- Indeed, within the boundaries of interpretation in the narrow sense, the law is with my colleague, Justice Matza. When the interpreter gives meaning to a legal text (constitution, law, contract, will), he is limited to the meaning of the language in which the text is expressed. Interpretive activity is dictated by the definitions of linguistic activity. "Among the linguistic options that the text raises, one must choose the linguistic option, which satisfies the purpose of the contract..." (Other Municipal Applications Judgment 832/81 [29] supra, at p. 45), and –
"The starting point for any interpretation – whether that of the statutory norm or that of the contractual norm – is in the language of the norm. True, the interpretation is not limited only to the words, but the words limit the interpretation" (Judgment in the Ata case [1], at p. 304).
"...The court must choose, from the variety of linguistic meanings that come into account, the meaning that realizes the contractual purpose..." (President Shamgar Other Municipality Applications 3804/90 [16], at p. 213). Indeed, the commentator is not only a linguist, but he must take into account the linguistic limitations. The legal meaning of the language, which is intended to realize the purpose of the legal norm derived from the language, must be consistent with one of the linguistic meanings of the text. I discussed this in one of the passages, noting: