As to the purpose of the interpretation, I will not dispute the statement "that the main principle in the interpretation of a law is the discovery of the intention that lies at its foundation and its implementation in practice". I will go further and say: The basic principles will show us that this basic principle cannot be disputed. Thus, in the discourse between people, we seek to reveal each other's intentions, so that only in this way will we understand each other. This is the case in oral discourse; This is the case in written discourse; This is the case in the interpretation of a law. However, even assuming that the essence is intentional and purpose, the question of the relationship between the language of the law and the "intention of the law" and "the purpose of the law" still remains. And this question is a complex one. For in order to discover the intention, we must read a text; A text is made up of words and phrases; And until we can get down to the question of intention, we need to understand the words and phrases. In other words, "the intention of the law" will be revealed to us through the words and their combinations. As a corridor leading to a lounge, so are the words and phrases that lead to intention and purpose. The ball is in the lounge but you will not come to the ball unless you walk through the hallway. You will not know the purpose of a law unless you know the language, just as you will not come to the second floor unless you have passed the first floor. We speak in words and phrases, and we mean, of course, themeaning of the words and the phrases (emphasis in the original – M. 8).
- Moreover – and here is the main point – we find it difficult to accept the determination that the language of a contract is never "clear". This is not how everyday life is conducted. We actually share the opposite assumption that "there are clear texts (written and oral) in our world" (Friedman, Contracts, 233). The language is a common language for all of us. We share the same dictionary – a written dictionary that is placed on a shelf and an unwritten dictionary that is in our head – a dictionary that instructs us the meaning of words and the meaning of expressions in the common language, in the language of human beings, in everyday language (the Burstein case, above). In general, we understand the words of others even without a complex process of interpretation and without the need for circumstances and overarching principles that will guide us. And since we know that contracts are also written by human beings like us – no more, they are often written by legal men whose language is our language and whose experience and legal instruments are similar to the legal instruments in our hands – but it is natural that in most cases, and on the basis of the premise that the parties meant words, expressions of language and sentences in their literal sense, we can interpret a certain contract even without a complex interpretive process. Indeed, if the language is lost, the contract will be lost, and if we do not assume that the contractors intended the wording of the contract in its literal sense, there will no longer be any reason and purpose for the existence of a contract, and in any case the security and certainty that the contract carries with it will be lost. Friedman, Contracts (ibid., 235):
A contract is an instrument for planning, and contractual security is a value of central importance. It is clear that this is not the only value, and it is clear that in the name of contractual security, the existence of contracts of oppression or contracts that violate public policy should not be allowed. However, it is appropriate to allow the parties, who have reached an impeccable agreement, to create a clear contract, which will contribute not only to the parties themselves but also to the economic and legal system and to save on litigation expenses.