At the same time, as my colleagues have noted, it is appropriate in my opinion to emphasize that since the interpreter is in the hands of the courts, a considerable interpretive tool, by means of which he must reach an understanding of the intentions of the parties to the contract, the search for the subjective intentions of the parties must be treated with the utmost caution and in an attempt to reach their conclusion. To this end, the interpreter must examine the language of the contract and its external circumstances on a continuous basis and act professionally and carefully based on the totality of the findings.
Judge
Judge A. Grunis:
My friends, Justice E. Rivlin and Vice President (retired) M. Cheshin, are following two parallel tracks. The first relates mainly to the concrete contract, while the other deals in the first part of his opinion with what he calls "the spirit of the Apropim rule." My opinion splits between the two. With regard to the examination of the concrete contract, I agree with my colleague Justice Rivlin. On the other hand, I attach my opinion to the opinion of my colleague Vice-President (ret.) M. Cheshin in the doctrinal part of his opinion. The excessive involvement of the courts in the interpretation of contracts entails a violation of legal certainty. As Vice President (ret.) M. Cheshin points out, the problem is not with the Apropim ruling itself, but with the atmosphere it created. The warning against the court becoming a kind of "party" to the contract, and because the contract is written by the court, should resonate from the court in Kiryat Shmona to the one in Eilat.
Judge
It was decided, by a majority opinion, to reject the petition, and the result is as stated in the judgment of Justice Rivlin.
Given today, 13 Iyar 5766 (11.5.06).
The PresidentVice-President (Ret.) Judge
Judge Judge Judge Judge Judge