On the other hand, my colleague Justice Rivlin notes in his opinion that the Apropim rule, as it stands, allows the court to reveal the true intention of the parties and thus reach just results. I am also of the opinion that the Apropim rule, as determined in the judgment of my colleague President A. Barak, enables the court system to trace the common intention of the parties and to determine what the purpose of their engagement was and what their actual intention was.
It is clear, therefore, that the main consideration that must be at the basis of the operation of contract law is the promotion of the autonomy of the parties to the contract. In order to trace their intention and promote their benefit, the court must take into account every relevant source, not only the language used by the parties, but also the circumstances under which the contract was made.
As has already been determined in the Apropim ruling, the subjective component means an attempt to locate the common subjective purpose of the parties. The subjective purpose is the common realistic purpose that the parties to the contract actually had. On the other hand, the objective component means an attempt to locate the objective purpose of the parties. This purpose will be determined by the nature and purpose of the transaction, as well as by the principles of reasonableness and logic.
According to the Apropim rule, in the interpretation of the agreement, it is possible to refer to the circumstances of its drafting and the negotiations that preceded it, in order to understand what was indeed agreed upon between the parties. It was thus determined by my colleague President Barak:
"There is no formal impediment to turning to the circumstances; There is no need for a preliminary determination that the language of the contract is unclear or ambiguous; There is no "transit station" between the contract and the circumstances; There are no two stages in the interpretive process... The interpretive process is a "continuum." The interpreter moves freely from the contract to the circumstances and from the circumstances to the contract. This movement ceases only at the end of the interpretive process" (A. Barak in his book Interpretation in Law – Interpretation of the Contract (Jerusalem, 1991), at p. 233).