"It is true that the opinions of the justices were divided as to the application of the words to the facts of the case, but it is well known that arguments against the application of the rule have their place in the appeal and not in the additional hearing, the purpose of which is a re-examination of the legal precedents that have been ruled."
(See also Additional Civil Hearing 6/82 Yanai v. Head of the Execution Authority, PD 36(3) 99, para. 3);
The importance of ensuring a clear definition of the various hearing frameworks, including the boundary lines between the additional hearing process and the appeal process, is not limited to the obligation to respect the procedures set forth in the law, and to realize the special purposes that characterize the various types of proceedings. It affects the stability of halakha; It is overshadowed by the element of certainty and confidence in the trial; It reflects on the principle of finality of the hearing; It contributes to the clear design of the various jurisdictions in the procedural frameworks established for them by law.
- The result of these words is that, in my opinion, from the stage at which my colleagues reached, and in law so, to the conclusion that the Apropim rule stands, as then as it is today, thus summarizing the purpose of the additional hearing proceeding, and there is no room to go back, examine and evaluate the manner in which this rule is applied in the courts, whether in general, or individually in the context of the growers' claim, the matter of which has already been decided on its merits. Since it was not proposed to change the rule of principle that was established, there is no room to examine in the additional hearing the ways of applying the rule, as if we were a "super-appeal" court against the determinations of the appellate court in this court. We are not meant to put to a specific test the methods of application of the rule of principle by the appellate court, since the matter of the additional hearing proceeding is "the examination of the legal precedent as such" and generally, not beyond that (the words of the then Acting President, Shamgar, in the Yanai case, ibid., para. 3; see also Additional Civil Hearing 7581/98 Clalit Health Fund v. Peled, [published in Nevo], Paragraph 6; Additional Civil Hearing 1833/91 Kohari v. State of Israel, [published in Nevo]). In light of this, therefore, there is no relevance to the question of what our position is as to the manner and manner in which our colleagues in the appeal panel applied the Apropim rule in the growers' claim, and this aspect is outside the scope of the additional hearing proceeding according to its purpose and objectives.
- My position is, therefore, that a re-evaluation of the Apropim rule in the framework of this additional hearing proceeding leads to the obvious conclusion that the rule is valid and exists, and has even gained strength over the years. Questions related to the methods of implementation of Halakha, which involve aspects of weighting and balancing between the various components of the exegetical principle and its various layers, certainly arise and occupy the courts through routine matters, and will arise in the future. However, they must be dealt with in the usual procedural frameworks, and in the process, the means and tools used for the proper application of the Apropim rule, in all its various aspects, must be developed and perfected. This issue is not relevant to the additional hearing proceeding, which has a different purpose. In any event, the opening of the individual matter relating to the claim of the vegetable growers, for the purpose of re-examining the manner in which the Apropim rule is applied , is not within the scope of the proceeding under discussion, and deviates from its purpose.
- If my opinion had been heard, we would have concluded and determined that the rule of Apropim is valid and exists, and we should not interfere in it and change it. This is the end of our work.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the petition for further hearing should be dismissed.