Therefore, the petition should be dismissed. I would propose that the petitioners be obligated to bear the legal expenses as well as the respondent's attorney's fees in the amount of NIS 20,000.
Afterword
I have examined the opinion of my colleague, Justice Cheshin. I have no need here to address the fundamental doubts that came to my mind – whether this case established grounds for holding another hearing; Does my colleague anchor his empirical claims about that sweeping and frequent "distortion" "in practical life" that the "spirit" of the Apropim rule has created – even with one example; Are the procedures proposed by my colleague for bringing "external evidence" for the purpose of interpreting a contract consistent with our approach? One way or another, we are unanimous, my friends and I, that the Apropim rule – as it is – it is better that you give up the machine. However, we are separated with regard to the resolution of the dispute between the Petitioners and the Respondent, and following the comments of my colleague, I would like to reiterate a number of details.
The additional discussion was given with regard to the fundamental questions in the field of contract law and not to the question of the specific interpretation of the contract in dispute. This is a special concrete matter, which does not fall within the scope of the further discussion. My colleague is of the opinion that the letters and affidavits that the petitioners attached to their statement of claim are sufficient to tip the scales in their favor. My opinion, on the other hand, is that all the letters and declarations, on behalf of both parties, should be given little evidentiary weight. Indeed, the petitioners also supported their claims in letters and affidavits of those who worked in the civil service at the relevant times. However, contrary to the opinion of my colleague, I am of the opinion that the state in our case is not made up of one piece. The same officials who supported the petitioners' approach were, at the relevant times, in their vicinity: the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Council for the Production and Marketing of Vegetables – both of which, and of course also the Vegetable Growers' Organization – represent to a large extent the interest of the farmers, and individually, the interest of the potato growers to receive the same financial grant. On the other hand, here it is the one holding the public's wallet – the Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance. The Minister of Finance at the time, Mr. Avraham Beiga Shohat, under his responsibility because Rabba, refrained from giving an affidavit. The petitioners support their claim, and my colleague's opinion, in a letter he sent in 1997 in response to the petitioners' request. There is no doubt that the former finance minister's letter is acceptable. However, the fact that his words were not presented in the framework of an affidavit is of great importance to me, and it can significantly reduce their weight. Alongside the letter from the former Minister of Finance, we are presented with an affidavit by Ron Ayalon, Agriculture Coordinator in the Budget Division of the Ministry of Finance from 1994 to 1996, who served as Deputy Director of Budgets at the Ministry of Finance when he submitted the affidavit. It is this affidavit, I get the impression, that represents the position of the other party to the contract – the state. I would like to express my reservations to the words of my colleague the Vice-President that the State is "caught" by what was stated in the letter of the Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture at the relevant times (letter dated May 9, 1996). The state for the purposes of our case – the person who represented the entire public in the framework of the agreement in question – is actually the Ministry of Finance. Thus, as is the case with any contractual dispute, when he came to court, each of the parties claimed that his intention at the time of the conclusion of the contract was different. However, from the very determination that a contract was entered into between the parties, it follows that at the time of its conclusion they had one common intention. After that, I asked to trace it. In the circumstances of the case, when each of the parties is pulling in the opposite direction, and since the parties were not questioned at all about their affidavits and in general, I chose to attribute to all the affidavits a low evidentiary weight, and to decide the dispute in accordance with the contract itself and the circumstances that led to its conclusion, as revealed in the limited infrastructure that was laid before us.