Caselaw

Class Action (Tel Aviv) 11278-10-19 Yehoshua Klein v. Oil Refineries Ltd. - part 57

January 13, 2026
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Discussion and conclusions

  1. After giving my consideration to the arguments of the parties and my impression of the opinion from the testimony of Lin and the other experts, and a review of the summaries that were submitted, I have come to the conclusion that I cannot adopt the expert's opinion as supporting the Applicants' claims, inter alia, regarding the existence and proof of a causal connection of all kinds, between the alleged emissions from the Respondents' factories and the alleged (non-pecuniary) damage caused to the Applicants, due to the excess morbidity that is claimed to exist in Haifa Bay and which originates from the Respondents' factories.
  2. In paragraph 66, the Applicants' summaries refer to Lin's statements  in his opinion relating  to someone who has already fallen ill.  Thus, for example, they quote from his opinion according to which "... I determine that if there is exposure of individuals in the Haifa Bay area to air pollution that includes substances, if there is indeed air pollution including particles with certain carcinogens that reaches individuals in Haifa Bay, I determine that such air pollution – if there is any – can be a risk factor related to  the morbidity of cancer diseases of each of them." 
  3. Thus, for example, in paragraph 70 of the summaries, it was similarly argued, inter alia, that "...Why is there a causal relationship between air pollution with certain carcinogens and morbidity – The determination of the causation of cancer in individuals who have contracted due to exposure to known risk factors is determined qualitatively and is based on Rothman's principle of minimal sufficient cause ("causal cookies"), according to which the very exposure to a certain carcinogen, and the appearance of the disease, indicate a causal relationship with a high probability between the carcinogenic substance and the disease.  Sections 211, 240 and 241 of the motion for approval].
  4. In their summaries, the respondents referred extensively to the opinion of Prof. Lin and his testimony, on pages 25-32.
  5. First of all, it should be noted, as emphasized above at the outset, that in the application for approval here, we are not concerned with the applicants (or members of a class) who have fallen ill. During Prof. Lin's interrogation, it became clear that his opinion deals mainly with the aspect  of retrospective qualitative causation and relates  to the plaintiffs who actually fell ill and about whom his thesis is that to the extent that the person  is indeed ill, his illness can be attributed  'backward' to air pollution (of a certain carcinogen) to which he was exposed.  In other words, it is more likely than not that exposure to air pollution (which occurred in the past) caused  the disease causally (see, for example, his testimony on page 693 as cited above), without taking into account and relating to intervening variables such as personal risk factors) such as genetic predisposition, smoking, lifestyle, diet, occupation, etc.  This thesis was rejected by the District Court and the Supreme Court in  the Kishon lawsuit, as quoted above.  This thesis is in fact irrelevant in relation to the application for approval in question.
  6. It should be emphasized that the expert was not at all aware that the proceeding in question did not concern the plaintiffs who took the disease. Thus, for example, he was asked and answered:

Adv. Mr. Gil Atar:      Why am I asking you? In fact, because all of your testimony, most of the testimony that you gave here in the previous days and even today, you concluded that in a moment That a person is sickOnce he got sick, it can be attributed back to the air pollution he was exposed to.  Right? That's what you said

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