However, I held above that even though clause 15 did not find explicit expression in the contracts signed by the plaintiffs, the transfer of the venue of the hearing informed plaintiffs 3-7 about the clause and its meanings. However, due to their enthusiasm for signing the contracts, they did not heed his words. The plaintiffs wished with all their might to sign the contracts, and for this reason they did not update their counsel, the court said, because shortly before the signing of the contracts, Mr. Dahari surprisingly demanded that they record lower amounts in the contracts than the amounts actually paid. I am faithful to the argument that if the plaintiffs had revealed his ear in the matter, he would not have agreed to have them sign the contracts. Since the plaintiffs were concerned about this, not only did they ignore every warning sign that came their way, but, as stated, they concealed material information from Mualem and ignored the rest of his words before the signing of the contracts.
In view of these factual determinations, I did not find that there was a defect in the manner in which the defendant moved the place of hearing from Mualem as counsel for plaintiffs 3-7.
In their summaries, plaintiffs 3-7 argued that Mualem's claim that he had informed them about clause 15 of the lease contract was inconsistent with two other letters written by Mualem at the request of Mualem to move the Goren hearing place in relation to other lands, which were referred to by the plaintiffs as "Mualem letters" (paragraphs 69-76 of the summaries). In these letters, Mualem confirmed that he had examined the documents of agricultural plots in another area of Ashkelon, and that according to the documents given to him from the Goren Hearing Place, in the past the Administration and the Ashkelon Municipality had given permits for the construction of a residential neighborhood on the same land.
However, the plaintiffs' request of May 9, 2024, after an investigation into the transfer of the place of hearing, to attach these letters as evidence in the case, was denied. In my decision of May 17, 2024, I noted that since the documents were in the possession of the plaintiffs' counsel about two months after the interrogation of the defendant, there was no room to file the request only at that time. If the letters had been submitted in advance, he would have provided for the transfer of a place of hearing to an observer to examine whether these letters were issued in his hands, under what circumstances and what his position is regarding their submission. The fact that the court was exposed to these letters only at the time of the hearing, when Mu'alem did not know whether they came out of his hands, created a difficulty in giving weight to these letters. Moreover, I noted that these are other lands, as opposed to the area of land that is the subject of the lawsuit (see also the admission of the plaintiffs' counsel, p. 2596, s. 16; See also: Interrogation of Mu'alem, at p. 2597, paras. 23-26). In view of this, even if it is found that Mu'alem issued the letters after the transfer of the place of hearing, their relevance to our matter is unclear. There is no claim by the plaintiffs that they relied on these letters prior to their purchase of the land, nor is there any claim that they saw them. Therefore, it has not been proven that there is relevance to the submission of these letters. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, I permitted the plaintiffs' counsel to clarify at the beginning of the subsequent hearing the degree of relevance of the letters to the present proceeding. At the beginning of the hearing held on July 1, 2024, counsel for the plaintiffs noted that at this stage he did not insist on submitting Mualem's letters and that he wished to wait until the date of Mr. Dahari's testimony.