In fact, case law states that even if such a clause is not included in the original lease contract, the ILA may condition the extension of a lease contract on the addition of a rezoning clause, subject to compensation to the lessee (Civil Case 8325/12 State of Israel Israel Lands Administration v. Mehadrin in Tax Appeal (June 5, 2014); see also: Civil Appeal 465/12 Israel Lands Administration v. Hadari HaCoastal Company No. 63 in Tax Appeal(August 21, 2014)). The ILA's right, therefore, to demand the restitution of the land in the event of a change of designation as part of its role as the public trustee of Israel Lands, constitutes an inherent component of the lease contracts to which the ILA signs, whether or not clause 15 appears in their language.
In light of the aforesaid, given the right of the administrator to take back the land to his disposal in the event of a change of designation, in these circumstances the plaintiffs' petition for compensation "...As if there is no clause 15 in the contract between the manager and defendant 1" (clause 79 of the claim), it is impossible. The expert on behalf of the plaintiffs, real estate appraiser Ron Hever, noted in his interrogation that "leased land without a restitution clause is a concept that does not exist, but the assessor asked me" (p. 500 of Prov. 22-24), since "every lease contract has a restitution clause" (ibid., p. 501, para. 2; p. 504, paras. 6-12; p. 505, paras. 3-4; p. 506, s. 1-2; p. 511, s. 7-8; p. 525 Q. 5-11).
A party may petition for compensation but on the basis of a factual scenario that has a factual basis. This is not the case in this case. The expert on behalf of the plaintiffs himself noted that this alternative "is theoretical, since the restitution clause constitutes a generic clause in the ILA's lease contracts that grants the ILA the right to carry out restitution in the event of a change of designation, while the procedure by which the ILA performs land restitution upon a change of designation is well known and known to anyone engaged in the field" (p. 14 of the opinion; See also paragraph 11(1) of the opinion). In his interrogation, he added, "The administrator always takes the land back" (p. 540, paras. 14-15; Ibid., p. 540, s. 18 to p. 541, s. 2). Therefore, the plaintiffs' argument that if the land they purchased had remained "clear(s) of third party rights" (paragraph 132 of the summaries), the value of the land would have been ILS 11.8 million (the plaintiffs referred to paragraph 4 on page 15 and page 17 of the expert opinion), clearly contradicts the fact that the expert on their behalf explicitly admitted that "...Land on lease without a restitution clause is a concept that does not exist, but the assessor asked me" (p. 500, paras. 22-24; Ibid., p. 561 of Prov. Sh. 7-9).