According to Section 31 of the Contracts Law, the court may, as aforesaid, exempt a party from the obligation of restitution, in whole or in part, if it deems it justified to do so and under conditions it deems appropriate. In the present case, after the parcels of land were taken by the Administrator, taking into account the conduct of the Goren Hearing Venue as described above, I am of the opinion that there is no justification for obliging the plaintiffs to return to Defendant 4 (and for the transfer of the Goren Hearing Place) anything, other than to deduct the cumulative amount from the sum that Defendant 4 and the Goren Hearing Place are required to return to each of the plaintiffs. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that on the other hand, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs are exempt from the deduction of the cumulative sum, since their behavior at the time of signing the contracts, the degree of guilt that was attached to them as well, and the desire that no sinners would be rewarded, serve this conclusion.
In this context, it should also be noted that the plaintiffs carried out a voluntary disclosure proceeding, which they claim did so because "each of the plaintiffs expressed complete remorse..." (Section 137(c) of their summaries; see also the argument of the Attorney for the transfer of the Cohen hearing that the voluntary disclosure proceeding was within the scope of "repentance" - p. 322, s. 9; Ms. Vyshevsky's argument at p. 1106 (paras. 14-15). This argument has no basis in reality. The plaintiffs carried out a process of voluntary disclosure in order to enable the filing of the lawsuit, and not as a result of reflections of remorse for their lost actions. Upon moving the venue of the hearing, Junger himself admitted that "most of us did not want" to conduct a voluntary disclosure proceeding, but, according to him, in 2018 Mr. Horowitz informed the other plaintiffs that he intended to conduct a voluntary disclosure proceeding, "and then we knew that everything would be opened anyway, so yes, so we joined" (p. 205, paras. 21-24). In other words, the plaintiffs never wanted to carry out a declaration of will, but after Mr. Hurwitz made it clear to them that he intended to carry out a voluntary disclosure proceeding, the other plaintiffs feared that as a result, the tax authorities might come to them as well. Therefore, a voluntary disclosure proceeding was initiated. Mr. Elia Shimoni also admitted in his interrogation that their counsel, who moved the venue of Weiss's hearing, had set them a condition according to which "I will not act if you do not make a disclosure" (p. 1574, question 10; See also the testimony of Mr. Attias at p. 1036, question 1). In other words, not thoughts of remorse or wishful thinking that malice would become rights, but rather a pragmatic condition that constituted a barrier to the exercise of the discretion of their counsel prior to the filing of the statement of claim. If the plaintiffs had expressed remorse, and if the words of the prosecutor of the transfer of the venue of the hearing that "since 2011 I have not slept at night" (p. 188, paras. 7-8) are true, it is presumed that the plaintiffs would have carried out a process of voluntary disclosure close to 2011, the date of their commission of the offense, and not about seven years later, shortly before the statute of limitations for the claim.