On December 28, 2020, defendant 1, following the transfer of the Goren hearing place, filed an affidavit on his behalf and on behalf of defendant 4.
On December 31, 2020, defendant 2 filed an affidavit on his behalf.
On January 12, 2021, Menorah (in whose case a partial judgment was given as ahead), announced that it did not intend to submit evidence on its behalf, even though it had petitioned to order the summoning of a representative of the ILA to testify, in order to detail the restitution amounts that the plaintiffs had received and which they were entitled to receive (see also its notice of March 7, 2021).
On January 19, 2021, defendant 3, Mr. Dahari, filed an affidavit on his behalf. He also submitted affidavits on behalf of Mr. Yoram Buchnik and Mr. Mordechai Dahan, which were signed in December 2019. However, against the background of a request to transfer the Goren hearing venue, in my decision of March 3, 2021, I ordered the removal of the affidavits of Mr. Buchnik and Mr. Dahan from the court file. This is because these affidavits were signed in 2019, and it was not clarified that they were signed for the purpose of this proceeding. In this context, I noted that when a party wishes to submit an affidavit of a person, he must obtain his consent to submit the affidavit for the purpose of a concrete legal proceeding. If that person refuses to submit an affidavit, the litigant has the power to request that he be summoned to testify by way of a primary investigation. Since it was not clarified that the affidavits were signed for the purpose of this proceeding, there is no reason to view them as part of Mr. Dahari's evidence. In any event, the wording of the affidavits shows that they were not prepared lawfully (see also my decision of August 9, 2021 in relation to the request submitted by Mr. Dahari to summon additional witnesses).
In the hearing on July 1, 2021, I instructed the ILA to provide its position regarding various aspects that have the power to help clarify the issues that are at the core of the judicial decision. In the meantime, it was determined that the ILA must clarify whether, as a rule, in the agricultural contracts it concludes, there is a clause of change of designation, and to the extent that such a clause exists, when it was decided to attach a change of designation clause to the lease contract; When did the ILA demand that each of the plaintiffs return the lands that are the subject of the lawsuit to it? What was the compensation granted by the ILA to the plaintiffs, insofar as it granted them; Did the ILA negotiate with the plaintiffs on this matter? What were the circumstances in which the ILA sought to return the land to its possession; whether all the plaintiffs were required to return the land, and whether they actually did so; whether the process of returning the land to the ILA stemmed from later legal provisions that arose after the signing of the contract, as claimed by the transfer of the Goren hearing place; Are the plaintiffs entitled, apart from the restitution fees, to purchase plots in the plan with an exemption from a tender whose value is 20% of the value of the lots in the plan, after the thawing?