Mualem's version of the transfer of a place of hearing on the matter is entirely faithful to me. Indeed, precisely because of the fact that the restitution clause is connected to the fundamental nature of the sale, the transfer of a place of discussion should have been conceived and the provision of clause 15 of the lease contract should have been added to the wording of the contracts signed by its clients, at least by way of an explicit reference to it. A reasonable lawyer would have ensured that his clients had read, and not just heard, his words at the time the contracts were signed. However, despite Mualem's failure to do so, I am persuaded that he informed all the plaintiffs about clause 15 of the lease contract, and that plaintiff No. 4 consulted in his office with other attorneys and at the end of the consultation was well aware of the risks and prospects involved in the transaction, and instructed the rest of his friends from the group of plaintiffs 3-7 to sign the contracts despite the restitution clause. As a matter of fact, the plaintiffs hoped that despite the restitution clause, the administrator would not take the land back into his lap, and that as long as he took the land, "they would receive handsome compensation" (p. 2522, paras. 13-14; See also ibid., paras. 19-20; Ibid., p. 2523, paras. 13-19). Had Mualem not informed them of the restitution clause, I accept his argument that just as they acted to record many conversations with interlocutors relevant to this affair, so they would have acted at some point to record the transfer of Mualem's hearing place and extract from him an admission that he did not inform them of the matter at the time of signing the contracts. I do not see the absence of the recording as conclusive evidence, but it is an aspect that is attached to my impression of the reliable testimony of the concealed hearing venue over the testimony of plaintiffs 3-7.
In his interrogation, Mr. Sidon claimed that he did not remember whether Mu'alem had moved the venue of the hearing, he read the contract to the plaintiffs (p. 1228, paras. 4-6), but he told them "the important points" (p. 1229, para. 8) for a few minutes (p. 1311, paras. 16-18). When asked what those "important points" were, he replied, "Me, I don't remember. He said that, I don't remember. He said, it's good, you know, uh, ground, basic things. I don't remember. I don't remember" (p. 1229, s. 25 to p. 1230, s. 1). The court further clarified that the core of the claim involves the question of whether the plaintiffs were told about clause 15 of the lease contract, and therefore, its answer does not lift the burden imposed on the plaintiffs, especially in the face of the opposite version of the transfer of a concealed hearing place. To this, Mr. Sidon replied that he did not remember what Mualem had told the plaintiffs when the contracts were signed (p. 1231, question 1), but he remembered that he did not tell them about clause 15 (p. 1231, question 4). I found it necessary to reject Mr. Sidon's version on the matter. This is because, according to him, Mualem told the plaintiffs the "important points," but he did not know what those points were, and he did not even remember what other things were said to the plaintiffs. Given that Mr. Sidon admitted that the transfer of the place of hearing Mu'alem told the plaintiffs the "important points", it is presumed that they include the matter of clause 15 of the lease contract, as stated by the transfer of the place of hearing Mualem in an affidavit and testimony, which was not concealed (in Mr. Horowitz's interrogation, he did not know at all whether his son was told about clause 15 at the time of signing the contract, while claiming that he should be asked about the matter - p. 31, para. 6).