As for plaintiff No. 2, Mrs. Vyshevsky, she testified that she signed the contract because she relied on her son-in-law, Mr. Attias, who had agreed on all the details with the transfer of the Goren hearing place (p. 1163, paras. 9-14). According to her, Goren showed her where she was supposed to sign the contract, and that "while I was skimming through the contract, I didn't really read it" (paragraph 41 of the affidavit). Ms. Vyszewski added that after the transfer of the venue of the Goren hearing, Goren took her to the real estate area, pointed to the nearby train station, and to "all the high potential of the place" (p. 1053, s. 8; See also ibid., p. 1054, paras. 24-26; p. 1124, s. 24-25; p. 1149 S. 12-26). As to the question of whether she knew that the rights to the land were leased from the Administration, Ms. Vysjovsky replied in the negative, and that she believed that it was private land belonging to the transfer of the Goren hearing place (p. 1123, paras. 3-20). Mrs. Vyshevsky's version regarding the nature of the rights to the land is not reliable to me. As noted above, the lease contract explicitly stated that the seller is the owner of the lease rights from the manager. Insofar as Mrs. Vyshevsky did not read the contract as she claimed that she relied on her son-in-law, she had nothing to complain about but herself. In any case, if she did indeed believe that it was private land, it is not clear why her son-in-law, Mr. Attias, conducted various checks at the Administration.
Ms. Vyśzyovsky further claimed that the transfer of the venue of the Goren hearing demanded that the payment be made in cash ( paragraph 33 of the affidavit; her interrogation at p. 1066, questions 9-19), and that she asked him why the money would not be transferred by bank transfer (paragraph 39 of the affidavit; her interrogation at p. 1078, question 13). According to her, "I preferred a bank transfer... I don't like to walk around with cash" (ibid., paras. 17-19; Ibid., p. 1079, paras. 12-13). Despite the fact that she understood that the demand to move Goren's hearing venue was unusual, without receiving a satisfactory explanation for this demand, Ms. Vyshevsky nevertheless decided to sign the contract. She further added that when Goren told her that he intended to record in the contracts "only a third of the price I paid him in cash" (paragraph 43 of the affidavit), "I was shocked that he wrote in the contract a third of the amount that Goren received from me, to the point that I was not able to tell him that I was canceling the transaction if he did not write the real amount in the contract" (paragraph 44 of the affidavit). Ms. Vyshevsky's version that she was unable not to sign the contract even after she was "shocked," as she put it, that a different amount would be recorded in the contract, raises a difficulty. Ms. Vyshevsky argued that the registration of a small sum in the contract is an "act of crime" on the part of the transfer of the Goren hearing place (ibid., ibid.). Despite the aforesaid, and although the demand to obtain cash was also unreasonable in her eyes, she signed the contracts because "I did not want to harm my son-in-law" (p. 1099, s. 5; Ibid., p. 1152, paras. 14-21). When she was asked why she did not ask her son-in-law whether to sign the contracts when she was told that lower sums would be recorded in the contracts, she had difficulty answering and finally said, "The answer that I made a serious mistake" (p. 1099, question 23).