Although I accept Goren's argument that he did not know about the administration's firm policy regarding the practice of enforcing the restitution clause in the event of a change of designation (see in this context the analysis of the matter regarding plaintiffs 3-7), at least he knew that the manager had the right to do so in accordance with the provision of clause 15 of the lease contract. In another context relating to the requirement of good faith in the market regulation in pledges, it has already been held that "the requirement of good faith does not summarize only the sincerity of the creditor's intentions according to what he knows. The existence of good faith is not an epistemological question - did you know or not? It is not enough that you did not know in order to get out of the net of bad faith. It should be remembered that the requirement of good faith in this context also includes a kind of duty of care. This is a requirement to find out and know. The question is not just what you knew, but whether you should have known. The scope of this requirement is derived from the duty of good faith in accordance with the circumstances of the case" (Civil Appeal 7916/13 Jonathan Javit v. Attorney and CPA Sigal Rosen Rev. et al . (June 18, 2014) (emphases added).
In these circumstances, the failure to disclose to plaintiffs 1-2 about the restitution clause (as opposed to the very existence of the lease contract, of which they knew), whether by virtue of its being explicit in the lease contract with the manager or by virtue of the general provisions of the law, especially when the transfer of the place of hearing Goren had knowledge and access to data that exceeded those of plaintiffs 1-2, overseas residents who came to Israel specifically in order to examine the purchase of these parcels of land, constitutes a breach of the duty of disclosure by virtue of good faith and even amounts to deception by virtue of the circumstances. This non-disclosure certainly influenced plaintiffs 1-2 in their decision to enter into contracts. Therefore, taking into account the circumstances of the present case, to the knowledge of the transferee of the Goren hearing place regarding the restitution clause, to the gaps in information and power between the parties, and in particular in light of the effect of the lack of information on the expectation of the transaction, I found that this is a breach that entitles plaintiffs 1-2 to the remedies that will be detailed below (with regard to Ms. Vyshevsky's reliance on the letter of the Deputy Mayor, which was delivered to her by the Goren Hearing Place, See paragraph 42 of the affidavit).