Indeed, at the time the contracts were signed in 2016, the plan of the Committee for the Planning of Preferred Housing Complexes (hereinafter: "the National Housing Committee") had not yet come into existence, and there were no "warning signs" that were supposed to arouse the suspicion of the transfer of the Goren hearing venue that the ILA intends to return these plots of land to its bosom in this way (see, for example, Civil Appeal 8124/18 Heirs of the Late Elkana Beishitz v. Yaakov Jarot (August 4, 2020). However, the very existence of the right that the manager left to himself in clause 15 of the lease contract had to be actively disclosed (as the transfer of the venue did not inform the plaintiffs 3-7 of the possible risks when it informed them of the possible risks but they ignored it, while the transfer of the venue did not inform the plaintiffs 1-2 about clause 15 of the lease contract at all, and in any event, did not elaborate on the possibility that the manager would take back the parcels of land in his possession). The fact that the transferee did so shows that he did not take into account the case of plaintiffs 1-2 in all his proceedings (this is also the case with regard to the fact that the transferee of the Goren hearing place charged them a sum higher than that recorded in the contracts entered into between them and defendant 4). It is possible that the transfer of the venue of the Goren hearing acted in this way due to the inherent conflict of interest situation in which he was at the time, which caused him to ignore the duty of loyalty imposed on him towards the plaintiffs 1-2, and possibly otherwise. In any event, Goren did not bother to clarify to them what required an explicit clarification, and in this he omitted.
For the sake of completeness, I will note that I do not consider that the duty of plaintiffs 1-2 should be attributed to contributory fault when they did not supervise that the relocation of the Goren hearing place did not properly fulfill its duty. It is not the role of a client to spy on someone who represents him (Sanford case; paragraph 33 of the opinion of the Honorable Justice Grosskopf). This is certainly true of plaintiffs 1-2, unrepresented foreign residents, who placed their trust in the transfer of the Goren hearing venue and relied on his mouthpiece, his many years of experience that was detailed before them and his extensive knowledge. Their reasonable reliance on his words, including that this is not a complex transaction that justifies the hiring of other legal representation services, helps to formulate a conclusion regarding his liability (compare: the Aldor case, paragraph 32 of the judgment).