Estate Case (Tel Aviv) 18696-07-20 Anonymous v. Anonymous - part 2

C.1.  - Introduction:

13. With all due respect and appreciation, and while choosing my words carefully, I can only state that the proceeding that was forced upon the man is an example and exemplary of a proceeding tainted by extreme bad faith and has nothing to do with the legitimate right of a party to bring his case before the court for the purpose of obtaining relief.
14. Before we bring the applicable law and the facts that were clarified in the course of the proceeding, it is impossible not to recall and mention a long list of acts and omissions on the part of the prosecution, all of which are directed at my conclusion in the preceding section.
15. First, it was the plaintiff, Yaakov, who declared to the Registrar of Inheritance that the deceased did not have a spouse at the time of her death, when the same Yaakov declared to the court in 1998 (see above) in clear and unequivocal words that cannot be interpreted in any way other than the plain meaning of the sentence, that the man is the common-law partner of the deceased. Both during Yaakov's lifetime and after his death, the prosecution did not find an attempt to reconcile the two opposing statements, and this cries out to me.
16. Second, despite Yaakov's additional declaration that: "It was known to everyone that the deceased had no spouse and that the objector was nothing but an acquaintance" (see paragraph 18 of the response; emphases added) – the prosecution did not bring even one witness from among those "all"! Why were neighbors not summoned(?), why were family members not summoned(?) and the question of questions – why did the plaintiff, who had been married to Yaakov for decades, not testify, and why did the son Shalom not testify from his personal knowledge of a single thing?! Reason, logic and common sense all lead to the conclusion that, whether the testimony of all those witnesses would not have benefited the prosecution or whether there were witnesses who did not want to take the risk of giving the testimony that was asked of them.
17. Third, during the course of the investigation of the claim, Brother Anonymous and his two children were heard, when it was clear that Brother Anonymous, who testified on behalf of the man, did so contrary to his economic interest. Instead of the prosecution taking a beam out of its sight, it chose to continue the proceeding and even cast aspersions on the motives of a certain brother, without any basis and without a shred of evidence, all in the sense of 'paper tolerates everything'.
18. After all this, we will turn to the law and the evidence and the conclusion that arises from the combination of them.

C.2.  The law applies:

19. Section 55 of the Inheritance Law, 5725-1965 (hereinafter: the Law), instructs that: "A man and a woman who live a family life in a joint household but are not married to each other, and if one of them dies and at the time of his death neither of them was married to another person, the surviving person is regarded as if the testator bequeathed to him what the surviving would have inherited according to the law if they had been married to each other. This is when there is no other provision, explicit or implicit, in the will left by the testator."
20. Section 55 of the Law is interpreted as follows:
21. Other Municipality Applications 714/88 Nira Schnitzer v. Yuval Rivlin (Nevo, 26 February 1991) held that: "In order for a couple to be considered 'common-law spouses' for the purposes of the Inheritance Law, four conditions must therefore be met: a. family life; b.  a joint household; c. They are not married to each other; d. At the time of the death of one of them, his spouse was not married to another person.  Conditions A and B are the main and usually difficult conditions to prove..." (ibid., p. 96).
22. Other Municipal Applications 621/69 Carol Nessis v. Koina Yoster (Nevo, May 25, 1970) held that: "According to the language of the section, there is no need for family life that will impress or convince the circle of acquaintances and friends that they are living as husband and wife, provided that in fact they behave among themselves as husband and wife for all intents and purposes and give their wealth or strength to maintain a joint household. The question of how to prove this is another question." S. Shilo adds to this in his book, Commentary on the Inheritance Law, that: "...  The way to prove it will be by bringing testimony from among members of the 'public' who knew the couple" (ibid., p. 468).

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• With regard to the period of joint life required to fall within the scope of section 55 of the law, it was held that: "The legislature did not set a minimum period of time for the existence of joint family life...  There is no doubt that such a period of time  [one year – 10 S], and even much shorter than that, is certainly sufficient..." (See Civil Appeal 621/69 Carol Nessis v. Koina Yoster, 24 (1970) at p. 623).  In this regard, it was held by the Honorable Judge G. Kling in Estate Case (Tel Aviv) 3696/90 Avi Amir v. Greta Zager (Nevo, September 16, 1991) that a residence of three months is sufficient to obtain inheritance rights from an estate.

1. In Prof. S. Lifshitz's essay "Married Against Their Will? A Liberal Analysis of the Institution of Common-Law Couples" (741) Law Studies | Volume 25 (2001-2002), the author refers to the developing trend in case law regarding the "conditions of entry" to the institution of "common-law couples", to say that "... The rulings dealing with the definition of common-law couples in the context of the economic relationship between the spouses have continued and even expanded the criteria that allow entry into a common-law situation.  In this framework, the absence of a permanent place of residence in which both spouses live, hints of separation of property, the existence of intimate relationships in parallel with the relationship with the spouse, frequent and violent quarrels between the spouses, the termination of marital relations, and even living in separate rooms did not negate the possibility of being considered a common-law partner..." (p. 785; emphasis added).
2. In addition, according to the law, it is not necessary to prove the degree of intention or desire of the deceased that the spouse will inherit him after his death in order for the surviving spouse to be considered an heir under section 55 of the law, as determined in other municipal applications 1717/98 Joseph Blau v. Edith Pozaš, 55(4) 376 (2000): "In case law... It was held that the right to inherit under section 55 does not depend on an additional condition or any intention of the deceased spouse, but rather that the three elements were met in order for the spouse who was not married to the deceased to be entitled to inherit him, as if they were married...  without any need for additional evidence, the right of the spouse stated in section 55; and there is no difference in the matter of this right, whether or not the deceased intended to bequeath it."  It was further stated that one should not place: "... Another condition for the right to inherit according to section 55, according to which the deceased must express an explicit intention to bequeath his estate to his surviving unmarried spouse...  Inheritance is the result of what has been learned from the nature of the general relationship between the spouses, who maintain, as noted, family life in a joint household...( 381-382 and the references therein).
3. As stated above, two affidavits were placed on behalf of the prosecution by Yaakov, from which the claims of the prosecution were presented. There is no dispute that Yaakov died before he was questioned about his affidavit, and in this situation, despite the fact that the testimony of the witness is hearsay testimony, it is possible to recognize the exceptions to the rule that invalidates the hearing testimony of the deceased, when there is a high probability that the facts included in it are true and that, on the face of it, there is a basis for the reliability of the testimony (see Civil Appeal 8493/06 Estate of the late Zion Cohen z"l v. First International Bank of Israel in a Tax Appeal (Nevo,  10.2010)).

In this regard, I can only mention Yaakov's statement in the proceeding before  me – "It should be emphasized that at no stage did the applicant [Yaakov – Y. S.]  think that the objector was the spouse of the deceased and certainly not the common-law partner.  On the contrary, it was known to everyone that the deceased had no spouse and that the objector was nothing more than an acquaintance" (see above) – in contrast to his own statement in the 1998 proceeding, in which he stated the exact opposite (see paragraph 5 above).

22. Despite the trend in case law to move from formal rules of admissibility to flexible rules of weight (see Civil Appeal 8493/06 above), I very doubt very much whether the prosecution has established any evidentiary foundation, or at least one that can be said to be of great weight. I will mention again that the prosecution did not bring a single witness who could testify with his knowledge of the connection between the man and the deceased, and in fact made do with the testimony of the man and the testimony of his witnesses in order to try to undermine the man's claims, where the burden of proof was on him.
23. In the man's cross-examination, an attempt was made to show that the man and the deceased were not a couple, and for this purpose the man was asked quite a few questions about their economic and personal lifestyles. The man answered honestly and honestly to the questions he was asked, including that he did not finance the expenses of the house (p. 22, paras. 13-14), but he would purchase groceries in cash and did not keep the receipts (p. 22, s. 28 - p. 23, s. 23, s. 32).  The man testified that he used to hand over money in cash to the deceased, but he did not attach any references and did not claim this in his affidavit (p. 24, paras. 3-21).  The man was asked why he did not summon neighbors to testify and replied that some of them had died and some (while mentioning their names) refused to testify (p. 30, paras. 4-34).  The man confirmed that he had never been abroad with the deceased (p. 31, paras. 15-16) and also confirmed that they were not in hotels in Israel (p. 32, paras. 7-14).  The man confirmed that he and the deceased did not have joint bank accounts (p. 34, paras. 10-11).
24. In her summary, the plaintiff referred to the fact that the man rarely brought evidence regarding his life with the deceased, and regarding the photographs he attached, she meant that a significant part of them were taken before 1997. In addition, the plaintiff brought contradictions from the man's testimony, including regarding his claim that there were mutual powers of attorney for him and the deceased, when it became clear from the man's later statements that he was the only one who gave the deceased a power of attorney and not the other way around (see pp. 35-36 of the transcript) as well as his statements regarding neighbors who were not invited by him, when he first testified that they had all died and then he knew how to name some who he claimed refused to testify (p. 30,  4-34).
25. As to the failure to summon the neighbors, I will note that I did not find any reference from the prosecution regarding its failure to summon all those neighbors itself or any of them in order to strengthen its claims. In this regard, I will refer to the words of the Honorable Judge Y. Amit in the Tax Appeal (Haifa District) 403/06 Anonymous v. Anonymous (published in Nevo, 8 March 2007), that: "The substantive law follows the evidentiary law, and a party must prove a claim that advances his case –  Civil Appeal 210/88 The Fruit Distribution Company v. The Local Planning and Building Committee of Kfar Saba...".
26. Indeed, some of the man's answers raised questions, and despite this, it is impossible to ignore the indisputable fact that the plaintiff cast all her hope by interrogating the man and his witnesses. The plaintiff did not bring any testimony on her behalf, despite the fact that, as stated, she had lived with her late husband for decades and was able to testify firsthand about things she knew.
27. So-and-so, the deceased's brother, gave an affidavit of the main witness in which he stated that he was in daily contact with the deceased and the man, and according to him, he even had the key to their apartment (see paragraph 3 of his affidavit). According to him, he and his children used to visit the couple frequently.  He also said that he was aware that the man and the deceased lived as common-law partners, and according to him: "They lived together, lived together in the same room, shared a double bed, loved each other, took care of each other, ran a joint household and were partners in every way..." (See paragraph 4 of his affidavit).  The witness added that: "Throughout the years, I drove the deceased in my car together with [the man] to the errands they needed" (see paragraph 6 of his affidavit), and also: "In 2015, the deceased required hospitalization for about  10 days at Ichilov Hospital [and the man] was the one who took her there and cared for her during every course of her hospitalization.  I visited her every day and saw [the man] was there and ate her from morning to night" (see paragraph 8 of his affidavit).
28. In the cross-examination of a certain person, he was asked extensively as to the manner in which the deceased and the man were to bear the expenses of the house in which the deceased and the man lived, as well as to the circumstances of the deceased's death and what happened afterwards (see pp. 60-65). The witness even replied in his cross-examination that the deceased and the man: "lived in secrecy, secrecy, did not want anyone to know anything about them..." (p. 67, s. 14).  The main testimony of the relevant witness in the matter – as quoted in the previous section – was not concealed.
29. The nephew of the deceased (the son of a certain person) also gave an affidavit of the main witness. According to him, he was in constant contact with the man and the deceased, visited their home many times, saw them living in a relationship and even hosted them in his home.  The witness attached a photograph that was taken in his home about a month before the deceased's death, in which the deceased and the man are also seen (see Appendix 14).  According to him, the man and the deceased were invited together to his wedding in 2017, participated in it, sat together and even wrote a joint greeting to him and his partner (see Appendix H).  Here, too, the witness was asked questions as to the manner in which he would bear the expenses of maintaining the house of the deceased and the man, and replied that he did not know who bore them (see p. 49, paras. 29-34) and added: "First of all...  I was at home, you see that they live together, living together, as if there is no difference between what they live and how I live with my wife..." (p. 50, paras. 3-4).  The witness left a positive impression on me and I did not find his testimony to be tendentious or unreliable.
30. Another and final witness who testified on behalf of the man, the nephew of the deceased (another son of so-and-so). According to him, he was in regular contact with the deceased and the man and used to visit their home many times (see paragraph 3 of his affidavit).  The witness saw that the deceased and the man "... were a couple in every way" (see paragraph 5 of his affidavit) and added that: "When I visited their home, I saw that the couple shared a double bed and I saw that they were living as a couple" (see paragraph 7 of his affidavit).  Here, too, the witness was questioned mainly about the joint life of the deceased and the man and whether they spent joint expenses together (see pp. 45-46), and mainly answered: "I did not go into his pocket...  I did not go into their pockets" (ibid., 4, 18), although he replied elsewhere that he had seen the man pay (ibid., no. 8).  The witness was even asked: "Did you see them having an intimate relationship with a couple? Have you seen them together?" He replied: "There are things that, out of respect and out of privacy, do not fit into their sheets" (ibid., para. 30), and despite the witness's full answer, he continued to be asked about this matter (ibid., para. 31 - p. 47, para. 1).  This witness also left a positive impression on me and I did not find his testimony to be tendentious or unreliable.
31. Thus, it emerged from the testimonies of the man and his witnesses that the man and the deceased had lived together in the apartment for more than 20 years and since 1997 (!), as the man testified and as also appears from Yaakov's statement in his affidavit of 1998. The claim that the man and the deceased lived outside of a marital framework is clearly unreasonable and contradicts the testimonies of the man and his witnesses, which I have found to be reliable.
32. The man attached an exhibit file with photos of the extended family showing the man and the deceased. In addition, invitations were attached to the celebrations of the extended family in which the deceased and the man were recorded together.  The man was recognized by the National Insurance Institute as a common-law partner of the deceased with the accompanying rights.
33. In addition, the man attached a printed, unsigned draft of the will of the witnesses, which, according to him, was found after her death in the closet in the apartment (Appendix 16 to his exhibits; see also at p. 35, s. 30 - p. 36, s. 5). Counsel for the plaintiff tried to cast doubt on this testimony of the man and even raised the hypothesis that it is possible that a certain person had placed it in the closet (see p. 36, paras. 6-10).  I will note that despite the fact that a certain person was interrogated at length by the plaintiff's counsel (see pp. 53-74), he was not asked a quarter of a thing about the aforementioned draft will.
34. I am absolutely under no impression that the man "fabricated" the aforementioned draft, and I trust his words that he did indeed find the draft of the will as he described, and as a result, I can determine that it was proven to me, at the required level, that the document was indeed written by the deceased, who was a lawyer, and the task of drafting a will was not foreign to her. In the draft will, it is written that the man will inherit 3/4 of the deceased's estate, while her brother Anonymous will inherit the remaining 1/4.  The deceased even made sure to write in that draft that she bequeathed all the allowances and any other sum to which she was entitled to the man "by virtue of his being my spouse" (ibid., at paragraph 11; emphasis not in the original).
35. Thus , beyond the testimonies of the man and his witnesses, I find that the draft of the will prepared by the deceased as the deceased's statement of opinion on the status of the man, which I will mention again and again, that the original plaintiff, Yaakov, stated exactly the same things in his affidavit of
36. The man and his witnesses stated that the deceased lived not only in one apartment with the deceased, but in one room with one double bed. In these circumstances, all the more so given the significant period of time of the joint life, I categorically reject the plaintiff's improper and disrespectful attempts to try and undermine the man's claim to the existence of an intimate life with the deceased.  In any case, it was not proven to me that these were two strangers who did not share a house or even a room, but rather a couple who even shared a double bed.
37. As to the many questions raised by the plaintiff regarding the manner in which the household expenses were borne, I did not find any substance. It is the full right of the parties to live their economic lives as they see fit.  Managing a joint household does not mean that it bears the expenses of the household jointly, but rather that it is carried out of cooperation and with the recognition that it is carried out for the benefit of both parties.  With all due respect, the narrative of the prosecution seems to be fundamentally unfounded, since it is difficult to reconcile the claim that a man and a woman will live together for more than two decades, in one house and in the same room, all the while they are two strangers whose kindness and compassion for the man alone brought him to live with her.  To be precise, this is not a short-term residence of a few weeks or months, but rather a residence for two decades, which places the plaintiff's claims on the presumption of unreasonable claims that can be proven by many strong evidences.  We will recall again and again that the plaintiff refrained from submitting an affidavit on her behalf, she refrained from submitting an affidavit from any other family member, and with the exception of an "affidavit" from her son (the use of quotation marks stems from the fact that there is not a single factual statement in it) that refers to Yaakov's affidavit.
38. Despite the contradictions that arose from the man's testimony, it can be said that most of his testimony was reliable. It must be remembered that the man came in the days and my general impression of him was unmediated and good.
39. After ordering the transfer of the burden of proof, I can only determine that the plaintiff did not comply with it and did not bring evidence to contradict the affidavit and testimony of the original plaintiff, Yaakov. If that were not enough, I found in the accumulation of evidence provided by the man and his witnesses to meet all the burdens that were on him, even if I would not order the reversal of the burden of proof.
40. Therefore, and all of the above, I hold that the man has proved the full conditions of section 55 of the Law, and as a result, the man is the heir to the deceased's full rights in the apartment as well as 2/3 of the balance of her estate (see and cf. sections 55 and 11(a)(2) of the Inheritance Law). As a result, the man will inherit the deceased's full rights in the apartment, her car (if she left it) and all the movables in the apartment, as well as 2/3 of the entire balance of her estate.  The deceased's four brothers will inherit the remaining 1/3 (1/12 each) in equal parts.
41. Before closing, I would like to dwell on two arguments raised by the prosecution, and for the purpose of the hearing only, I will consider them as a parable of proof, as follows:
42. The deceased, who was a religious woman, denied that the man was her spouse – it is possible that in light of the clear findings of this judgment, the deceased did not feel comfortable that her family members would think that she was "living in sin", as the prosecution said. This assumption is consistent with the testimony of a certain person, according to which the couple "lived in secrecy, secrecy, and did not want anyone to know anything about them..." (p. 67, para. 14).
43. Despite the legal knowledge of the deceased, who was a lawyer and had a master's degree, she chose not to make a will "because she wished to bequeath her property according to the laws of inheritance" – about which it is said, she is the giver! The deceased is presumed to have known that she also knew that in the absence of a will, the man would inherit her, and this is the more probable reason why she did not make a valid will. Any attorney or jurist will ask himself whether he would advise a client who has lived with a person for 20 years to make a will or not, whenever the client would ask that person not to inherit him.  Since the answer is clear, it is clear that the prosecution's claim in this matter is nothing more than a double-edged sword claim.
44. I will also mention that all the other brothers of the deceased did not see any interest in the present proceeding. Common sense teaches that if one of them had believed that the man was not the spouse of the deceased, it is very reasonable to assume that they would have sought to take part in the proceeding and object to the man's petition, and thus inherit large portions of her inheritance.  At the end of the day, only one brother of the deceased was found, the deceased Yaakov, who in his life had been in conflict with the deceased and even declared that the man was her common-law partner, and despite this, took his life in a legal proceeding that was completely contrary to that statement.  After his passing, his heir was expected to look at reality with open eyes and consider continuing to adhere to the proceeding, all the more so when it implicitly refrained from submitting an affidavit or bringing any other testimony on its behalf.
45. As for the expenses of the proceeding, as a rule, a party who has been acquitted should be awarded the expenses he incurred for the proceeding, when they are reasonable and backed by references. The man did not present a rent agreement or receipts and therefore he is considered to leave the matter to the discretion of the court (see Civil Appeal 2617/00 Kinneret Quarries (Limited Partnership) v. Local Planning and Building Committee, Nazareth Illit, (1) 600 (2005) at p. 619).  After considering the matter, I found that the plaintiff should be charged with the man's attorney's fees in the total sum of NIS 30,000.

IV – Summary of the Matter:

44. Therefore, and from all that is collected, I instruct:
45. An inheritance order was issued after the deceased in accordance with the provisions of section 40 above. No estate manager was appointed.
46. The plaintiff will pay the man's attorney's fees in the sum of NIS 30,000. The amount will be paid within 30 days, otherwise it will bear linkage differentials and arrears interest from today until the actual date of payment.

• A formal order can be submitted for my signature.

1. The files will be closed.

Given today, January 18, 2026, in the absence of the parties.