In light of the above, the court ruled that Kestenbaum's status, as Koffler's counsel, is as an agent in the sense of The Law of Mission, 5725-1965 (hereinafter: The Law of Mission). The court further ruled that in accordance with Section 6(b) According to the Courier Law, when an agent acts in deviation from authorization, the third party is entitled to regard the agent as his agent, since an "implied contract" has been perfected in the framework of which the agent assumes the sender's obligations towards the third party.
As to the circumstances of the matter before it, the court ruled that Yaacobi did not demand that Kestenbaum enter into the brokerage contract since he presented himself as Koffler's agent, but in practice Kestenbaum deviated from the authorization and entered into a contract for the purchase of the property himself. Therefore, the court ruled that in accordance with theThe Law of Mission An implied contract between Kestenbaum and the company he owns and Yaacobi and the company he owns has been perfected, which fully adopts the brokerage agreement entered into between Yaacobi and Koffler, so that Kestenbaum is obligated to pay the brokerage fees to Yaacobi and the company he owns.
The court added that this result arises not only from the Section 6(b) But even Kestenbaum, in his conduct, believed that this was the result of his actions. Thus, in the course of the negotiations conducted by Kestenbaum, he wrote to Bar Yosef that "Closing the matter with Shai [Yaacobi – Y. 20]", so it is clear that he was aware of the risk that he would be obligated to pay the brokerage fees to Yaakobi and the company he owns if he entered into an agreement to purchase the property. Therefore, the court ruled that even if Kestenbaum did not fully clarify the scope of the charge in accordance with the brokerage agreement, he had taken upon himself the risk involved, and he had no choice but to complain about himself.
In addition to the aforesaid, the court noted that the same result can also be reached in the application of the principles of the law of enrichment and not in law. This is because unjust enrichment laws allow a person to be obligated to pay a proper wage for an action performed by another for him, even if no contract has been entered into between them, and they can be applied in situations where an attempt is made to "bypass" a broker in order to evade payment of the agreed brokerage fees. The court ruled that in the present case Kestenbaum followed in Koffler's shoes in receiving the brokerage services from Yaakobi, knowing that Yaakobi had the right to receive the brokerage fees, and therefore he became illegally enriched at Yaakobi's expense, and he could be obligated to pay for it.