Civil Case (Tel Aviv) 29573-08-16 Nadav Niv v. Avivit Insurance Ltd.

26.9.21

The parties and the question in dispute, in summary

1. The plaintiff, Mr. XXX (Hereinafter: "The Plaintiff") is an insurance agent; Defendant 1, Avivit Insurance in a Tax Appeal (hereinafter: "The Defendant") is an insurance agency, the shares of which are held by Mr. Ziv Avivi and managed by him. Ziv Avivi is licensed to serve as an insurance agent, and is the father of Ms. Hadar Feinberg, who served as a manager for the defendant at the relevant times of the lawsuit.  The claim before me was originally filed against Mr. Avivi (hereinafter referred to as "Ziv") and against Hadar Feinberg (attribute hereinafter: "Hadar"), but during the evidentiary stage, at the end of the prosecution's testimonies, the personal claim against Ziv and Hadar was deleted, with the consent of the plaintiff, and the latter continued to be clarified only against the defendant (for reasons of convenience, the defendant, Ziv and Hadar will be referred to as "The Defendants").
2. There is no dispute that as of 1.12.10 (and even earlier, even though the plaintiff had received unemployment benefits up to that date) and until December 31, 2013, the plaintiff and the defendant cooperated in the field of insurance and sold insurance policies to customers (hereinafter: "Partnership Period"). As will be detailed below, the partnership period came to an end with an "explosion", and against the background of the defendant's suspicions that the plaintiff had begun to manage the partnership business in a competing partnership.  Conversations took place between the parties, some of the transcripts were submitted as evidence.  On February 17, 2014, the plaintiff gave the defendant a number of checks for a total sum of NIS 50,000 together with a tax appeal (NIS 58,995), see Appendix 10 to Ziv's affidavit; On that date, the defendant issued a tax invoice on which it was recorded: "Payment of overpaid wages and compensation for breach of agreement(See Appendix 9 to Ziv's affidavit).  It should be noted that out of this sum, a sum of approximately NIS 20,000 was paid; A number of checks were not honored, and according to the defendant, a debt of NIS 30,330 remained.
3. The main question in dispute is whether, as the defendant claims, the "reckoning" that took place on February 17, 2014 brought the partnership between the parties to a full termination, including an account for the past as well as for the future (the fees that continue to be paid for the partnership's policies/customers); or perhaps, as the plaintiff claims, if at all, then only the past was taken into account; This calculation was also made after a campaign of threats and intimidation on Ziv's part, and was forced upon him out of pressure and distress; In any event, this does not detract from his right, as a partner, to receive his share in the partnership after its dissolution (as of January 1, 2014). The plaintiff claims that such an accounting was not on the agenda at all and requires the provision of accounts, and if necessary, petitions for the appointment of an expert in order to prepare the required calculations.  According to the plaintiff, the calculations should be made after deducting operating expenses by a maximum of 20%, and not 40% as demanded by the defendant.  This is in the essence of the dispute, the following is the background required for a decision.

The background required for the decision

4. This lawsuit was originally filed in the Tel Aviv Magistrate's Court (Civil Case 29573-08-16) and was conducted before the Honorable Judge Avi Shalev (hereinafter: "The Prosecution in Peace"). About two years before the lawsuit was filed, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant, Ziv and Hadar in the Regional Labor Court. Labor Dispute 37620-11-14 (Hereinafter: "The lawsuit in Badaa").  In the framework of the lawsuit in Bada, he recounts the story of the act as he sees fit, which he also repeats in the lawsuit in the peace and in the lawsuit before me.  The background to the claims is, as stated, the period of joint work between the plaintiff and the defendant.  As part of the remedies claimed in the DA, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, sums due to him, according to him, as a result of the period of his employment with the defendant, including, the plaintiff claimed severance pay; unpaid salaries; Advance notice fee; Redemption of vacation and other rights by virtue of being an employee.  At the same time, he raised demands for the payment of commissions; Claims for defamation and other remedies for the provision of accounts, see the statement of claim in Bada, which was attached as Appendix 20 to the plaintiff's affidavit in this proceeding.
5. It should be noted that in the statement of defense filed by the defendants in Bada, they argued, inter alia, that this was not an employee-employer relationship; claimed that there was a partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant; and that there was no room to file a personal lawsuit against Ziv and Hadar. At the beginning of the evidence hearing in Bada, on July 25, 2017, and about a year after the plaintiff conducted a parallel proceeding in the Magistrate's Court, the claim was dismissed in the Magistrate's Court, with the question of expenses to be taken into account by the Magistrate's Court, see the judgment that was attached as Appendix 21 to the plaintiff's affidavit.
6. In the framework of the claim in peace, the plaintiff sought to obligate the The defendants in the sum of NIS 1,152,500 which consists of a claim toPartnership fees from the beginning of 2014 amounting to NIS 680,000 and past fees up to December 31, 2013 amounting to NIS 322,500. An injunction was also requested prohibiting the defendants from making use of the customer data in their possession.  In addition, compensation is claimed for Prohibition of Defamation Law In view of the exchange of words that were thrown between the parties as part of the termination of the engagement between them.
7. The Statement of Claim Rolling A factual set according to which in 2010 it was agreed between the parties to establish a business partnership in the framework of which they would build a portfolio of joint insurance policies that would be jointly owned by them. The joint venture bore the name "Avivit-Shenhav" and registered on the defendant's agent number with a separate designated number for receiving commissions from the insurance companies.  The plaintiff claimed in his lawsuit that The parties acted in this framework as of December 1, 2010, and tried to put the partnership agreement in writing, such as an agreement made with Ms. Dalia Mor (Appendix D to the statement of claim), but they disagreed on some of its terms, and therefore did not sign a formal agreement (hereinafter referred to: "Dalia Mor Agreement").  The plaintiff continued his statement of claim and claimed that In August 2013, he announced his intention to dismantle the joint venture. This was due to irregularities discovered in the defendant (see also paragraph 94 of the plaintiff's affidavit) and "Non-kosher actions" (paragraph 100 of the plaintiff's affidavit).  The plaintiff claimed that The parties continued to work together until December 31, 2013, when the dispute escalated.
8. There is no dispute that on December 31, 2013, the plaintiff was asked to attend a meeting at Ziv's office (hereinafter: "The meeting was held on December 31, 2013"). Regarding the events of this meeting, polar descriptions were included in the pleadings and affidavits - While the plaintiff claims that he was summoned to this meeting in "Cunning"; was imprisoned in the conference room and banned from going out; He was falsely accused of his actions in the partnership; He was hurled at things that constitute defamation; Real physical violence was used by Ziv ("He pushed me wildly, hit me in the chest"and Ziv made death threats against him (see paragraphs 102-112 of the affidavit), so the defendants categorically denied all these harsh descriptions.  According to them, during the month of December 2013, the defendant discovered the embezzlement of another employee, Mr. Avi Aharoni, who later served a prison sentence for his actions (hereinafter: "Aharoni").  At that time, Aharoni argued to another employee of the defendant, Mrs. Orly Katan (hereinafter:Orly") that the plaintiff is competing with the defendant and acting in a conflict of interest towards it.  The defendant acted to clarify this claim and discovered that during 2013 the plaintiff began to sell insurance policies not through the defendant but through a competing agency, "Tiger" (hereinafter: "Leopard").  Due to these suspicions, the meeting was summoned on December 31, 2013, and Ziv does not deny that in light of the discovery of Aharoni's embezzlement and the suspicions against the plaintiff, whom he has known since 1999, he was in a storm of emotions (see paragraphs 71-76 of Ziv's affidavit; paragraphs 33-39 of Hadar's affidavit; paragraphs 4-11 of the affidavit of Shai Feinberg, Hadar's husband, hereinafter referred to as "Shay").
9. Either way, and I will present my relevant conclusions later, on the evening of the meeting, Ziv sent an email to the plaintiff, which was attached as Appendix 8 to Ziv's affidavit. In this email, the plaintiff was required to immediately leave the iPad, mobile phone, car keys and office keys in the hands of the defendant, see Shai's testimony on this matter, at p. 281.  On February 11, 2014, a conversation was held between the plaintiff and Ziv, see the transcript attached as Appendix 16 to the plaintiff's affidavit (hereinafter: "The conversation of February 11, 2014").  On February 17, 2014, another conversation was held, part of which Mr. Schechter was also present (hereinafter: "Schechter"And"The conversation of February 17, 2014", See Appendix 6 to Ziv's affidavit).  The day after the call, dated February 17, 2014, the plaintiff gave the defendant checks for a total of NIS 50,000 plus VAT.
10. This is the place to note that according to the plaintiff, already on January 2, 2014 (i.e., two days after the "explosion" meeting and about a month and a half before the payment was made), he contacted Adv. Abigail Katz, who specializes in labor law, and the latter sent the defendant a letter of demand, see Appendix 26 to the plaintiff's affidavit and his response, Appendix 23 to the plaintiff's affidavit. This letter contains requirements relating to the wage component (section 3 of the letter, with its subsections) as well as requirements relating to "Partnership Clients"And"Partnership Funds" (paragraph 4 of the letter).
11. Even after the checks were delivered, the plaintiff continued to demand that an account be made. On April 2, 2014, the defendant sent the plaintiff a draft agreement, following the plaintiff's demands.  In the draft agreement, the defendant does not offer to pay additional sums, on the contrary.  Thus, for example, in section 5(5) of the draft it is stated: "Thus XXX agrees that his debt to Avivit, after he gave up the portfolio, is NIS 300,000." (See Appendix 31 to the plaintiff's affidavit, hereinafter referred to: "Draft agreement on behalf of the defendant").  The plaintiff refused to sign this draft and continued to send letters from lawyers, see Appendices 27 and 28 to his affidavit.  When his demands were not met, the plaintiff filed his claim in November 2014 with Bada, and in August 2016 he filed his claim in peace.
12. 12. After a pre-trial meeting was held in the Magistrate's Court, after deadlines were set for the submission of affidavits of the main witness and the plaintiff's affidavits were submitted, Serve The Defendants Motion to Dismiss the Claim on the grounds of lack of substantive jurisdiction and claimed that this was a claim for the dissolution of a partnership, which must be clarified before the District Court accordingly Sections 46 and 47 The Partnerships Ordinance [New Version] 5735-1975 (Hereinafter: "The Partnerships Ordinance"). The plaintiff responded to the request and devoted most of his response to the timing of its filing.  According to him, raising the claim of lack of authority at the stage In which it was uploaded constitutes bad faith, and is intended only to delay the proceeding.  On the merits of the matter, he claimed that the parties had an intention to create a partnership and register it, but since this was not carried out, the partnership was not established and was not registered, and therefore there was business cooperation between the parties and not a partnership.
13. On February 4, 2019, a decision was made in the case in peace, ordering that the hearing be transferred to the District Court. Among other things, it was determined as follows: "I found it necessary to exercise my authority in this matter at this stage of the proceedings, also since the facts were sharpened when the parties filed affidavits, and the plaintiff went further and added in his affidavits many remedies that are not essentially discussed in a monetary claim in the Magistrate's Court (such as his willingness to conduct bidding BMBY with respect to the clients' file), and additional remedies (which were not originally claimed) relating to the division of the partnership's other assets (laptop, cell phone, monetary prize that he won, etc.) and even the petition for injunctions related to the relationship with the partnership's customers (which in any case are not under the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court).  In the course of the hearing, the cause of action relating to defamation for matters exchanged between the parties in the framework of the termination of the engagement between them was deleted, and it was suggested to the plaintiff's attorney to petition the transfer court to reduce the statement of claim (and see in this regard the legislature's position in Regulation 9 of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018, which have not yet come into effect).  Therefore, and in accordance with my authority in section 79 of the Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, I order that the claim be transferred to the Tel Aviv District Court".  Due to the stage at which the claim of authority was raised, no expenses were awarded.
14. After the case was transferred to my care, I summoned the parties to a pre-trial meeting (see the minutes of the hearing of 25 March 2019). In the same discussion, I raised the question of the audit that took place on February 17, 2014, and whether it "closed the door" on future auditing.  The plaintiff's counsel noted, inter alia: "It's not a payment for buying a bag" (p. 2, s. 28).  On the other hand, counsel for the defendants noted: " There was a partnership, we didn't change our version, only that the partnership ended with consideration.  At the evidentiary hearing, the court will find that the defendants are right.  There was a partnership that ended.  You don't need an accountant, you don't need an expert, it's a judicial decision whether the parties really separated" (p. 2, s. 26-29).
15. At the end of that meeting, I determined in paragraph 1 of the decision as follows:This case was transferred to the District Court following a decision by the Honorable Judge Shalev. The case was transferred to the court after it already contained affidavits.  After the affidavits were submitted, and in order for the District Court to grant jurisdiction to hear the entire claim, the cause of action based on defamation was deleted.  In fact, the dispute regarding the accounting remains, incidentally to the termination of the partnership.  If I summarize the dispute, then, according to the defendants, the calculation was made on February 17, 2014, and it was done as of December 31, 2013, the day on which the joint activity ceased.  According to the defendants, this calculation also included the account for the past, i.e., the period of joint employment, as well as future accounting, if and to the extent that such accounting was necessary.  On the other hand, the plaintiff claims that the calculation was not made; If and to the extent that any sums were paid, then they were paid under pressure, and at most this is the end of the calculation for the past period.  According to the plaintiff, a calculation of the future – i.e., commissions for joint policies – was not made"(my emphases); Clause 4.2 of my decision states: " The court noted to the plaintiffs that the main dispute, as it sees it, relates to the agreement that existed between the parties, the mechanism of separation and whether they were fulfilled in the case at hand".
16. After the pre-trial meeting, a number of evidentiary hearings were held, during which the prosecution's witnesses were questioned (the plaintiff himself, his wife Dorit, Mr. Mordechai Hershko – the owner of the Nimr agency, Mr. David Davidovich and the expert Mr. Rami Maimon, regarding the appropriate/customary rate of operating fees). On behalf of the defendants, Ziv, Hadar, Shai, Orly and Schechter testified.  During the evidentiary hearings as well, I reiterated the question in dispute, see at p. 201, paras. 3-4: "I remind you that here, first of all, the question of whether the partnership relationship ended in a way that does not entitle the plaintiff to an additional shekel, this is the argument."I will note that the interrogations of the witnesses were sometimes conducted in harsh tones; Each side accuses the other party of interfering during the interrogation of the witnesses, see, for example, my comment at p. 239, paras. 18-27.  After the investigations, additional documents were submitted, some of which were removed from the file by judicial decision (see Request No. 47 and my decision of June 14, 2020).  The parties submitted their written summaries, and in these summaries the parties usually refer to the points - Claims regarding the expansion of a prohibited front (each side slams the other); arguments regarding the scope of application of the Dalia Mor Agreement to the parties; disputes regarding operating fees; disputes regarding the defendants' knowledge of the move to Tiger and their prior consent to it; disputes regarding the "explosion" meeting; disputes as to the nature of the accounting that was made between the parties; Mutual accusations regarding the character of each of the hawks (the plaintiff and Ziv).  I will note that the summaries and the scope of the arguments detailed therein constitute a direct continuation of the long and exhausting investigations and pleadings (especially on the part of the plaintiff), and it seems that no potential cause of action has been omitted, even if one is inconsistent with the other.
17. I do not intend to be dragged behind the parties and address all the arguments detailed by them. As I mentioned from the first pre-trial meeting that took place before me - The main dispute relates to the question of the accounting that was made between the parties.  If I accept the defendants' version and determine that this calculation brought the partnership to an end in every possible aspect, both with regard to the past and with regard to the future; Both with regard to salary withdrawals made at the expense of the commissions and with regard to future commissions, then our journey will come to an end without the need for additional disputes.
18. And on the last point, I have already removed one of the plaintiff's claims from the agenda - I do not believe that the defendant's claim that the accounting also related to the clients' portfolio and made the mechanism of the - bmby This is because of the expansion of a forbidden front. The defendant claimed that a comprehensive calculation had already been made in her statement of defense, see, for example, sections 60, 70, 75, 81, 85, 89, and 91; Attached to the statement of defense was the transcript of February 17, 2014, which speaks for itself (and I will address this later); Ziv addressed this claim in his affidavit, see paragraphs 108-109; The court raised this argument in the framework of the first pre-trial meeting and during the evidentiary hearings, and I determined that this was the main question in dispute, and therefore the interrogations of the witnesses all addressed this question.  Thus - Not only is this not an expansion of a prohibited front, but it is the bone of contention in this case, and it must be addressed.

The decision, and first of all, the basic concepts

19. 19. Regarding a version that is not true, other municipal requests will be determined 765/18 Shmuel Hayoun v. Elad Hayoun [Published in the databases, May 1, 2019] (Hereinafter: "Hayun Judgment") As follows: "Of these rules, the most basic and oldest rule is the evidentiary presumption that one who knowingly lies about one thing is lying in his entire testimony: Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus.  This presumption is part of English common law, which serves as the basis for the laws of evidence that are customary in our places.  It has gone through various incarnations and softened over the years.  Its status as an absolute and irrefutable presumption has long since been stripped of it, and today it serves as a presumption of discretion, the operation of which depends on the wisdom of the trial court (see: 3 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law 674-683 (1940)).  The application of this presumption (hereinafter: the presumption of falsehood) in the case of a party who knowingly gives false testimony on a central subject to the litigation, which is at the heart of the dispute, is clear and self-evident.  In the vast majority of such cases, if we rule the law in favor of a party who lied – and this, even without analyzing other evidence – he did not err.  Relying on the presumption of falsehood can lead us to an incorrect decision in the most exceptional cases (if not negligible)."
20. Up Next Hayun Judgment (See paragraph 35) The court also mentions the rule prohibiting abuse of court proceedings: "The third and final rule is the prohibition of misuse of court proceedings. The source of this prohibition is Section 61(b) of the Contracts Law (General Part), 5733-1973 (hereinafter: the Contracts Law), which applies the duty of good faith and the duty to act in an "acceptable manner" to any legal action, including appealing to the courts and conducting litigation in court, arbitration or other forum (see Civil Appeal 3496/15 Hormuz in Balfour v. Givat Marom in Tax Appeal [Published in Nevo] (Paragraph 9 of the judge's judgment A. Hayut (as described at the time), and the references mentioned there) (‏17.1.2017)).  This rule prohibits a party from initiating a legal proceeding based on a false claim and deliberate concealment of material facts, one kind or another.  It also prohibits a litigant from attempting to distort the law by knowingly giving false testimony.  Such prohibitions must be enforced with determination, with a harsh hand, and in a manner that will deter litigants from giving false testimony and other wrongful acts that constitute an abuse of legal proceedings.  The correct remedy against the giving of false testimony by a party – when the testimony relates to a material matter of litigation and is knowingly given with the intention of skewing the outcome of the trial – is to render a judgment for the liar's duty (in addition to criminal punishment and costs rulings, matters that are not under discussion here)."

And for the purpose of applying the halakha – the facts and conclusions that arise from the evidence

21. There is no dispute that the relationship between the parties began even before December 1, 2010, and see the plaintiff's testimony on this matter at p. 100, paras. 24-31. I will mention that although the business relationship began even before this date, the plaintiff reported and received unemployment benefits until December 1, 2010 (the plaintiff at p. 101, para. 11).  In any event, there is no dispute that the basis for the engagement was the Dalia Mor Agreement, which was not signed.  The Dalia Mor Agreement states in its third reason that the partnership is based on "Policy portfolio", see also the definition in section 2a, the reference in sections 2b and 2c.  The parties themselves also referred to the partnership in "The Policy Portfolio", see the plaintiff's testimony at p. 109, question 7, question 22, the transcript of February 17, 2014, p. 4, question 24, where the plaintiff confirms that the partnership agreement relates to policies, see the testimony of Ziv at p. 370, question 4: "XXX He was a partner with me on the policies he only does, and he said that."  Say from now on - There is no basis for the plaintiff's claim that there is a partnership in the "clients".
22. Regarding the operation, see clause 2 of the Dalia Mor Agreement. It is true that the Dalia Mor agreement does not state that it is a matter of - 40% of income; In addition, the agent was given the right to operate the policy portfolio."Himself", but it is stated in section 2D that in such a case "The agent will be obligated to use Avivit's computer and telephony system.".  It is also stated in clause 3A of the Dalia Mor Agreement that: "The agent will operate only within the framework of Avivit and is not permitted to engage in any other occupation or work with another entity except with the prior written consent of Avivit".
23. The evidence showed that the parties did indeed act in accordance with the Dalia Mor Agreement and considered themselves bound by it, see the plaintiff's testimony on this matter at p. 108, question 13, question 24 (where he argued for partial agreement), at p. 112, questions 6-14. See Hadar's testimony at p. 288, s. 11, testimony of Ziv, at p. 314, s. 10-19; See Appendix 11 to Ziv's affidavit, which is an email sent by the plaintiff on January 24, 2013 to Mr. Eliran Hershko, to which he attaches the Dalia Mor agreement and writes: "Here's the agreement I have".  I will also note that the plaintiff himself wishes to rely on the Dalia Mor agreement with regard to the stage of dissolution of the partnership and the implementation of the - bmby (See clause 4 of the Dalia Mor Agreement and Appendix A to it).  To this I will add the fact that the parties conducted themselves for three years on the basis of this agreement; It has been proven before me that this is not the only case in which Ziv did not insist on signing an agreement and suffices with a handshake, see the testimony of Schechter at p. 206, s. 11, p. 207, s. 12-17; Hadar's testimony at p. 288, question 13.  Hence - The conclusion that the parties acted in accordance with the Dalia Mor Agreement.
24. As I have already mentioned above, the Dalia Mor agreement does not specify a rate of 40% as operating fees. I have reached the conclusion that a dialogue took place between the parties in this matter, when the defendant insisted on a demand for payment at this rate and even believed that her expenses were higher, see Hadar's testimony at p. 292, questions 14-12, p. 311, questions 23-25, Ziv's testimony at p. 314, questions 28-28, p. 341, questions 3. "And I must emphasize.  My expenses are over 40 percent".  On the other hand, the plaintiff asked to reduce the amounts, see his testimony at p. 130, s. 32, p. 131, s. 24.  Alongside this - My conclusion is that at most one year after the beginning of the entire partnership period, the plaintiff also knew that the rate of operating fees was 40%, see his confirmation of this at p. 136, question 5; Hadar's testimony at p. 312, s. 33 "He came in from day one with 40%."; Testimony of Ziv, at p. 321, s. 30 "From day one, it was 40%."  At no stage was an agreement formulated to reduce this rate, and all the while the plaintiff confirmed that he had full access to all the data, see his testimony at p. 134, para. 30; See the email sent to Moshe Abadi on the subject of salary calculations, attached as Appendix 7 to Ziv's affidavit, see Ziv's testimony at p. 315, questions 29-33, pp. 317, questions 1-6.
25. I have come to the conclusion that in August 2013 or thereabouts, the plaintiff has the right to take over the management of the policy portfolio."About Himself", as allowed by the Dalia Mor agreement (but subject to the terms therein, see also Ziv's words at p. 324, s. 14): "He can manage the case himself. It is written").  According to the plaintiff, at that stage he began toGroping", inter alia, with the Nimr Agency (see his testimony at p. 121, paras. 27-34, and the testimony of Hershko at p. 68, paras. 19-20).  However, I do not accept the plaintiff's version that "Groping" only, and there is certainly no truth in his claim that the defendant or Ziv gave their consent to move to "Tiger".  At the last point, the plaintiff's version was convoluted, full of contradictions and turns, until he was finally forced to admit that already in 2013 he had drawn up policies using a tiger: "6,8, I don't remember exactly how much", see p. 122, question 3, p. 125, question 5, p. 127, question 17-19.
26. Hershko himself also tried to present the matter first as "Groping"For joint work (p. 69, question 6), however, after being confronted with various documents, he was forced to admit that this is not the case, and it is possible that the joint work began at the end of 2013, see his words at p. 80, questions 1-13, and also exhibit P/5, with its sub-documents, which leave no room for doubt as to the date of the commencement of joint work. Hershko himself admitted that: "I don't work with people when they're part of an activity...  I don't, probably not, I didn't know he worked there." (p. 83, paras. 18, 23).  It should be noted that Hershko and the plaintiff did not present the framework agreements mentioned in his testimony on p. 77, paras. 12-13, despite an order issued in this regard on May 24, 2020, and this refusal works to the detriment of the plaintiff.
27. There is no truth in the plaintiff's claim that the transfer to the tiger was with the knowledge and consent of the defendant or Ziv. Ziv explicitly denied this in his testimony, see his testimony at p. 324, paras. 24-29: "Sorry guys, we're talking about a policy portfolio.  The customer belongs to Avivit.  He's insured with my car, he's insured with my apartment, he's insured with me life insurance that he didn't do.  It's impossible for the operation of an insurance agency, first of all, no self-respecting agency to take anything other than its own systems, to set aside a position that is related to Avivit's computers and is open to all of Avivit's databases, right? 16,000 customers.  Unthinkable".  See also Hadar's testimony at p. 297, paras. 24-33: "Why would Avivit agree in some world to transfer the entire customer portfolio to another insurance agency?".  See also her words at p. 302, paras. 18-32.  The plaintiff himself confirmed that there was no written consent, as required by clause 3A of the Dalia Mor Agreement, see his testimony at p. 128, question 28.  When asked by the court what the agreement was with Ziv, he got into trouble with his answers, when he realized that they lacked any business logic, see p. 139, s. 20 to p. 140, s. 33.  I will note that the possibility of self-operation also requires the use of Avivit's computer and telephone system (clause 2D of the Dalia Mor Agreement), and indeed there is no business logic for the defendant to allow the plaintiff to operate the joint policy portfolio from a competing company.
28. If there was still room for doubt, a review of the transcript of the conversation of February 11, 2014 (a conversation recorded by the plaintiff, see his testimony at p. 184, question 28) completely dispels this doubt, see the words on page 1, paras. 25-26, which are said by Ziv: "We didn't talk about me paying you a salary and you move to another place and sell policies somewhere else and steal customers. We didn't talk about it.".  Ziv also repeats these words on p. 2, s. 20-21, p. 3, s. 14.  From the compilation comes my conclusion - The plaintiff acted behind the defendant's back; Not with her knowledge and not with her consent, and certainly not with regard to the transition to the tiger.  This transition does not comply with the terms of the Dalia Mor Agreement; The transfer of the policy file to the operation of Nimr constitutes a breach of the partnership agreement and entitles the injured party to the appropriate remedies, and see Sections 29, 39, 53 to the Partnerships Ordinance.
29. The evidence also showed that during that period (late 2013) the defendant underwent another shock, after Aharoni's embezzlement was discovered, see Orly's testimony on this matter at p. 242, paras. 31-34, at p. 244, para. 34: "The whole office was shattered, sensitive", Hadar's testimony at p. 316, paras. 10-15; Shai's testimony at p. 270, questions 1-11, Ziv's testimony at p. 331, questions 11-28, p. 332, questions 8-18. Orly testified that Aharoni was the one who exposed the plaintiff's actions, and as a result the connection between the plaintiff and Nimer was discovered, see her testimony at p. 243, paras. 1-2.  This was the background to the "explosion" meeting, and the storm of emotions in which Ziv was subjected is understandable, see the testimony of Orly who testified that he heard Ziv crying, p. 248 Q. 10, 14, 18-19: "But at some point I heard Ziv say, 'Why did you do this to me?' In a broken voice.  He said it two or three times, even." ; Shai's testimony at p. 272, paras. 1-3, p. 274, paras. 33-34: "Ziv in the middle choked with tears, passed it to me, I read it like I can read any document"; Hadar's testimony at p. 331, paras. 3-4, paras. 10-11: "And he started crying.  I thought he was going to have a heart attack."
30. I will also note that I did not find any substance in the plaintiff's claims as detailed in the pleadings in his affidavit according to which, as it were, he was the one who sought to bring the relationship to my business to an end due to a fear of improper conduct on the part of the defendant (see paragraph 88 of the affidavit). When the plaintiff was questioned on this matter, he stated that he had no documents in his possession (his testimony at p. 103, paras. 26-27, p. 104, para. 9), and my conclusion is that this is an inaccurate version, to say the least, that attempts to cast aspersions on the defendant.  I will note that the plaintiff contradicted this version in his oral testimony, where he claimed that he did not intend to bring the business relationship to an end, but only to transfer the operation to him, see his testimony at p. 138, paras. 1-4.
31. There is no truth in the plaintiff's claim that he was imprisoned in the room, the allegations of physical violence against him, and Kahane and Kahane, as well as harsh and difficult claims that require an appropriate level of proof of the severity of the allegations. In this regard, the plaintiff himself did not mention in his testimony whether there was a key in the room (p. 180, questions 22-34), see also Shai's testimony at p. 277, questions 1-3, questions 17, p. 279, questions 30.  I will note that in general I was impressed that Ziv could indeed raise his voice or phrase it bluntly, and see, for example, the transcript of February 11, 2014: I'm looking at you, hello to the thief." (p. 1, s. 9); "Revenge is served cold...  I will descend to your soul..." (p. 2, paras. 12-17); "I won't forget you for another ten days, remember that" (p. 3, s. 4).  However, in the very same transcript Ziv notes: "Not by violence, God forbid..." (p. 2, s. 16).  It seems that Schechter's words describe Ziv's style well: "A barking dog does not bite", p. 208, s. 31-34, p. 209, s. 5-12.  I will mention that the plaintiff has known Ziv since 1999; The partnership period lasted over 3 years; Therefore, it seems that Ziv's style was familiar to him, and I do not believe that there was room for the sense of fear and dread that he describes, certainly not."Death threats".  I am of the opinion that the plaintiff knew that he acted unlawfully behind Ziv's back; Concern that Ziv might harm him in the field of insurance (see Ziv's testimony regarding his intentions in that conversation, at p. 348, paras. 32 to p. 349, s. 2): "I'll look for you wherever I can, if I can take you a customer, I'll take you a customer"); And so he decided to "close the matters" as quickly as possible, as he explicitly testified:I saw it, I came to get up and close and not see him anymore, what he wants to get and leave me quietly..." (p. 172, paras. 22-27).
32. There was no room to raise claims of distress, oppression and coercion with regard to the reckoning that was made between the parties. First of all, I will note that I got the impression that the plaintiff (and his wife) knows how to stand up for his rights and he is not a leaf that blows in the wind.  I will refer to Orly's testimony regarding the plaintiff's conduct in the partnership: "I'm not hurt by anyone who looks down on me", p. 260, s. 17 to p. 261, s. 9; I will turn to Hadar's testimony on the same matter:I, and my father, will testify, have told him several times that I don't understand how he gets along with him as a partner.  I find it hard to accept the amount of his comments and his demands and everything is wrong, and everything is in complaints, and everything is the best, and he knows better than anyone else, and there is no argument that can end with him not winning".  To this impression I will add the fact that two days after the "explosion" meeting, the plaintiff applied for legal assistance (!), see his testimony at p. 184, paras. 6-7, and from the warning letter that was sent it appears that he was aware of his rights and knew how to make a distinction between the past and the future (the policy file).  All these demands and arguments were in front of his eyes when he spoke with Ziv on February 17, 2014, and he was offered two options for ending the partnership.
33. In this regard, I refer to the transcript of February 17, 2014, on pages 34, s. 24 to p. 35, s. 17, where Ziv details the two options available to the plaintiff: " At this point in time there are two possibilities, another option that talks about Bambi. It means that one, you first give me a check for everything you received from me...  You get a check for 30% of all fees that come in,..  And then they do Bambi.  Second Option - You take your clients and you refund me my expenses from August.  It's such a fascination, you know it may get significantly less here, but...  I said it's Fausli, that's the final amount.  You give me money, you take your customers, and here you will owe me a lot of money."  Later in the conversation, the plaintiff seeks to understand again what the two options are on the agenda, and Ziv explicitly clarifies that according to the first option, in the first stage, the withdrawals must be returned by deducting the fees, and after the refund is made.Doing a Calculation Bambi", see p. 37 Q. 2, and according to the second possibility, the "fascular" one, the plaintiff pays a sum of money, takes the customers he brought with him and the customer portfolio remains with the defendant, see p. 37 Q. 25.  See also his words on p. 38, paras. 4-9, and at p. 39, paras. 20-24, Ziv clarifies that in the second option: "I buy everything from you.  I'm buying the bag from you".
34. From all these passages it is clear that the choice was in the hands of the plaintiff - Perform an accurate calculation "on the shekel" regarding the past, and after making the refund, make a bmby Regarding the customer portfolio, or to pay a global sum of NIS 50,000 plus VAT, to take his own clients; To leave the lion's share of the joint policy portfolio in the hands of the defendant (when there is no dispute that these were the defendant's customers) and to put the affair behind it. Ziv repeated these words in his testimony before me as well, see his words at p. 337, paras. 3-4; p. 350, s. 30 to p. 351, s. 8; p. 351, s. 23-24, p. 352, s. 1-4: "He can ask for Bambi.  He didn't ask because he knew he shouldn't be."
35. It was proven to me that even in the Schechter case, the dissolution of the partnership was done orally, in the account of "Faucili": "We made a general summary, shook hands and closed the matter", p. 210, s. 11, the Ziv Committees, at p. 310, s. 12: "With Schechter, I stuck with a spoon.". See also Hadar's testimony at p. 306, paras. 20-30: "This is my father.  I hate accounts.  All his things will end in round numbers.  It's always like that.  That's the person.  The round numbers are always against him."
36. The plaintiff's decision was not made under threat - At the end of the meeting, the plaintiff asked "Sleep on it"And only the next day did he hand over the checks. It is true that the receipt was written "on the basis of salary" and the policy file was not mentioned.  However, Ziv and Hadar gave an explanation of the matter, and see Hadar's testimony at p. 338, paras. 23-31, p. 339, testimony of Ziv at p. 374, paras. 24-33.  Even if there were room to phrase things differently, what is stated in the Kabbalah is not enough to contradict the common intention that is portrayed in every sentence in the conversation that took place on February 17, 2014.  Moreover, I am of the opinion that the agreement sent by the defendant in April 2014 also supports her version - Even if the plaintiff continued to raise demands, the defendant insisted that the plaintiff did not deserve an additional shekel and that he Give up The entire customer file, against concessions made by the defendant, and see what is stated in clause 5(5) of the draft agreement sent by the defendant, Appendix 3A.  It is also not superfluous to refer to Schechter's testimony regarding the meeting, which fully supports the defendant's version, and see p. 217, s. 8-22, p. 218, s. 8-13, p. 219, s. 9-23.
37. Just as the parties may shape the partnership, so they may determine how it will come to an end, see section 30; Section 41(a)(3) to the Partnerships Ordinance. In the case at hand, Ziv testified, and I accept this version: On February 17th, we parted...  And the bag remains with me.  That's the agreement with him." (p. 322, s. 26-30); In his testimony, Ziv repeated the choice made by the plaintiff, p. 329, s. 22-34, p. 330, s. 20, p. 362, s. 33-34.  This was the separation agreement between the parties, against the background of the events described above, and in order to put the story behind us, from every possible aspect: "in an agreement at a meeting on February 17.  There is an agreement from February 17, it is not in writing, it is oral.  Fortunately for us, it is recorded because you deny it, but there is a proposal for an agreement.  At the end of that evening there was a receipt and the next day checks arrived.  It wasn't at that moment that the reception was made, the reception was made the next day", see Ziv's testimony at p. 375, paras. 30-33.
38. This is not a situation of "Partner Removal" (see Section 35 to the Ordinance); This is not a case of dissolution of the partnership by the court by virtue of Section 45 to the Ordinance; This is a situation in which the partnership came to an end by agreement, in the manner in which the plaintiff assigned his share of the partnership to the defendant, after an offset made between them (see Section 40 to the Ordinance). The dealer has no remaining rights in the partnership, including no right to future profits or to be held accountable in the affairs of the partnership.  This agreement was not accepted at all in a vacuum - At that stage, the defendants believed that "XXX Above and betrayed us and worked behind our backs, he stuck our back knife" (p. 335, s. 17-18); The debt to them was estimated at half a million NIS (Hadar at p. 337, s. 26, p. 338, s. 14, Ziv at p. 317, s. 8-10, p. 323, s. 20-22, p. 335, s. 33: "To give me back the half million.").  See also the calculations that appear in the transcript of the conversation of February 17, 2014.  XXX He did his calculations, slept on it "at night", consulted with his wife, received legal advice at that stage, took his own clients, and put the affair behind him.  There is no room now to reopen the reckoning.

Conclusion

39. After hearing the evidence, I came to the conclusion that the plaintiff's version was inaccurate, to say the least, not to say false; Thus, there is no truth in the plaintiff's version regarding the agreement to move to the tiger; There is no truth in the claim of threats, violence, coercion; There is no truth in the claim that the payment of the - NIS 50,000 was made solely to close the past debt and the matter of the policy portfolio was not discussed; There is no truth in the claim that there was a partnership in a client portfolio, as opposed to a policy portfolio. It appears that the plaintiff's version of events collapses and is inconsistent with the facts.  The plaintiff did not hesitate to throw mud and slime, including criminal acts, at Ziv's doorstep, all without any basis.  In accordance with the AnonymousIn such a case, the court must take a hard step and dismiss the claim.
40. Moreover, I have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff abused the court proceedings, whether in the contradictory proceedings he adopted; if in the arguments he raised in the various proceedings that he conducted, arguments that cannot coexist; If in his decision to sue Ziv and Hadar personally - both in the case and in the lawsuit before me, and this is without any basis; Thus, there was no room to file a lawsuit with the Attorney General's Office, since the plaintiff also knew that the payment of the "salary" was made at the expense of his profits in the partnership - See this section 34 (6) To the Partnerships Ordinance who determines that a partner is not entitled to remuneration for his work in the partnership. All of this did not prevent the plaintiff from demanding full social rights, and he went further when he demanded advance notice - How is this demand consistent with his claim in paragraph 94 of his affidavit that he was the one who sought to bring the relationship to an end? (A claim that did not receive any evidentiary anchoring, as stated, and see also his interrogation on this matter at p. 104, paras. 20-34).
41. In particular, it is impossible to ignore the plaintiff's intolerable ease of including in his pleadings, affidavits, and summaries harsh and serious allegations of criminal acts - Even those that have nothing to do with the affair (see the claim that Ziv physically assaulted Hadar on a trip – the Schechter interrogation at p. 231, paras. 14-16, Hadar's interrogation at p. 327, paras. 6-8, the investigation of Ziv at p. 347, paras. 15). See the other serious allegations such as false imprisonment, death threats; Physical assault.  I did not find any anchoring in these arguments in the evidence, and in my opinion in this case "The correct remedy against the giving of false testimony by a party – when the testimony relates to a material matter of litigation and is given knowingly with the intention of skewing the outcome of the trial – is to render a judgment for the liar's duty".
42. Beyond that and on the merits of the matter - I found that in the preliminary question in dispute, the question of the implications of the calculation, the defendant's version should be preferred, as detailed in my findings above. I have come to the conclusion that against the background of what was discovered, the partnership agreement was indeed violated; In law, the defendant and Ziv believed that the plaintiff had betrayed their trust and acted behind their backs; The plaintiff was presented with two clear options - As emerges from the conversation of February 17, 2014, and they (a) to make a careful accounting in the first stage with respect to the past withdrawals that were made, and subject to the return of funds if it is necessary to move to the second stage, which is the purchase of the policy portfolio or (b) to conduct a global accounting based on the data that were known to both parties at the time, to waive all claims relating to breach, non-competition, etc., to allow the plaintiff to take the customers he brought into the partnership with him while the balance of the portfolio remains with the defendant,  And all this in exchange for a payment of NIS 50,000 + VAT.
43. As stated, I have reached the conclusion that the plaintiff considered both options, while he was already being accompanied by an attorney, see the warning letter of January 2, 2014; No one forced the plaintiff to choose option B; After the conversation, the plaintiff asked "Well, let me sleep on it, acceptable?", see the transcript of February 17, 2014, p. 60, s. 26; The plaintiff consulted with his wife, assessed his chances and risks, and chose to put the affair behind him, see his affidavit at paragraph 149 and his testimony at p. 147, paras. 22-23; p. 147 Q. 27-28: "I wanted to take it out of my life... I didn't want him in my life anymore".  I am of the opinion that with the delivery of the checks, the partnership between the parties ended in every possible aspect, with the plaintiff taking certain customers with him and the defendant continuing to handle the policies that were issued to the other joint customers (80% of which were in any case its own customers, see the plaintiff's testimony at p. 114, question 17).  Against the background of this conclusion, I determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to any additional sums; He is not entitled to the remedy of providing bills or any other remedy, and the lawsuit should be dismissed.

Conclusion

44. For all these reasons - The claim is dismissed in its entirety. In light of the many proceedings that have been taken; the personal claims that were filed and rejected; The receipts attached to the summaries attest to the payment of NIS 86,876, including a tax appeal as attorney's fees, I hereby obligate the plaintiff to pay the defendant global legal expenses (including attorney's fees) in the amount of NIS 100,000.  The payment will be made within 30 days from the date of receipt of the judgment, and after that date it will bear linkage and interest differentials in accordance with the law, until the full payment is actually made.

Granted today, September 26, 2021, in the absence of the parties.