In our case, at least, we are dealing with a plaintiff who is unable to disclose the source of the wealth intended to reach her, but at the same time, the fact that she did not bother to contact the friend of the deceased, who according to her version was the one who advised him to open the account in the said way, and who informed her of the existence of the sum, in order to obtain supplementary information from him and did not testify to him, prima facie indicates the fact that she refrained from taking the steps required to do so.
- Section 47(a) of Procedure 411 states that "to the extent that a transfer in which there is no information about the parties to the action is not accepted", there is no doubt that there is a lack of information, and in fact there is no information whatsoever, about the person who transferred the funds from Singapore – which is the Panamanian company – and of course also about its connection to the deceased and his own connection to the money.
Here, too, it is worth emphasizing that the fact that according to the plaintiff's version – which was not backed up by any evidence – the Singapore branch refused to provide her with additional information about the money, even though she had handed him the inheritance order and even though he expressed his willingness to transfer the money to her, raises questions that only intensify the defendant's reasonable fear.
To this, it should be added that the plaintiff did not claim, and needless to say, did not prove, that she tried to trace the deceased's connection to the Panamanian company that had a bank account in Singapore – for example, by contacting the Registrar of Companies in Panama in order to obtain the details of the company's owners, or in other ways – in a way that might have shed light on the many question marks that arise in this case and constitute "red flags", This, too, intensifies the perplexity with regard to the revealed and the hidden and the details that the plaintiff refrains from revealing for reasons that are not understood and therefore arouse suspicion.
- Section 1.9 of Appendix C of Procedure 411 instructs banks to update the regulator with a risk-based approach to cross-border activity of customers, with an emphasis on the source of the funds and while receiving appropriate references, which indicates that such a situation is assessed as suspicious.
In our case, there is no doubt that this is a cross-border activity that raises many question marks, and that no references have been provided that can answer them.
- Section 50(a) of Procedure 411 explicitly states that one of the conditions under which the bank's refusal to open an account is a reasonable refusal is a situation in which there is a customer's failure to provide the details required to fulfill the provisions of the order.
- Clause 10.1 of Appendix C to Procedure 411 states that refusal to open an account will be considered reasonable, inter alia, in the case of "opening an account for a customer who does not cooperate with the banking corporation in a manner that is required for the implementation of the corporation's policy and procedures regarding cross-border risk", as in the previous case.
- In paragraph 24 of the Toledano case, it was held that "a customer's failure to comply with the bank's demands in his requests that are intended to prevent money laundering or terrorist financing, when these are requested in accordance with the provisions that apply to a banking corporation, may also constitute a reasonable reason for refusing to provide banking services in the circumstances", and it seems that in relation to the circumstances of this proceeding, there is no need to add anything to these matters.
- As I noted above, the aforesaid is sufficient to bring about the dismissal of the claim, since at least one of the grounds for rejecting the request to open an account raised by the defendant in his letter is the lack of information regarding the source of the money, and as we have seen in the circumstances of the present case, this is indeed the situation and this is a situation that gives rise to reasonable suspicion.
I will reiterate, in continuation of what I have already noted, that this is not only a situation in which the plaintiff as an heir lacks information – even though this is sufficient, if only according to the Supervisor of Banks' letter of November 23, 2016, which received backing in the Toledano case (paragraph 27) – but also someone who knowingly refrained from exhausting (at least overtly) the available sources of information, did not contact anyone who revealed her ear and did not even bother to testify. It did not seek the details of the Panamanian company and did not show much required evidence regarding its contacts with the Singapore branch, and therefore it is acting in its obligation.
- In addition to all of the above, it is important to add that alongside the reasons cited above, it has been proven that there are "red flags" and other suspicious signs in accordance with Procedure 411 and the authority document listed below, which are capable of intensifying the suspicion that bases his reasonable refusal, in the spirit of the Supreme Court's words in the Toiga case cited above (paragraph 25): "In order to learn which situations may raise 'red flags' for money laundering or terrorist financing, which may even justify refusal to open an account or to continue managing it, should refer to the Anti-Money Laundering Order and Procedure 411 of the Supervisor of Banks":
- The involvement of the deceased, who is ostensibly the source of the funds, in the activities of the stock exchange club, the plaintiff and other members of her family who were involved in its activities were convicted of various offenses for its management, which are not only tax offenses but also original offenses, albeit after his death, when the transfer of such a considerable sum of money to Panama, which is considered a tax haven, and its holding in an account in the name of a company whose connection to it is not clear in a bank in Singapore, raises serious questions and raises serious questions as to whether it is indeed only the money from the profits of an innocent clothing store or whether it has a connection to the profits of an innocent clothing store The club that is involved in committing the original offenses.
- The plaintiff's very criminal convictions for various offenses, both tax offenses and offenses relating to pimping and prostitution and the possession of a place used for prostitution, in which the deceased also took part in its management, raises a reasonable suspicion that the funds are derived from offenses that are not only tax offenses.
In this context, I will note that the plaintiff argued at length that the defendant based his refusal on the claim that the deceased was also convicted, a claim that there is no dispute in retrospect that it is incorrect, and that since the decision is based on an erroneous fact, it should be annulled, but even from this argument I do not believe that she will be saved.