It should be emphasized, in this regard, that in order to prove an "act of terrorism", it is not required that the nationalist or ideological motive be the sole or dominant motive by virtue of which the defendant acted. Section D of the definition of "terrorist act" in section 2(a) of the Counter-Terrorism Law states that it does not matter whether the nationalist or ideological motive from which the act was committed was the sole or primary motive for the act (see Criminal Case (Jerusalem District) 21367-08-18 State of Israel v. Y. Anonymous, paragraphs 31-32 (March 11, 2020); Serious Crimes Case (Jerusalem District) 50450-12-16 State of Israel v. Amani, paragraphs 43-44 (October 24, 2017); Serious Crimes Case (Hai District) 55524-06-21 State of Israel v. Abbas, para. 14 (July 13, 2023)). Therefore, even if the defendant acted out of some additional motive, it was proven that his actions also had a nationalist or ideological motive, as required by law.
- As stated, the defendant himself chose to retain the right to remain silent in his interrogations before the police and in court, did not shed light on the circumstances of the acts, did not provide any other explanation for the acts, did not refute the impression as to the motive underlying them, and this too strengthens the conclusion that there was a nationalist-ideological motive for the acts (Sarhan, para. 32).
In summary, the location of the acts, the manner and timing in which the acts were committed, against the background of the version given by Shimon on the matter, and the defendant's silence all lead to the conclusion that the acts were carried out for a nationalist-ideological motive.
The defendant's actions constituted a real risk of serious injury
- As can be seen from the evidence material, and as detailed above, the defendant's actions constituted a real risk of serious bodily injury to a person. Since the acts were carried out using weapons, as stated, all the elements of the definition of a "terrorist act" are met. Therefore, the discussion of proving the risk of serious damage to property or infrastructure, systems or essential services is superfluous, in accordance with the provisions of sections 3(c) and 3(e) of the definition of a "terrorist act" in section 2(a) of the Counter-Terrorism Law, and in any case with proof that the act was committed with the aim of arousing fear or panic in the public in accordance with section 2 of the definition of a "terrorist act".
- In light of the aforesaid, and in view of the existence of the elements of the offense of sabotage with aggravated intent and the definition of an "act of terrorism", the elements of the offense of a terrorist act of sabotage with aggravated intent also exist in the defendant's case.
Operating with Weapons for the Purpose of Terrorism
- Operation with weapons for terrorist purposes is defined in Section 30 of the Counter-Terrorism Law as follows:
- (A) Anyone who possesses, purchases, sells, manufactures, repairs, imports, exports, transports, brokers, distributes or carries out any other transaction in arms, with the aim of promoting the activity of a terrorist organization or the commission of a terrorist act or assisting in such activity or execution, all for consideration or not, shall be sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment or a fine ten times the fine prescribed in section 61(a)(4) of the Penal Law.
In this case, the defendant manufactured himself, carried his bag and actually threw Molotov cocktails at residential houses in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. The manufacture and transportation of weapons with the aim of promoting the commission of a terrorist act amounts to the offense of using weapons for terrorist purposes.