It should be emphasized that the offense of arson entails a real and wide-ranging risk of harm. The very act of sending fire creates a situation in which there is no certainty as to the route of its spread, the identification of possible casualties, or the intensity of the impact. Once the fire is ignited, the sender is stripped of all control over it, and the damage that may be caused to the body, property and the environment is unexpected and has serious potential ( State of Israel Criminal Appeal v. Abu Taqa (March 27, 2008); Criminal Appeal 1438/14 Barazi v. State of Israel (March 26, 2014); Criminal Appeal 334/14 Aryeh Haas v. State of Israel (March 31, 2015)). Therefore, the conclusion is necessary that the defendant intended to harm his victims and expected that this would be the case. In these circumstances, the first charge contains the special mental element of a purpose to harm human beings.
In light of this, and in view of the existence of the definition of "terrorist act", I determine that in the first charge the defendant committed three offenses of a terrorist act of arson under section 448(a) of the Penal Law, together with section 37 of the Counter-Terrorism Law.
- In the second and third charges, the defendant was charged with section 448(a) of the Penal Law, with an alternative that deals with the dispatch of fire with the special intention of damaging property used by the public.
In the second charge, the required mental element is met, including the requirement of special intention. The defendant arrived at the post office on foot in the early hours of the morning, carrying a bag containing Molotov cocktails that he had prepared in advance. When he arrived at the scene, the defendant took out three Molotov cocktails one after the other, set them on fire and threw them at the post office. The Molotov cocktails shattered, caught fire and caused damage to the door of the post office. The potential for damage in the defendant's actions was great, in view of the extent of the fire and the time at which the arson was carried out, in the early hours of the morning, when there was a real concern that no one would notice the fire, call for help, and not act to extinguish it. The defendant had no ability to control the spread of the fire, or the extent of the damage that might be caused as a result of it. But miraculously, no injuries were caused to the body or soul as a result of the acts. These circumstances establish the conclusion that the act was carried out intentionally and in a planned manner, that the defendant was aware of his actions, intended to harm the post office, and expected that this would be the case.