As is well known, this fact did not tip the scales there.
- Regarding the agreements with the surrogacy institute, in the judgment in the Another discussion Nachmani It was explained that the couple entered into a preliminary agreement that essentially regulates the financial aspects of the process. In the meantime, in the framework of the preamble to the agreement, it was noted that the Institute deals with surrogacy agreements for Couples who cannot carry their children themselves (for the exact wording of the section, see: Name, at p. 767). It was also explained that according to the agreement, the two intended parents are supposed to choose the surrogate mother together. In addition, the surrogacy institute presented the Nachmani couple with a draft agreement (which was not ultimately signed) with the surrogate mother. In this context, the judge noted Light Because "this agreement clearly indicates the need for the consent of each of the spouses to perform the transplant: both Ruthie and Danny are parties to it, and all of its obligations. It teaches about the fundamental requirement for the existence of a true relationship when agreeing to the transplant."Name, at p. 768). The District Court, where the litigation between the Nachmani couple began, also addressed this, noting that "the Institute's demand in the United States that the transplant be performed jointly by both spouses is a condition between the Institute and the couple, but not a condition between the couple themselves" (Matter Nachmani District, at p. 168).
- The truth can be told: the reference to the aforementioned agreements appears only in the opinions of the minority judges (the above references are to the opinions of the judges). Light andNightingale). The majority justices did not address this explicitly, but it can be assumed that these were factual aspects that were not in dispute (as opposed to their legal ramifications). What is important for our purposes is that in the end, the judgment in the matter Another discussion Nachmani - Who sealed the affair - Ruthie Nachmani was allowed to make use of the frozen embryos despite Danny's objections, when in the circumstances of the case there were also agreements signed by the couple that required the consent of each of them for the insertion of the embryos. In view of the above, I do not believe that the affidavit that is at the center of the arguments in the present proceeding establishes a significant distinction between our case and past precedents, in a manner that justifies a different decision. On the contrary, it seems that we are walking in a well-plowed furrow.
- Another difference on which the respondent placed his hope lies in the fact that the Nachmani couple were married to each other, and strove from the beginning to carry out a surrogacy process. However, in fact, this does not create a real difference between their case and the present case. Although the appellant and the respondent did not marry each other, they began the process of IVF as a couple, and in this sense there is no material distinction between them and the Nachmani couple. In addition, I did not find any real weight to attribute any weight to the fact that the Nachmani couple aimed at the surrogacy process in the first place. This fact stemmed from Ruthie Nachmani's physiological state, which was ruthless from the very beginning. The appellant's circumstances were different, as explained, and only at the top of the road was her uterus removed. This circumstantial difference has no bearing on the decision in the case of the parties.
- In conclusion, I believe that in a comparison between the Nachmani And the case at hand is much more similar than the different. In both cases, there were written documents that partially anchored the agreements, in which it was stated that consent was required from each of the parties throughout the stages of the process. At the same time, in both cases the woman relied significantly on the agreements that were formed between the parties (whether in writing or in behavior) in a way that affects the "last chance" to realize genetic parenthood. In both cases, there was no legislation regulating the couple's relationship (since the Surrogacy Law does not apply to the Nachmani couple, and in any case this law does not relate to the relationship between the intended parents). To all of this, it should be added that in contrast to Parashat Nachmani, here there was also a reliance on misrepresentation It is clear on the part of the respondent - in a manner that strengthens the decision in favor of the appellant in comparison to past precedents.
- My conclusion is therefore unequivocal: the appellant should be allowed to make use of the frozen embryos.
How to Use Frozen Embryos: The Issue of Surrogacy
- Further to my aforesaid conclusion, it is requested to clarify that the question concerning surrogacy is quite marginal, in view of the fact that even from the respondent's point of view, this is not the main reason for his objection to the continuation of the process. It is appropriate to bring in this regard words in the name of their words:
"Attorney Dori Schwartz: Let's assume that [the appellant] would not have undergone a hysterectomy, it's important for me to know what your position was. Suppose [the appellant] were to sit here without a hysterectomy, but for medical reasons, one kind or another, her body cannot produce more eggs and so on, even though she has a uterus, and it is also possible to insert the embryos into her uterus, would you then agree? Leave it at the moment from a legal point of view, would you agree to that?