To be precise, the harm caused to the appellant is not limited to an impairment of expectation or emotional disappointment, but rather to the denial of her ability to exercise genetic parenthood in any other way. From the moment the eggs were fertilized with the respondent's sperm, the appellant's chances of genetic parenthood were placed absolutely, on the consent of the respondent.
Therefore, I agree with my colleague, the judge D. Barak-Erez, that in the circumstances of the present case, the respondent is silenced from making use of his right by virtue of section 4 of the affidavit, and from objecting to the use of the eggs.
- As for the operative level, as my colleague pointed out, the judge D. Barak-Erez, throughout the entire proceeding, the respondent presented a one-dimensional line of argument, in which he strongly objected to the use of the fertilized eggs. Therefore, I am of the opinion that before we decide on the manner in which the eggs should be used, it is better that the respondent be given an opportunity to give his opinion on the question of his place, rights and obligations with regard to the fate of the child to be born (if and when) from the use of fertilized eggs, and to present his position on this issue to us, to the extent that he is interested in it.
Therefore, even with regard to the operative result, I would like to add my opinion to the opinion of my colleague, the judge D. Barak-Erez.
Yechiel KasherJudge
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It was decided to accept the appeal as stated in paragraph 109 of the judgment of Justice Barak-Erez, with the concurrence of Justice Kasher, against the dissenting opinion of Justice Kanfi-Steinitz.
Given today, January 29, 2026.
Dafna Barak-ErezJudge
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Gila Kanfi-Steinitz Judge
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Yechiel KasherJudge
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