I would like to emphasize that I have not lost sight of the comment of my colleague, the judge G. Kanfi-Steinitz, according to which a short period of time of less than 24 hours passed between the date on which the respondent's sperm was taken and the date of fertilization of the three eggs. However, I am of the opinion that it is not possible to take into account the fact that the respondent had a period of time that is not long enough to share his state of mind with the appellant, in order to exempt him from the duty of disclosure. This is because, in the circumstances of the case at hand, this is the period of time available to the parties to make the decision whether to take sperm from the respondent and use it for the purpose of fertilizing the appellant's eggs - a decision that was clear to all that its results could and are fateful for the appellant. Moreover, even though this is not a long period of time, it is also not a matter of a few minutes in which the respondent did not have the opportunity to gather his thoughts and decide to share his state of mind with the appellant. Indeed, as described above, the time available to the respondent was sufficient for him to share his thoughts with his mother and to consult with her.
Against the background of the above, I am of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case at hand, the three elements of the doctrine of estoppel by reason of silence are met: the respondent's silence created a representation to the appellant that she does not take a risk in fertilizing the eggs extracted from her in the first round of pumping his sperm, beyond the "usual" risk, that between the fertilization and the date on which the respondent's consent will be requested, a change in circumstances will occur, following which the respondent will refuse to give his consent. The appellant relied on this representation and requested that her eggs be fertilized with the respondent's sperm; And in doing so, she changed her situation for the worse, by deciding to fertilize her eggs with the respondent's sperm, while being aware that the respondent's consent would be required to use the fertilized eggs, when there was a real risk that these were the only eggs she could use.