The facts are therefore clear: from the respondent's mouth, not in a statement from the witness stand but in a lawfully prepared affidavit, we learn that at the critical time of the delivery of his sperm for fertilization of the appellant's eggs, the respondent saw his relationship with the appellant as one that was under appeal. More importantly, we learn that at this time the respondent wishes not to participate at all in the process of sperm donation and fertilization ("How to get out of it"), and we hold on to the right granted to him not to allow, in the future, the use of the fertilized eggs, as a remedy in advance for the consequences "His hasty consent"Participate in the fertilization process.
To the importance of the respondent's aforesaid statement, I will also return later on.
Alongside the dwelling on the respondent's state of mind at that critical time, I am of the opinion that it is appropriate to dwell a little on the appellant's situation at that time as well: after the appellant was recently struck with the knowledge that she was seriously ill and that due to the aggressive treatment she had to undergo in order to treat it, it was recommended for her to undergo a procedure for fertility preservation, the appellant discovered that in the extraction of the eggs, only three normal eggs were extracted from her body. An exceptionally low number considering age (p. 15, lines 13-21, of the minutes of the District Court hearing of October 30, 2024). On the advice of her doctors, the appellant decides to fertilize the eggs with the respondent's sperm in order to increase the chance that they can be used in the future - all with the appellant's consent and without revealing to her his state of mind and the fact that there is a real risk that by relying on him, the appellant relies on the support of a broken reed.
After fertilizing the three eggs that were extracted from the appellant into the respondent's sperm, the appellant intended to undergo another round of pumping. However, due to the deterioration of her medical condition, the process of preserving the appellant's fertility was stopped. After several months, during which the appellant underwent six rounds of chemotherapy treatments, the appellant was informed that she would have to undergo a hysterectomy procedure. According to her, at that time the respondent comforted her by saying that she had nothing to fear, since she could always make use of the fertilized eggs that had been frozen. On July 20, 2016, the appellant underwent a hysterectomy procedure, and a month later the respondent informed her that he was interested in ending the marital relationship between them.