Our case is different, since classifying the scope of the search of computer materials from the outset as "seizure of cameras" only, without seizing phones or personal computers, without searching them and without any examination thereof, greatly reduces the concern of disproportionate infringement of the privacy of the owners of the photographed material, and reduces the need to present qualifications to the investigative authorities at the stage of issuing the search warrant. It should be noted that in the present case, too, which deals with the seizure of cameras, we are dealing with computer materials, to which the provisions of section 23a(b) of the Civil Code apply, according to which the court that signs the order is required to determine its terms "in such a manner as not to infringe on a person's privacy beyond what is required", but from the outset, when it comes to such a limited request, the intensity of the concern of disproportionate infringement of privacy is much lessened, compared to the issues discussed in the Urich case. The Magistrate's Court also saw fit to reduce the scope of the violation of rights, by directing that the videos be copied on the spot, to the extent possible.
Nevertheless, the defense is of the opinion that the orders issued for the seizure of the cameras are essentially null and void because they are too general and broad, and could have violated the privacy of hundreds of thousands of residents living in the dense urban areas covered by the orders, when the orders allegedly allowed the investigative unit, for example's sake, to seize almost any camera in Tel Aviv "and to observe private and intimate events of third parties without any restriction" [paras. 158-160 of the summaries]. In these arguments, the defense does not attack the Magistrate's Court's authority to sign such search warrants, but rather the manner in which it exercises its discretion with respect to the scope of the warrant and its limitations, in view of the guidelines established in this context in the Urich case. However, contrary to what is claimed in the defense summaries, I did not find a single statement in any judgment mentioned therein, which states that the erroneous or defective exercise of discretion at the stage of signing the order means the complete nullity of the order, and everything done by virtue of it, in a sweeping manner, is rendered without any legal validity.