Therefore, no difficulty arises with respect to the establishment of the offense of murder in aggravated circumstances, and taking into account the very same circumstances, nor does any difficulty arise in my opinion with respect to the offense of conspiracy. As is well known, this is not the way for conspirators to document the agreements formulated between them in writing or in visual documentation, and therefore the conviction for this offense is often based on circumstantial evidence, as well as on the totality of the data surrounding the perfect offense. In the case before us, we were dealing with a joint activity that was carried out in a group, which involved a division of duties, obtaining extensive advance information, locating and collecting a large amount of equipment, and meticulously planning the joint activity, before, during, and in the hours and days after the murder, all with the aim of bringing about the fatal result. This activity could not have been carried out without a prior connection between the parties who took part in it, and therefore there is no difficulty in determining that this offense was also proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The more complex legal question relates to the status of the defendant and his responsibility for committing these offenses, taking into account the fact that he himself did not participate in the shooting at the deceased, nor was he at any point in the Toyota vehicle in which the shooters were staying and the weapons and ammunition were kept. All that has been proven is that the defendant spent the relevant hours in the additional vehicle, the Mitsubishi car, and that he used the 685 subscription, and against this background the question arises as to whether and to what extent it is appropriate to attribute responsibility to him for each of the offenses in the indictment, and in particular to the offense of murder. Whether, as the accuser petitions, he should be regarded as a joint perpetrator, whether, as the defense petition, he should be acquitted of this offense because he was not aware at all of the intention to harm or kill the deceased, or should he choose an intermediate path and be regarded, for example, as aiding in the commission of the offenses. I will now discuss these issues, using the guidelines and tests set by the Supreme Court inCriminal Appeal 2549/19 M.I. v. Za'atra (January 25, 2022):