Since we are concerned with a pending claim in respect of which the law applies, and in view of the change in the legal situation, I am unable to accept a claim for the existence of an act of the court.
- More than necessary, I will note that I also found a reason in the respondents' argument that a determination that an act of the court took place in our case would lead to the deprivation of the victims of the four terror attacks that were discussed in the case Anonymous, and theirs only. As I noted above, the provision of section 4 of the Law states that it applies to any pending claim. I do not believe that the fact that the respondents in this case filed an appeal on the question of the appellants' liability and that the appeal was heard in relation to the legal situation prior to the enactment of the Model Compensation Law, constitutes a relevant difference between them and other victims who were injured by acts of terror and their claim is pending. It has long been said that the purpose of any law is to promote and preserve the principle of equality (Barak, Interpretation of the Legislation, at p. 566); and that "Between two interpretive possibilities, we should prefer an interpretation that is consistent with the principle of equality to an interpretation that will harm it" (AAA 8223/07) Heim v. Southern Sharon Regional Council, paragraph 17 (June 26, 2011)). Therefore, there is no justification for preferring an interpretation that applies the law differently, and accepting the appellants' argument for the existence of a court action will lead to an undesirable result (Rosen-Zvi, at p. 935).
- Presumption set forth in Section 2(e) and Policy ChangeThe appellants claim that they were not given the opportunity to bring evidence and prove that the presumption did not apply to them. As claimed in the appeal, on February 10, 2025, the legislative situation of the appellants was changed, so that today, instead of the usual compensation policy, there is "a mechanism of support and social assistance that relies on criteria concerning the socioeconomic status of those eligible". This, in their view, is sufficient to prove that the law does not apply to them. According to their position, since the trial court did not allow them to bring such evidence, their right to plead was violated. My opinion is the opinion of the trial court and I am of the opinion that this argument should not be accepted for a number of reasons.
- First, the presumption set forth in section 2(e) does not apply at all in our case. Sections 2(a) and 2(b) list a number of alternatives for a party that may be obligated to pay compensation, for example: (a) the perpetrator of the act of terrorism; (b) the rewarder of terrorism; (c) A person whose liability has been determined in accordance with sections 12 to 14 of the Torts Ordinance. The presumption established in section 2(e) states as follows: "For the purposes of this law, the presumption is that the defendant is Rewarding Terror [...] whether its policy of providing compensation in connection with acts of terrorism is implemented by way of primary legislation, subsidiary legislation, or the provision of instructions for the payment of funds for this purpose." From the language of the provision of the section it appears that the presumption relates only to the matter of an alternative II The above – rewards terror. In our case, the liability of the appellants was determined by virtue of section 12 of the Torts Ordinance and therefore we fall within the scope of an alternative III, so the presumption has no applicability.
In this regard, the appellants claim that "it is unreasonable to assume that the new law will act in favor of one party only, and that the claim will be heard on the basis of a determination on the question of liability given under the 'old law', without allowing the appellants to prove that the new law does not apply to them and to contradict the The Eligibility Itself for punitive damages/for example" [emphasis in underline in the original – 11]. However, a distinction must be made between the question of when it is possible to impose Warranty And between the question of which Compensation It is possible to rule given the same liability. In the matter Anonymous It was held that it is possible to impose liability on the appellants by virtue of section 12 of the Torts Ordinance, but it is not possible to rule By virtue of it Punitive damages. In other words: responsibility – yes; Non-pharmacological compensation – no. In the current state of affairs, the Exemplary Damages Law states that once liability has been established by virtue of section 12 of the Torts Ordinance (which, needless to say, is still in force and is not the "old law"), it is now possible to award exemplary damages as well. In other words: responsibility – yes; Non-pharmacological compensation – yes. In other words, the Model Compensation Law changed the normative situation, but with respect to the question of the type of compensation that can be awarded to the appellants for their liability as a "ratifier" under section 12 of the Torts Ordinance.
- Second, even if I assume that the appellants are liable to pay exemplary damages by virtue of an alternative II, i.e., being a "terror rewarder." Even in this state of affairs, we do not need to require a presumption. According to the definition enumerated in section 1 of the law, a terrorist rewarder is "a person who transfers funds for the benefit of the perpetrator of the terrorist act or to anyone on his behalf." In other words, to the extent that there is concrete evidence of the transfer of funds due to a specific act of terrorism, this is sufficient to establish a payment obligation. The issue of possession relates only to situations in which there is no concrete proof of the transfer of funds due to an act of terrorism Specific. In such cases, the presumption states that it is sufficient In the policy Remuneration prescribed in legislation in order to transfer the burden to the terror rewarder to prove otherwise. However, once the trial court has determined that there are conclusive findings of fact in our case regarding the transfer of funds in the specific case, this is sufficient to fall within the scope of the law and obligate the appellants to pay exemplary damages.
- Third, and far more than necessary, even if there was no concrete evidence of the transfer of funds in the specific case; And even if I assume in favor of the appellants that on February 10, 2025, their policy with regard to the remuneration of acts of terror did indeed change [and I am not at all required by the content of the new legislation, but I will note in a parenthetical article that even with regard to the previous legislation for which the appellants were held liable for being "ratifiers", it is claimed that this is a payment policy Social (See Matter Anonymous, at paragraph 35)] – I still do not believe that this is of any assistance to the appellants in the case before us. Indeed, the language of the law states that a person who rewards terrorism is "who who transmits Finances", in the present tense. Therefore, it can be argued that to the extent that the policy of transferring funds has been stopped and no more funds are actually transferred, in the present time, the presumption is contradicted and the appellants are no longer considered a "terror rewarder" within the meaning of the law [in parentheses, it should be noted that the wording of sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the bill that was transferred to the first reading used the past tense ("rewards terrorism, that he passed consideration for an act of terror"), and turning the law into a desert in the present tense may strengthen this argument even more].
However, the alternative of the terror rewarder does not stand alone. Alongside it is the alternative of "ratifying" the act of terror under section 12 of the Torts Ordinance. We are dealing with an act of terror that took place back in 2001, and there is no dispute that in the period that followed, the PA's policy of remuneration for perpetrators of terrorist acts and their family members was in effect (this policy was the basis of the determination in 2019). Anonymous that the appellants are liable for medical damages by virtue of their being "ratifiers"). It is clear that a change in the policy that was enacted after the act of terror and after years in which the awards were paid does not have the power to negate the applicability of the "ratification" alternative by virtue of section 12 of the Torts Ordinance, which also originates in the appellants' remuneration policy, since "the responsibility of the ratifier in the timeline is in relation to the tort that has already been done." Done" [emphasis added - 10] (Matter Anonymous, in paragraph 17). Therefore, imposing liability on the appellants for being "ratifiers" Looking back - An act of terror that has already been committed, payments that have already been paid. In contrast, a change in policy cannot change actions that have already been done and can affect the application of the law only at a glance Looking to the Future, i.e., with regard to future lawsuits, and we will recall that the cause of action is the act of terrorism – "to the extent that the Palestinian Authority ceases this policy, this will have an impact on its determination of responsibility for terrorist acts in the future" (Matter PA, in paragraph 12). In this regard, see, for example, the rulings of the district courts: Civil Case (Jerusalem District) 20975-06-24 Anonymous v. Palestinian Authority, paragraph 29C and the references there (January 19, 2026); Civil Case (Jerusalem District) 59138-06-23 Anonymous v. Palestinian Authority, paragraph 15 and the references there (July 31, 2025) (both by the judge A. Darel); Civil Case (Jerusalem District) 57423-09-24 Anonymous v. Palestinian Authorityparagraphs 25-26 (July 25, 2025)); Civil Case (Jerusalem District) 60931-09-24 Anonymous v. Palestinian Authority, paragraphs 24-25 (July 29, 2025); Civil Case (Jerusalem District) 40726-08-22 Anonymous v. Palestinian Authority, paragraphs 27-29 (August 6, 2025) (all three by the judge H. M. Lomp); Civil Case 56301-10-21 Anonymous v. Palestinian Authority, paragraphs 11 and 20 (August 11, 2025) (the judge M. Ilani); Bag Civilian (Tel Aviv District) 104-01-21 Anonymous v. Palestinian Authority, paragraphs 20-21 (March 13, 2025) (the judge A. Kalman Brom).
- Application of the Law to Indirect Victims: The appellants claim that the law does not entitle an indirect victim since he was not "harmed by the act of terrorism", and that this is an overextension of the applicability of the law. I cannot accept this argument. In my opinion, both the language of the law and its purposes indicate that it applies to indirect victims as it applies to direct victims.
- As for the language of the law. Section 2(b) establishes the entitlement to receive compensation as follows: "A person is injured by an act of terror and has been permanently disabled." It can already be seen that the section does not determine what is the permanent disability that entitles to compensation, for example, and it can be physical or mental. Moreover, the phrase "victim of a person" does not require that the victim of the act of terror be a direct victim. According to the Alsoja, an indirect victim was also injured As a result The conditions for recognizing him as an indirect victim are, inter alia, a direct impression of the harmful event and proximity to the place and time of the harmful event (for more on this, see Civil Appeal 3619/23 Anonymous v. Palestinian Authority, paragraph 10 (August 20, 2024) (hereinafter: Matter Anonymous 3619/23)). It seems to me that the language of the section also suffers from an interpretation according to which the person who was injured by the act of terror is the indirect victim, since there is a causal connection between the act of terror and his permanent disability.
- As stated, according to the rules of interpretation, where the language suffers from two interpretations, the interpretation that best fulfills the purpose of the law should be chosen. An interpretation according to which the law also applies to indirect victims is consistent with the subjective purpose of the law as reflected in the committee's deliberations:
"The purpose of this law is to dress up in the existing law, insofar as it applies to the situation, and to add to it. If today a minimum threshold of 15% or higher is required for the purpose of the Al-Sokha ruling, then for those who need to prove compliance with these conditions, this is what will apply to them" (Minutes 157 of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, 25th Knesset, 34 (March 5, 2024) (hereinafter: Minutes 157 of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee).