It is not superfluous to note that the right of indirect victims to receive punitive damages has long been recognized in case law (Civil Appeal 71/18 The Palestinian Authority v. Ben Shalom's Heirs, paragraph 114 (10.3.2021) (Interest Ben Shalom)). In this sense, an interpretation according to which the law allows for the award of exemplary damages even to indirect victims does not deviate from what was determined in the past. Therefore, there is no room to intervene in the decision of the trial court in this matter as well.
- [It should be noted that the question may arise as to whether indirect injured persons are required to comply with the conditions of the rule Alsoja In order to be eligible for exemplary compensation according to the law, and in particular, whether they are required to meet the fourth condition, which is the degree of disability, or whether some permanent disability is sufficient. In view of the above quoted from the Committee's minutes; and in view of the determination of this court that a injured party is obligated to prove that he meets all four conditions in order to be considered entitled to punitive damages ( Ben Shalom, at paragraphs 118-121), I am of the opinion that in our case as well, compliance with the conditions of the rule Alsoja necessary in order for an indirect injured party to be able to fall within the scope of section 2(b) of the law. In any event, as the trial court noted this question does not arise in our case, since respondents 3-5 meet the conditions of the rule Alsojaand with regard to respondent 2, since no medical opinion was submitted in his case, it was not proven that he has a permanent disability, which is in any case a condition for the application of the law].
- The amount of exemplary compensationFinally, the appellants argue that the law should be interpreted in such a way that it is determined that the amount specified in it is a maximum amount that should be reduced in accordance with the degree of the appellants' involvement or fault in the specific event; or in relation to the level of disability, so that the maximum amount will be awarded only to those whose permanent disability is 100%. I did not find any substance in these claims. Indeed, awarding identical compensation to a victim who has been determined to have a degree of disability of 100% and to a victim who has been determined to have a disability of 10% contradicts basic concepts in tort law. However, the language of the law is clear and unequivocal – the injured parties will be entitled to compensation."In the amount of". It seems to me that there can be no dispute that the language of the law gives rise to a uniform and fixed amount, which is not subject to the discretion of the court, and cannot be interpreted as determining a maximum amount (compare with other laws in which the legislature determined that the amount of compensation "shall not exceed", language that expresses an intention to a maximum amount of compensation: for example, section 7A of the Prohibition of Defamation Law, 5725-1965; section 31A(a) of the Consumer Protection Law, 5741-1981; Section 15a(a) of the Protection of Privacy Law, 5741-1981).
In view of the clear language of the law, we are not required to meet the purposes of the legislation, but I will note that the Model Compensation Law is intended to give the injured party "compensation that is not dependent on the damage" (Explanatory Notes to the Compensation for Victims of Terrorism (Exemplary Compensation) Bill, 5783-2023, H.H. 975, 142). Therefore, the source of the compensation is not pharmaceutical, and it should not be interpreted as one that depends on the amount of permanent disability. Moreover, an examination of the legislative history shows that "proposals to determine the amount of compensation as the amount of 'ceiling' or 'floor' or as a percentage of the degree of disability were not reflected in the final version of the law" (Matter PA, paragraph 21; See, for example, Transcript 57 of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, at pp. 24-31; Transcript 138 of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, pp. 7-8, 12-13).