Civil Appeal Authority 28822-11-25 Shai Levy v. Tel Aviv Hilton Ltd.

Civil Appeal Authority    28822-11-25

E: Judge  Alex Stein

Our Sugya

1. Is the list detailed in section 3(a) of the Prohibition of Discrimination in Products, Services and Entry to Places of Entertainment and Public Places, 5761-2000 (hereinafter: the Prohibition of Discrimination Law or the Law), a closed list of grounds for which where and where is prohibited - or is it an open list, in light of the language of section 3(c1) of the Law?
2. On this issue, we are required to decide within the scope of the application for leave to appeal before us. This application revolves around the judgment of the Tel Aviv-Jaffa District Court (Judge A.  Cohen, S.N.), which was given on July 17, 2025 in Small Claims Appeal Authority 25911-03-25, in which the Respondent's appeal against the judgment of the Small Claims Court of Tel Aviv-Jaffa (registration of H.  Borochovich Litvin) was accepted, which was granted on February 24, 2025 inSmall Claim 23400-07-24.  The Small Claims Court ruled that the eviction of the Applicant and his son from the "Hilton" Hotel in Tel Aviv (hereinafter: the Hotel), which is operated by the Respondent, while leaving a group of associates of the hotel employee at the site, constitutes prohibited discrimination; This is in light of his interpretation of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law, according to which section 3(c1) expands the list of grounds listed in section 3(a) of the law, while determining that it is an open list.  On the other hand, the District Court ruled that the list of grounds in section 3(a) of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law is a closed list, and that although the hotel's conduct raises a moral-ethical difficulty, it does not amount to prohibited discrimination under the provisions of the law.

Background and Previous Proceedings

3. The applicant, a resident of the city of Kiryat Shmona, was evacuated from his home together with his son after the outbreak of the "Iron Sword" war on October 7, 2023. The Applicant and his son were housed in the Hilton Hotel in Tel Aviv, which is operated, as aforesaid, by the Respondent; The evacuation to the hotel was made in accordance with the referral of the Ministry of Tourism.
4. On December 27, 2023, the hotel's VP of Operations contacted the applicant and other evacuees, demanding that they evacuate the hotel and move to a nearby hotel; This is on the grounds that the hotel will undergo a massive renovation that does not allow the evacuees to continue to be accommodated.
5. Some time later, the Applicant learned that another group of evacuees, who he claimed was close to one of the hotel employees through family and friendship ties, was allowed to stay at the hotel. According to the applicant, when he contacted the hotel's VP of Operations to investigate the matter, the latter denied this, but later explained that the hotel's monetary fund was the one that paid for the continued stay of the evacuees close to the hotel employee.  According to the applicant, the relatives of the same employee admitted to him that they had been asked to ignore the demand for eviction, and had instructed their children to cut off contact with the applicant's son in order to conceal their stay at the hotel.  Eventually, the applicant and his son moved to the nearby Carlton Hotel.
6. When the Applicant was of the opinion that the Respondent's conduct towards him violated the provisions of the Law regarding the prohibition of discrimination, on July 9, 2024, the Applicant filed an action against the Respondent and the Hotel's VP of Operations in the Small Claims Court in Safed. On July 28, 2024, the Small Claims Court in Safed (Registrar   Finian) ordered that the proceeding be transferred to the Small Claims Court in the Tel Aviv District, in view of the lack of local jurisdiction for the Small Claims Court in Safed.

The Small Claims Court's Judgment

7. The Small Claims Court accepted the Applicant's arguments in the matter and ruled that the Respondent had violated the provisions of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law. In parentheses, it should be noted that the court rejected the personal claim filed by the applicant against the hotel's VP of Operations, since he acted as the respondent's organ.
8. At the basis of its rulings, the Small Claims Court noted that the Prohibition of Discrimination Law is intended to remedy a social tort of refusal to provide service or entry to a place of entertainment or a public place due to the refusal to belong to a group. It was also emphasized that discrimination harms human dignity and the fabric of social relations, even if it is not intentional.  Therefore, and as stated above, the court adopted an expansive interpretation of section 3(c1) of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law and ruled that this section expands the grounds for discrimination listed in section 3(a) of the law and allows for the granting of remedies for discrimination even when it is not explicitly included in one of the grounds specified in the law.
9. In applying these principles to the case at hand, the court ruled that the respondent chose to determine as a criterion for staying in the hotel that some of the evacuees were close to the hotel employee. The court rejected the respondent's argument regarding the need for eviction due to a massive renovation, and ruled that even if this were true, no clear criteria were established for the eviction of guests.  It was further noted that the group that remained at the hotel included not only close family members of the employee, but also friends from more distant social circles, and that the respondent's conduct, which included hiding information from the evacuees and failing to talk to them, was far from reasonable and sensitive behavior in the circumstances of the matter.  Therefore, it was held that the criterion of preference for associates amounts to "setting an irrelevant condition" that constitutes prohibited discrimination.
10. As a result of these rulings, the Small Claims Court accepted the Applicant's claim in part, and ordered the Respondent to pay the Applicant compensation in the amount of ILS 25,000 for non-pecuniary damage, as well as legal expenses in the amount of ILS 1,500.

The District Court's Judgment

11. The District Court accepted the Respondent's appeal against the Small Claims Court's ruling, and rejected its expansive interpretation of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law.
12. The District Court ruled that the list of grounds for discrimination listed in section 3(a) of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law is a closed list; that section 3(c1) of the Law, which states that "for the purposes of this section, the determination of conditions that are not relevant to the nature of the matter is also regarded as discrimination", does not stand on its own and does not expand the list of grounds in section 3(a) of the Law; and that the purpose of section 3(c1) is not to create independent grounds for discrimination, but rather to prevent circumvention of the grounds for discrimination listed in section 3(a) by imposing conditions that are not relevant to the refusal.
13. Although the District Court found the Respondent's conduct in the Applicant's case to be problematic and morally difficult, it was ruled that this conduct does not amount to prohibited discrimination under the provisions of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law. In other words, law is separate, and morality is separate (for a classic legal doctrine article on the subject, see: L.A.  Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harvard L.  Rev.  593 (1958)).
14. In light of these rulings, the District Court accepted the appeal filed by the Respondent and annulled the Small Claims Court's ruling. The District Court recommended that the Respondent act beyond the letter of the law and waive the return of the funds received by the Applicant by virtue of the revoked judgment, but clarified that it did not obligate it to do so.  In light of the Respondent's conduct, the Applicant was not charged with expenses.

The parties' arguments

15. According to the Applicant, the District Court erred in its restrictive interpretation of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law, since, according to the Applicant, this interpretation is contrary to the purposes of the Law.
16. The Applicant emphasizes that section 3(c1) of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law supports a broad interpretation, since this section is intended to deal with situations in which discrimination is not expressly included in the grounds listed in section 3(a). According to him, the fact that grounds have been added to the law over the years does not create a negative arrangement, and there is nothing to prevent the legislature from defining central protection groups without denying protection to additional groups of victims of discrimination that were not explicitly defined in the law.  The Applicant further adds that it is possible to learn an equal derivative from the Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 5748-1988, where the labor courts interpreted the list of grounds prohibiting discrimination as an open list.  Moreover, the Applicant argues that the Respondent's conduct requires that the compensation be left in place, by virtue of the laws of torts and due to the mental anguish caused to him and his son.
17. The Applicant is of the opinion that the fundamental question regarding the interpretation of the list of grounds in the Prohibition of Discrimination Law has not yet been decided in the case law of this Court - which justifies granting permission to appeal the judgment of the District Court in a "third incarnation".
18. On December 18, 2025, I determined that the request for leave to appeal requires an answer, and I instructed the respondent to submit its response to the application, which was filed on January 8, 2026.
19. In its response, the respondent relies on the judgment of the District Court, and argues that the application for leave to appeal should be rejected. According to the Respondent, in this case there are no reasons justifying the granting of leave to appeal "in a third incarnation", and that the language and purpose of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law clearly indicate that the list of grounds for discrimination listed in section 3(a) of the Law is a closed list.  The Respondent is of the opinion that section 3(c1) of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law is intended only to prevent circumvention of the grounds that exist in section 3(a) by setting conditions that are not of the same kind.  The Respondent justifies this position, inter alia, by the fact that the legislature itself added grounds to the list explicitly in legislative amendments, which proves the closed nature of the list of grounds.  Therefore, the respondent is of the opinion that not every unequal conduct amounts to prohibited discrimination that falls within the scope of the law.

Discussion and Decision

20. After reviewing the writings that the parties placed before us, I have reached the conclusion that we would do well to hear this application as an appeal within the framework of our powers under Regulations 149(2)(b) and 138(a)(5) of the Civil Procedure Regulations, 5779-2018. I am also of the opinion that we would do well to dismiss the appeal on its merits and leave the judgment of the District Court in place.
21. Sections 3(a) and 3(c1) of the Prohibition of Discrimination Law, which are the focus of our discussion, are drafted as follows:

"3(a).  A person who is engaged in the provision of a public product or service or in the operation of a public place shall not discriminate in the provision of the public product or service, in the provision of entry to a public place or in the provision of a service in a public place, because of race, religion or religious group, nationality, country of origin, sex, sexual orientation, outlook, party affiliation, age, personal status, parenthood or wearing the uniform of the security and rescue forces or wearing their symbols.