The defendant further argues that with regard to the plaintiff's conduct with regard to the sale of the other apartments in the building, with regard to the Goldberg apartment and with regard to a mortgage from Bank Leumi, the plaintiff claims, only with regard to the loan she took from the defendant, that it is null and void since Feldman, her husband, 'worked on it', did not explain anything to her, and so did Adv. Winder, and that she did not read the documents and did not understand them. This is despite the fact that the plaintiff signed no less than 112 signatures on a number of loan agreements over a period of no less than three years and two months - without any coercion or coercion, when she was represented, she received the loan money and even used it to repay the mortgage she took from Bank Leumi.
It was argued that in these circumstances, in which the plaintiff's version is so illogical and even false, the presumption of falsehood should be applied in connection with it, as determined in other Municipality Applications 765/18 Shmuel Hayoun v. Elad Hayoun (May 1, 2019). It was argued that support for this can be found in the testimony of Feldman, her husband, who testified (in the Goldberg case) that he was lying and even falsifying documents, given that not only is the plaintiff's version illogical and contrary to the logic of life, but it is also contrary to the provisions of the law. This is all the more so in view of the plaintiff's failure to present the mortgage documents that she herself took from Bank Leumi - in order to show what the plaintiff signed there and what the terms of that mortgage were and what was explained to her. It was argued that a reflection of the plaintiff's testimony was also found in the words of the Honorable Justice Grossman, who discussed the application for an injunction that was filed by the plaintiff in paragraph 24 of her decision of June 29, 2023.
- On the merits of the claims, the defendant claims that it fully complied with the duties imposed on it by law. Thus, it was argued that - contrary to the plaintiff's claims - the defendant did not have any duty of explanation on the relevant dates for signing the loan agreement. In this regard, the defendant refers to the language of section 3 of the Fair Credit Law, which before Amendment 5, which came into effect only on August 25, 2019, stated: "A lender who is about to sign a loan contract with a borrower, shall give him a copy of it and a reasonable opportunity to review it before signing it, and shall also give him a signed copy of it after the signature" - i.e., it does not establish any duty of explanation as claimed by the plaintiff. It was further argued that similarly, the plaintiff did not explain the source in the law to her claims according to which the defendant applies: the obligation to explain the legal and economic aspects orally by the lender or an attorney on his behalf; the obligation to sign the borrower with the lender; the obligation not to suffice with the borrower's signature before his representative; and the obligation to ensure that the borrower understands the essence of the loan agreement and its implications - all of these obligations that do not exist by law.
According to the defendant, even though the claims as detailed above were raised by her in the framework of the statement of defense, and yes, in the framework of the statement of defense, the defendant referred to the ruling to which the plaintiff referred, the plaintiff chose not to file a reply to all that this entailed.
- Moreover, it was argued that even though the defendant was not imposed on the defendant any duty of explanation and so much more, even though in accordance with the provisions of the law, there was no obligation to verify a signature by a lawyer in order for the loan agreement to come into effect - the defendant chose to refer the plaintiff to sign the loan agreement before a lawyer, who confirmed that the terms of the loan and its meaning had been explained to the plaintiff prior to its signature. With regard to the lawyer's approval, the defendant argues that in the framework of the case law, it was explicitly determined with respect to the bank - and all the more so with regard to a non-bank lender to whom there is no obligation to explain or verify a signature - that he is entitled to assume upon receipt of the mortgage deed signed by a lawyer, that explanations were indeed given to the couple who took out a mortgage, and this applies even more strongly where the applicant signed the mortgage deed in front of a lawyer who did not represent the bank or at the bank branch, and therefore cannot To raise an argument that it was misled by the bank at the time of signing (the defendant refers in this matter to the rulings of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal 11519/04 Yaffa Levkowitz v. Bank Hapoalim in a Tax Appeal (7/7/05) (hereinafter: "the Levkowitz case").
- The defendant further argues that there is no substance to the plaintiff's claims in which she is trying to cast aspersions on Adv. Winder, who verified her signature and confirmed that he clarified to her the terms of the transaction she signed. With regard to this, the defendant begins by arguing that the plaintiff should not be allowed to rely on an alleged recording that was made with Adv. Winder - when such a recording was not presented at all in the framework of the legal proceeding, and all its content is only that reflected in the plaintiff's counsel's questions.
Moreover, it was argued that we should not accept, in support of the plaintiff's arguments that Adv. Winder does not explain the details of the transaction and the risks involved in it, when he approves a signature and signs a certificate such as the one he signed in his case - the testimony of the two witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff - Akiva Grinzig and Leah Stul - who testified that they could have come to Adv. Winder for the purpose of signing mortgage deeds, and this did not clarify to them the significance of the transaction and the risks involved in it. Rather, they signed and verified their signature and nothing more. As to these testimonies, the defendant points out that these witnesses are connected by a family connection to the plaintiff's attorney (even though the witness - Akiva - concealed this connection and claimed only that he 'did the lawyer a favor'). The defendant also referred to contradictions in the testimonies of these witnesses. In addition, the defendant referred to the fact that these witnesses - even though they approached Adv. Winder as part of an exercise in order to present evidence relating to this in this proceeding - chose not to record the meeting between them and Adv. Winder and made do with their affidavit, in which they claimed that the meeting had taken place. In this context, it was claimed that only in the course of his cross-examination did the witness Akiva claim that he wanted to make a recording of the encounter, but that he had a malfunction in the recording device. The defendant claims that this version is not only suppressed, but in any case it was not explained by the witness why - insofar as he did ask to record the conversation but there was a malfunction - he did not have another meeting with Adv. Winder, who was recorded.