It was argued that in the face of these testimonies, Adv. Winder's testimony sounded credible and he testified to the one and only truth, which also emerges from the documents signed by the plaintiff and verified by him - according to which he warned the plaintiff and also clarified to her the risks involved in the transaction. Similarly, Adv. Winder testified that he also warned the witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff about the significance of the transaction, including that, even though he did not go over the entire document with them, he explained the meaning of the document, i.e., that they sign a mortgage, take a loan and mortgage the house for this purpose, and the meaning is that as long as the loan is not repaid, the bank can remove the signatories from the house and they have no way of defending themselves.
- According to the defendant, in light of all the aforesaid and from the evidence as presented, it became clear that the defendant had fulfilled the duty of disclosure, which is the only duty imposed on it by virtue of the provisions of the law and case law, since all the details of the transaction were detailed in the framework of the loan agreements that the plaintiff signed without coercion or rape - and this claim was not even raised by the plaintiff. It was argued that in these circumstances, even if Adv. Winder was negligent in his duties, this argument does not entitle the plaintiff to any relief against the defendant, but at most against Adv. Winder or her husband.
- Without derogating from the aforesaid, it was argued that even if Adv. Winder was negligent in his duties - in any case on three other occasions - other attorneys verified the plaintiff's signature, and even these confirmed that they explained to the plaintiff the meaning of the agreements she signed. It was argued that the plaintiff chose not to bring to testify the other attorneys whose signatures were verified (except for Attorney Sweet, who testified on behalf of the defendant and testified that he explained the significance of the transaction to the plaintiff), and that this omission shows an evidentiary presumption against this claim. Moreover, the defendant refers to the fact that the plaintiff raised a version as to the manner in which she signed the first loan agreement, but did not present any version as to the manner in which she signed the other agreements, nor as to the manner in which the other lawyers who verified her signature warned her and confirmed that they explained to her what she was signing. It was argued that in response to the defendant's questions regarding the additional signatures, the plaintiff replied only that she did not remember - that is, she did not present a factual version. Moreover, the defendant refers to the fact that the plaintiff attached to the statement of claim the loan agreement as well as most of the appendices that were signed - i.e., these were in her possession. Despite this, the plaintiff did not explain why, over the course of more than two years, which elapsed from the date she signed the first loan agreement, until the date she signed the appendices, she did not examine the agreement that she had in her possession, nor did she examine Adv. Winder in the context of her other signatures, with all that this entails.
- Moreover, according to the defendant, the plaintiff's claims are in the form of "nothing was done", since the plaintiff claims that she signed the documents without understanding what was written in them. According to the defendant, in the framework of the case law, it was determined that in order to lift the burden on a claim of the type "nothing was done", the plaintiff had to present positive evidence, whereas in our case the factual version is based only on the testimonies of the plaintiff and her husband, which should be questioned and in any case should be treated as a single testimony. Moreover, according to the defendant, the plaintiff's claims indicate that she signed with blind reliance on her husband. It was argued that in light of this and in accordance with the case law, the plaintiff was prevented from raising the claim that she did not understand what she was signing.
- The defendant further admits that the plaintiff's signature does not appear on the last debt arrangement - however, according to the defendant, the plaintiff will not benefit from this - on the contrary - since, in the absence of application to this arrangement - which improves the situation - the plaintiff - the amount of debt that the plaintiff must bear is even higher than what is thought.
- Moreover, it was argued that the plaintiff's claims, according to which nothing was explained to her, contradict the testimony of Feldman, her husband, and accordingly she knew that a mortgage in the sum of ILS 2,500,000 was taken out from the outset, because she knew that the fund was being increased to ILS 4,170,000 and that everything was for the needs of the couple and of their own free will, and moreover, that he knew in real time that he was mortgaging the house.
- In addition, according to the defendant, she presented documents showing that a sum of ILS 2,585,000 was transferred directly to the private accounts of the plaintiff and her husband. It was claimed that the plaintiff approved the receipt of these sums, but testified that when the sums arrived they were "passed on" by her husband. However, according to the defendant, the plaintiff did not present any document or reference showing that the funds were indeed transferred and moreover, the plaintiff did not even testify that she had examined the current account transactions indicating this, but only claimed that she relied on her husband's words. It was argued that on the other hand, Feldman testified that the money was indeed transferred by the defendant to his and the plaintiff's private accounts, and that from that date the defendant had no ability or control over the continued movement of the funds from these accounts.
It was further claimed that contrary to the plaintiff's claims that the funds were not in her favor, Feldman himself testified that the plaintiff agreed to take the loan from the defendant according to the terms, in order to serve Feldman through a single family unit. Moreover, it was argued that the plaintiff, who denies the purposes of the loan, and even though she herself did not pay anything for the loan, claims that she should be credited with the payments for the interest on the loan, which were made by the Builders and Protectors Company.
- The defendant further claims that the plaintiff made mere allegations of oppression, but did not prove financial pressure or exceptional circumstances on her part that support these claiMs.
- Moreover, according to the defendant, the plaintiff did not prove that the interest set in the loan was illegal or unreasonable. In this regard, the defendant points out that the plaintiff did not attach the mortgage documents that the couple took from Bank Leumi in order to show the interest that was charged to them from this bank. In this regard, the defendant emphasizes that the opinion that the plaintiff attached regarding the expected repayments of Bank Leumi's mortgage was based on an erroneous assumption that the amount of the mortgage was less than ILS 1 million. This is in contrast to Feldman's testimony, who confirmed that the mortgage was in the sum of over ILS 1 million, and in addition, contrary to the registration in the Land Registry - which shows that this was a mortgage that stood at the sum of ILS 2 million at the time it was taken - a fact that negates the expert opinion on behalf of the plaintiff, whose starting point for calculation is incorrect. It was further emphasized that this expert did not make any opinion regarding the amount of the current debt and testified that he did not examine it and does not challenge it.
Moreover, with regard to the reasonableness of the interest collected by it, the defendant refers to a loan agreement that Feldman entered into with another company - Tama 19 Miller on March 14, 2018, according to which the contractual interest rate was 31.1%, while the arrears interest rate was 42.14% per annum, including a tax appeal (in support of this, the defendant refers to Appendix 13 to her affidavits as well as to Feldman's testimony from line 15 on page 140 to line 4 on page 141).
- The defendant further claims that there was no proof of any financial entanglement on the part of Feldman or of the Bonim and Protected Company prior to taking the loan from it in 2017. On the contrary, it was claimed that Feldman's testimony showed that the entanglement began in 2021. The defendant further points out that the apartment in which the plaintiff and her husband live, which is the subject of the hearing, is not an ordinary apartment, but rather a penthouse apartment that extends over approximately 155 square meters - in addition to the building that Feldman himself built. It was argued that Feldman's testimony that at the time of taking the loan he was not in financial trouble is supported both by the fact that the Bonim and Protected Company repaid close to ILS 2 million in interest over the years, and that according to Feldman's testimony these were payments that were transferred "from within the project in Rehovot" and that Bank Hapoalim approved an increase in credit to Savyoni in 2022 to a total of ILS 3 million.
- Finally - with regard to the plaintiff's arguments regarding the transaction permit - it was first argued that in the framework of the clause that determines the application of the transaction permit, it was expressly determined that in any case of contradiction between the provisions of this section and any of the clauses of the agreement, the provisions of the agreement would prevail. Therefore, it was argued that the transaction permit clause does not negate the provisions of the agreement, including those relating to interest. Moreover, it was argued that in any event, the witness's affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff regarding the significance of the transaction permit should not be accepted, when his testimony was not brought as an opinion. With regard to this, it was first argued that it was not proven that the witness who gave the affidavit constituted the witness who was appointed as an expert, and furthermore, it was argued that this affidavit should not be accepted when the plaintiff did not give any explanation for her improper conduct in bringing the witness's testimony as an affidavit and not as an opinion, and she did not even petition to correct her failure to bring an opinion on the matter. It was argued that in these circumstances, the defendant's duty should not be attributed to her lawful refusal to cross-examine the witness, and his affidavit should not be accepted as evidence.
Moreover, it was argued that in any event, in accordance with the case law, the nature of the transaction permit should be examined as any agreement is examined - that is, according to the intentions of the parties and accordingly, it should be determined whether it is an investment agreement or a regular loan contract. According to the defendant in the present case, the intention of the parties was to enter into a loan transaction - the terms of which were clear and signed lawfully, all while the loan was promised in a mortgage that was duly registered in all the registers. In these circumstances, it was argued that the clause that states that this is a transaction permit does not change the nature of the transaction as a loan transaction and nullifies the obligation of the borrowers to repay the loan according to its terMs.
- In light of all of the above, it was argued that all of the plaintiff's claims should be rejected and her claim should be dismissed, while cancelling the injunction that was issued delaying the continuation of the execution proceedings for the realization of the apartment.
the plaintiff's arguments in the summaries of the reply on her behalf;
- In the summaries of the reply on her behalf, the plaintiff argues that in practice, the defendant admitted in her summaries that she was satisfied with a formal disclosure, but did nothing actively to ensure that the plaintiff understood the meaning of the agreements she signed and the risks involved in them, including the consequences for her home. It was further argued that the defendant was prevented from claiming the presumption of understanding on behalf of the plaintiff, while the defendant itself disavowed the legal and commercial significance of the "transaction permit" clause that it included in its agreements. It was argued that it was not possible for the defendant to relate to the plaintiff a higher level of understanding than that demonstrated by the defendant in relation to the agreements, and therefore, her claims should be dismissed due to lack of good faith and estoppel.
- It was further argued that in accordance with the ruling, a non-bank lender has increased debts than those of a bank, both in light of the weakened population that turns to the non-bank lender, which is more exposed to abuse, and since, unlike banks that operate in accordance with the regulation, the defendant operates in a vacuum. In this regard, it was argued that the aforesaid applies even more strongly given that the defendant herself testified that she was acting without orderly work procedures.
- The plaintiff further argues that a distinction must be made between the ruling presented by the defendant and our case. Thus, it was argued that in the Levkowitz case , a temporary relief was discussed, in which it was determined that the plaintiff submitted it with unclean hands, and when the lawyer who signed it was not investigated at all, and therefore the factual basis was not examined. Moreover, it was argued that in the Gilman case, the plaintiff did not raise any claim against the lawyer before whom she signed the mortgage deed, and in addition, it was determined that she did not rely on blind reliance, but signed after consulting with her husband and her lawyer and understanding the document. It was argued that in the case at hand - the lawyer did not explain anything to the plaintiff and this was clarified after his interrogation. It was further argued that in this case the words of the Honorable Justice Amit, which referred to blind reliance on reliable counsel on the signatory, should not be applied, whereas in the circumstances of the present case it was proven that the plaintiff came to sign before Adv. Winder only for the technical purpose of verifying her signature and not for the purpose of receiving legal advice.
- In addition, the plaintiff argues that the claims against her, which are based on the presumption of falsehood, should be rejected - both because the plaintiff did not buy a strike in the case law, and in addition, since its foundations do not exist in this case, since the plaintiff did not lie on substantive issues, but at most the contradictions in her testimony relate to marginal and peripheral matters.
- The plaintiff requests that importance be attributed to the short section that the defendant attributed to a significant and central issue in the plaintiff's argument - the issue of the transaction permit. As regards this, it was argued that the defendant did not deal with the substantive argument that in circumstances in which the business failed, the business permit does not exempt the borrower from restitution. It was further argued that the defendant chose to quote a general ruling on the meaning of the parties' intention, but did not present a factual version on its behalf, and in general, did not analyze why in the circumstances of the case the contract should not be regarded as an investment contract. It was argued that the defendant's failure to present such a version was even more acute in light of the fact that the defendant admitted that the clause had significance, since it was included in the borrower's request, but she refrained from specifying what was the economic or legal intention of that meaning. It was argued that since the defendant did not present any contradictory version or explanation that reconciles the existence of the clause with the definition of the transaction as a regular loan, it did not lift the burden to contradict the plaintiff's claim, and according to the parties' intentions in real time, it was to create an investment transaction subject to the terms of the Business A permit. It was further argued in this regard that the fact that the agreement is drafted as a loan agreement does not negate its essence as an investment agreement, and that just as any bank loan that is subject to a business permit is defined from a legal and halachic point of view as a joint transaction of investment, so too in its case. It was argued that the businesspermit A is not a meaningless religious appendix, but rather a contractual tool intended to prevent the prohibition of interest by changing the nature of the transaction from a regular loan to an investment transaction subject to the terms of the permit. It is further argued that in its summaries the defendant casts doubt on Rabbi Bronfman's expertise and claims that no lawful opinion was submitted, but in doing so it seeks to evade the substantive discussion concerning the meaning of the term heter transaction formulated by it and its implications for the circumstances of our case and the fact that it is not in dispute that all the funds went down the drain and therefore in any case there is no obligation to repay except for the loan principal minus the amounts paid.
- In addition, the plaintiff argues that there is no substance to the defendant's attempt to cast aspersions on witnesses on her behalf Akiva and Leah - in the context of their testimony, the plaintiff begins by noting that there is no obligation to prove under Israeli law by means of a recording and that their affidavit, which constitutes direct testimony and teaches us about Adv. Winder's negligent method and pattern of action, is sufficient.
- In conclusion, it was argued that the plaintiff's omission should not be blamed on the testimony of Attorney Melman, who verified the plaintiff's signature in one of the appendices. In this regard, it was argued that the defendant's claims that she fulfilled the duty of disclosure and explanation are in the realm of admission and dismissal, and therefore, the defendant should have brought Adv. Melman to testify in order to support her claiMs.
- In light of all the above, the plaintiff reiterated her arguments and requested that her claim be accepted.
Discussion and Decision;
- In the proceeding, two evidentiary hearings were held. The first was on May 22, 2025 - Rabbi Bronfman appeared for this hearing, who submitted an affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff, but the defendant raised an argument and accordingly this witness submitted an affidavit under the submission of an opinion, and therefore, the witness was not cross-examined, while the defendant maintained her claims regarding the admissibility of his affidavit; the plaintiff's witnesses were cross-examined: Moti Rosenfeld, CPA; Mr. Grinzig Akiva; Mrs. Leah Stul; the plaintiff; Mr. Yehezkel Feldman - her husband. Also testified at this hearing on behalf of the defendant: Attorney Yona Winder. Another hearing was held on July 15, 2025, in which the defendant testified on behalf of Mr. Roy Frishman and Mr. Tal Matuk. At the end of the discussion, instructions were given regarding the submission of summaries, which were submitted.
- When all the evidence was presented to the court, including this, the witnesses of the parties testified and the parties submitted their summaries, the time came for the decision - in which I will precede the first conclusion - after I have examined all the arguments and evidence, I am satisfied that the claim should be dismissed. Once my decision has been detailed, I will turn to the details of the reasoning that underlies it.
- As emerges from the summary of the plaintiff's arguments, her arguments can be divided into two main divisions - the first revolved around the validity of the plaintiff's signature on the loan agreement, its appendices and the debt arrangements - including in light of the plaintiff's claims regarding the scope of the disclosure and explanatory duties that apply to the defendant and, accordingly, their breach against her by the defendant, and also, in light of her claims that the defendant was negligent towards her or that the agreement and its appendices were signed under coercion and oppression. As a result of these arguments, the plaintiff argues that the law of the loan agreement and the appendices signed by the plaintiff are null and void, or at least some of their provisions should be changed. The second category of arguments revolved around the provisions of a specific clause in the loan agreement entitled "Heter Iska" - which applies to the provisions of the agreement, according to the plaintiff's approach, specific provisions in the light of which, even to the extent that the agreement and its appendices are to be given effect - in any case, the plaintiff is at most obligated to repay the principal of the loan, and even this while deducting any payment that was made on account of the loan over the years.
Below I will examine these arguments of the plaintiff, first first and last but last.
- the plaintiff's claims regarding the validity of her signature on the agreement and the appendices that are the subject of the hearing;
The main normative examination with regard to this argument revolved around an examination of the scope of the debts that apply to the defendant and its beginning with the Fair Credit Law (formerly known as the Non-Bank Loans Regulation Law). In the framework of Section 3 of this Law, the lender has a cogent duty of disclosure, which obligates him to provide the borrower with a copy of the loan contract before signing it, and to allow him a reasonable time to review it. It was further determined that the contract must include full disclosure of material details, including the details of the borrowers and guarantors of the agreement; the amount of the loan; the amount actually received by the borrower at the time the loan agreement was made; details regarding interest rates; the rate of the actual cost of the credit; the type of linkage, the rate of linkage, and the basis for it; the rate of the maximum cost of credit applicable to the loan; The loan period, the amounts of payments to be repaid and their dates; the steps that the lender may take in the event of non-payment; the interest rate of arrears; and the possibility of early repayment.