In the Tishler case, it was argued by the bank that the general terms of the transaction (Appendix B to the claim, as well as the other documents signed by the debtor on the basis of which the claim was filed) are "letters of equality" between the giver/bank and the receiver/debtor, i.e., written agreements that determine the manner of calculating the fixed amount given by the receiver/debtor to the giver against whom the giver/bank agreed to waive the condition that the recipient take a severe oath required of him according to the "transaction".
As for these, it was held that: "They are in accordance with the terms of the 'deal' deed ... According to the poskim, there is no impediment to the equalization agreement being made in determining a fixed amount, even in the form of percentages (27 per 100 in the example cited in the book Meir Einim of Rabbi Yehoshua Pelek, letter 3) and that it should be done even before the fate of the "deal" is clarified (see Responsa Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh De'ah, paragraph 87 [8]), and there is no doubt that the making of the equalization agreement is also for the benefit of the recipient/debtor, since if the recipient/debtor gives the agreed amount of equivalence, the giver/bank will not be able to sue the debtor who swears, on the other hand, despite the existence of the equivalence agreement, the recipient/debtor is entitled to take an oath and then will be exempt from the profits of the "transaction" as well as from his obligations under the equivalence agreement." [My emphasis is L.B.]
The court further clarified that:
"It follows that after the conclusion of the equivalence agreement, the recipient has two options: he will pay the profits of the deposit or he will be exempt from paying them altogether, if there are no profits, after he has taken a severe oath as a condition of the "transaction" deed.
If the recipient chooses not to swear, he will pay the giver the profits at the rate specified in the equalization agreement and will be exempt from an oath.