Dr. Plato-Shinar notes that the duty of disclosure imposed on the bank vis-à-vis the mortgage is a duty of disclosure in the broad sense, which, according to her, includes several subsidiary duties, including: the duty to disclose data in the narrow sense, relating to data external to the contract; the duty to emphasize material matters; the duty to provide an explanation as to its full meaning, the results and implications of the transaction; and the duty to ensure that the data and explanations provided are understood (see the discussion in the third chapter of her book, which deals with "The Banking Duty of Trust - Its Essence, Scope and Extent", at pp. 71-111).
- In my opinion, the District Court was correct in determining that the bank breached its obligations to the respondent. The information that was not provided to it in relation to the amount of the existing debt is material information that belongs to the initial circles of the duty of disclosure - those that are close to the core of the duty of disclosure (More in this context: Civil Appeal 4080/04 Gilat v. United Mizrahi Bank, paragraph 8 of Justice Barak's judgment ([Published in Nevo], 9.10.2005)).
- The Bank reiterated to us that the Respondent signed the Commitment "to ensure full and accurate payment of all amounts Those who arrive and/or will arrive to the bank from the borrower and/or the mortgagee in connection with the provision of banking services". According to him, there is no basis for the respondent's claims with respect to the loans given to the husband After taking out the mortgage, whose obligation also included all future debts. Prima facie, the bank is correct that in light of the determination that the respondent knew that it was a mortgage note, and in view of the fact that it was agreed to pay "All Amounts Those who arrive and/or will arrive To the bank [emphasis added - M.N.]" - The Respondent cannot be heard in the arguments regarding the loans given After The date of signing the mortgage. In light of the language of the deed, its obligation encompasses them as well. However, the problem is not found on this level, but rather at an earlier point in time - the bank should have informed the respondent that Before By signing the mortgage deed, there was already a considerable debt. If the bank had fulfilled its duty and informed the Respondent in this matter, it would indeed appear that the Respondent's claims regarding the debts that were created After The signing of the deed would have been postponed, based on the language of the agreement she had signed. However, similar to the ruling of Justice Danziger in the Sultani case, if the respondent had known that she was being asked to sign a mortgage for past debts and future debts in an account in which there was already a debt balance Significant, and especially when the mortgage is in relation to the residence - there is no certainty that the respondent was willing to sign the mortgage. In these circumstances, the bank's argument that from the moment it was determined that the respondent knew that she was signing a mortgage deed, there was no room at all to examine its own conduct and the explanation given to the respondent in any way that was not given. The hearing in the District Court did not stop, and rightly so, on the question of whether the Respondent knew that she was signing a mortgage, a question to which she was answered in the affirmative, and proceeded to examine the other circumstances of the signature.
- The bank argues that the significance of the District Court's rulings is that "all real estate mortgage transactions signed by lawyers in Israel no longer fulfill what is required."
And it is not. The world order remains as it was, and the judgment does not constitute "revolutionary" rulings. Also in the Sultani case, Justice Danziger suggested: