Other reasons that we enumerated in the Zelig case for the preference for the broad interpretation were rooted in the fact that the purpose deriving from the hierarchical structure of the police does not justify a distinction between the various normative sources that authorize the Labor Court to hear the claim; The Supreme Court's ruling shows a clear trend of giving an expansive interpretation of section 93A of the Ordinance, taking into account the purpose underlying it. In the Pozaylov case, a broad interpretation of section 93A of the Ordinance was established so that it applies even if monetary remedies were involved in the cause of action, and in the Yakubov case, it was held that there is no room for a decision on the matters listed in section 93A in Guerra, even if this would lead to a split of the hearing, despite the burden inherent in it; The argument regarding the uniqueness of the principle of equality, in and of itself, does not justify the preference for a narrow interpretation, when these issues are also discussed in the administrative courts; The main function of section 14 It is in the construction of the spectrum of remedies, since the matters listed in Chapter D of the Law in any case fall within the scope of the jurisdiction of the Labor Court by virtue of section 24(a)(1) of the Labor Court Law; If the interpretation claimed by the appellant is accepted, then different grounds in the context of a single act of dismissal will be heard in different instances.
- Does the judgment given in the Zelig case have any implications for the case at hand, with a preference for a broad interpretation? In our opinion, the answer to this question is negative, for two reasons: First, in the Zelig case, we addressed the question of the scope of the interpretation of section 93A of the Police Ordinance (which is equivalent to section 129 of the Prisons Ordinance) in relation to the authority of the Labor Court. In that matter, the language of the law was an anchor for the interpretive dilemma that arose, i.e., whether to adopt a broad or narrow interpretation, since sections 93A and 129 explicitly referred to section 24 of the Labor Court Law. The scope of the doubt was the scope of their referral, i.e., whether to section 24(a)(1) or also to section 24(a)(5) of the Labor Court Law. However, in our case, there is no anchor in the language of the law for the interpretive dilemma that is alleged between the Discharged Soldiers Law and the Police Ordinance and the Prisons Ordinance, since section 93A of the Police Ordinance and section 129 of the Prisons Ordinance do not refer to discharged soldiers in the law. Second, as quoted above, in the Zelig case, the first reason for the preference for a broad interpretation was rooted in legislative history. This is because at the time section 93A of the Police Ordinance (and section 129 of the Prisons Ordinance) was enacted, the Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities Law was enacted, and in any event, section 24(a)(5) of the Labor Court Law had not yet been enacted. Therefore, the silence of the legislature in section 93 in relation to the Equal Rights for Persons with Disabilities Law does not indicate a preference for the narrow interpretation. However, in this case, this reasoning does not apply. This is not only because sections 93A and 129 were enacted after the Discharged Soldiers Law, but the explanatory notes – as quoted above – indicate the legislature's intention to introduce a negative, rather than positive, arrangement with respect to the arrangements set forth in the Discharged Soldiers Law.
- The state argues that since the court is not authorized to hear the release of a prison guard from service, it is clear that the court will also not be able to acquire jurisdiction to hear this issue in the framework of an appeal against the decision of the Employment Committee by virtue of section 23 of the Discharged Soldiers Law. According to this argument of the State, since the Tribunal is not authorized to conduct judicial review proceedings on the decision of the Employment Committee, then the Employment Committee does not have the authority to hear the matter. We are unable to accept this argument. The issue that arises before us is who is the court with the primary procedural authority to hear the claim, and not which instance is authorized to conduct judicial review of the Employment Committee's decision (for the distinction between procedural-original authority and judicial review authority, see: Labor Appeal (National) 55491-12-17 State of Israel - Wage Commissioner - Zemer Local Council [published in Nevo] (August 5, 2019), paragraphs 53-54 and references therein). Even if the state's argument regarding the court authorized to conduct judicial review of the Employment Committee's decision is accepted – and we do not express any position on this at this stage, since it is beyond the scope of the discussion – it means that the judicial review of the Employment Committee's decision in relation to a soldier or prison guard will be before the Administrative Affairs Court (and not before the Labor Court). The determination of the identity of the court competent to conduct judicial review does not affect the identity of the body with the primary procedural authority to hear the application. We reiterate that we did not pretend in the framework of this appeal to decide the question of the court competent to conduct judicial review of the decision of the Employment Committee in relation to a police officer or prison guard, and the parties' arguments in this regard are reserved for them.
- Another argument of the state is that the Employment Committee lacks the authority to discuss an indirect attack on the legality of the dismissal, since section 76 of the Courts Law does not apply to it, and therefore there is no point in holding a hearing before it. In our opinion, in the present case, there is no need to address the scope of the application of section 76 of the Courts Law to the Employment Committee (which is an administrative body that exercises quasi-judicial powers) or to the question of the committee's authority to decide on the legality of the dismissal as a matter of dispute by virtue of another normative source. The reason for this is that the authority of the Employment Committee to address the question of whether the dismissal is contrary to the provisions of the Discharged Soldiers Law is directly vested in it by virtue of the combination of section 41A and section 21 of the Discharged Soldiers Law. In this spirit, it was stated in Labor Appeal (National) 347/06 State of Israel - Ministry of Defense - Stipulate Industries in Tax Appeal [published in Nevo] (January 3, 2007). Thus it is stated:
"The Employment Committee operates in accordance with the Discharged Soldiers (Return to Work) Law. This law deals, for our purposes, with the relationship between an employee's place of work and his status as a reservist. The law prohibits the dismissal of an employee due to his reserve service. There can be no doubt that the authority and discretion of the Employment Committee range in this area of the relationship between the workplace and reserve service. The Employment Committee is not the body that supervises the conduct of the employer. It is not a disciplinary court. It is not a labor court and has neither authority nor tools to examine the correctness of the dismissal process. Similarly, the committee is not authorized to step into the shoes of the employer and consider in his place "economic", "organizational" or "feasibility" considerations of one kind or another. It is not for this purpose that the committee was established by law, and considerations of this kind are not its domain.