There is correct internal logic in the conclusion of the Regional Court that the considerations of the Employment Committee can move in an area where there is some connection between the interest of the employee before it and reserve duty. This conclusion lies in the language and purpose of the law. The committee was authorized to examine the connection between the dismissal of an employee and reserve service, and therefore there is justification for linking the committee's considerations to this service."
Since the legislature authorized the committee to discuss directly the question of whether the dismissal of an employee is contrary to the provisions of the Discharged Soldiers Law, there is no need to examine whether the committee has the authority to discuss the matter in a manner. In this way, the case at hand also differs from the Yaakov case , which dealt with the authority of the civil court to decide the question of the matter listed in section 93A of the Guerra Police Ordinance and in the framework of indirect assault. In our case, as stated above, it is the committee's authority to decide the issue directly, and not indirectly, by virtue of the provisions of the Discharged Soldiers Law.
- Finally, the state seeks to base its arguments on the purpose of section 93A of the Police Ordinance and section 129 of the Prisons Ordinance in light of the unique structure of the police and the Prison Service. Indeed, in the Zelig case and in the Ben Sha'anan case, weight was given to this purpose after it was anchored in the language of section 129 of the Prisons Ordinance and section 93A of the Police Ordinance, and in this context a real interpretive dilemma arose in connection with the authority of the Labor Court, in view of the language of the aforementioned sections. Given a real interpretive dilemma, preference was given to the purpose of the sections in the spirit that arises from the Pozailov case and the Yakukov case. In this case, the state seeks to take another step. In fact, the state wishes to give validity to the purpose stated in the absence of a linguistic anchor in section 129 that allows this (since the section does not mention the Employment Committee) and despite the existence of interpretive anchors that lead to a different conclusion, namely section 30 of the Discharged Soldiers Law and the explanatory notes to amend section 129 of the Prisons Ordinance. In these circumstances, and taking into account the provisions of the Discharged Soldiers Law and the explanatory notes to amend section 129 of the Prisons Ordinance, we are of the opinion that there is no receptacle in the existing normative fabric that allows for the containment of the alleged purpose.
- Before closing, we should note that in the Zelig case and in the Ben Sha'anan case (and following the Yakubov case) we were aware that the practical result of the decision is not simple from the point of view of those who serve in the Prison Service and the police. This is because the Court for Administrative Affairs, when hearing an administrative petition – as opposed to an administrative action – is not authorized to grant monetary relief (see section 8 of the Administrative Courts Law). This restriction requires that duplication of proceedings be taken in two different systems on the way to receiving the relief, i.e., a claim for declaratory relief in the Court of Administrative Affairs regarding the legality of the dismissal, and if it is determined that there has been a defect in these cases, the filing of a claim for monetary relief in the Regional Labor Court. This result raises considerable difficulties in terms of the possibility of access to the judicial courts, and for this reason we noted in the conclusion of the judgment in the Zelig case as follows (section 42):
"We would like to note that we are aware that the result we have reached regarding a split between the Court for Administrative Affairs and the Labor Court in accordance with Section 93A of the Ordinance is a burden on the policeman who filed the lawsuit. To this, we will add that even with respect to a cause to be heard in the Administrative Affairs Court, the possibility that the need to translate it into financial relief in the Labor Court after the conclusion of the litigation in the Administrative Affairs Court and depending on its results should not be ruled out. This is an additional burden for the plaintiff policeman. The concern is that at the end of the day, the costs and burdens involved in splitting the litigation will constitute a negative incentive to exercise the right of access to the courts of the police officers as employees. Therefore, we deem it appropriate to order that our judgment be forwarded to the Attorney General for review in order for him to consider the consequences deriving from the said division of powers."